the guidance of the chain of natural causes； in accordance with the
general laws of nature； and ever follows the light of the idea of an
author of the universe… not for the purpose of deducing the
finality； which it constantly pursues； from this Supreme Being； but to
attain to the cognition of his existence from the finality which it
seeks in the existence of the phenomena of nature； and； if possible；
in that of all things to cognize this being； consequently； as
absolutely necessary。 Whether this latter purpose succeed or not；
the idea is and must always be a true one； and its employment； when
merely regulative； must always be acpanied by truthful and
beneficial results。
plete unity； in conformity with aims； constitutes absolute
perfection。 But if we do not find this unity in the nature of the
things which go to constitute the world of experience； that is； of
objective cognition； consequently in the universal and necessary
laws of nature； how can we infer from this unity the idea of the
supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of a primal being； which
is the origin of all causality？ The greatest systematic unity； and
consequently teleological unity； constitutes the very foundation of
the possibility of the most extended employment of human reason。 The
idea of unity is therefore essentially and indissolubly connected with
the nature of our reason。 This idea is a legislative one； and hence it
is very natural that we should assume the existence of a legislative
reason corresponding to it； from which the systematic unity of nature…
the object of the operations of reason… must be derived。
In the course of our discussion of the antinomies； we stated that it
is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may
raise； and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition； which
is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural
phenomena； cannot in this case be admitted； because the questions
raised do not relate to the nature of things； but are necessarily
originated by the nature of reason itself； and relate to its own
internal constitution。 We can now establish this assertion； which at
first sight appeared so rash； in relation to the two questions in
which reason takes the greatest interest； and thus plete our
discussion of the dialectic of pure reason。
If； then； the question is asked； in relation to transcendental
theology；* first； whether there is anything distinct from the world；
which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according
to general laws？ The answer is： Certainly。 For the world is a sum of
phenomena； there must； therefore； be some transcendental basis of
these phenomena； that is； a basis cogitable by the pure
understanding alone。 If； secondly； the question is asked whether
this being is substance； whether it is of the greatest reality；
whether it is necessary； and so forth？ I answer that this question
is utterly without meaning。 For all the categories which aid me in
forming a conception of an object cannot be employed except in the
world of sense； and are without meaning when not applied to objects of
actual or possible experience。 Out of this sphere； they are not
properly conceptions； but the mere marks or indices of conceptions；
which we may admit； although they cannot； without the help of
experience； help us to understand any subject or thing。 If； thirdly；
the question is whether we may not cogitate this being； which is
distinct from the world； in analogy with the objects of experience？
The answer is： Undoubtedly； but only as an ideal； and not as a real
object。 That is； we must cogitate it only as an unknown substratum
of the systematic unity； order； and finality of the world… a unity
which reason must employ as the regulative principle of its
investigation of nature。 Nay； more； we may admit into the idea certain
anthropomorphic elements； which are promotive of the interests of this
regulative principle。 For it is no more than an idea； which does not
relate directly to a being distinct from the world； but to the
regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world； by means；
however； of a schema of this unity… the schema of a Supreme
Intelligence； who is the wisely…designing author of the universe。 What
this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself； we know not… we
cannot discover from the idea； we merely know how we ought to employ
the idea of this unity； in relation to the systematic operation of
reason in the sphere of experience。
*After what has been said of the psychological idea of the ego and
its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations of
reason； I need not enter into details regarding the transcendental
illusion by which the systematic unity of all the various phenomena of
the internal sense is hypostatized。 The procedure is in this case very
similar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the
theological ideal。
But； it will be asked again； can we on these grounds； admit the
existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world？ Without doubt；
and not only so； but we must assume the existence of such a being。 But
do we thus extend the limits of our knowledge beyond the field of
possible experience？ By no means。 For we have merely presupposed a
something； of which we have no conception； which we do not know as
it is in itself； but； in relation to the systematic disposition of the
universe； which we must presuppose in all our observation of nature；
we have cogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent
existence （an empirical conception）； that is to say； we have endowed
it with those attributes； which； judging from the nature of our own
reason； may contain the ground of such a systematic unity。 This idea
is therefore valid only relatively to the employment in experience
of our reason。 But if we attribute to it absolute and objective
validity； we overlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that
we cogitate； and； by setting out from a basis which is not
determinable by considerations drawn from experience； we place
ourselves in a position which incapacitates us from applying this
principle to the empirical employment of reason。
But； it will be asked further； can I make any use of this conception
and hypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature？ Yes；
for this very purpose was the idea established by reason as a
fundamental basis。 But may I regard certain arrangements； which seemed
to have been made in conformity with some fixed aim； as the
arrangements of design； and look upon them as proceeding from the
divine will； with the intervention； however； of certain other
particular arrangements disposed to that end？ Yes； you may do so；
but at the same time you must regard it as indifferent； whether it
is asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in conformity
with his highest aims； or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a
regulative principle in the investigation of nature； and at the same
time a principle of the systematic unity of nature according to
general laws； even in those cases where we are unable to discover that
unity。 In other words； it must be perfectly indifferent to you whether
you say； when you have discovered this unity： God has wisely willed it
so； or： Nature has wisely arranged this。 For it was nothing but the
systematic unity； which reason requires as a basis for the
investigation of nature； that justified you in accepting the idea of a
supreme intelligence as a schema for a regulative principle； and；
the farther you advance in the discovery of design and finality； the
more certain the validity of your idea。 But； as the whole aim of
this regulative principle was the discovery of a necessary and
systematic unity in nature； we have； in so far as we attain this； to
attribute our success to the idea of a Supreme Being； while； at the
same time； we cannot； without involving ourselves in contradictions；
overlook the general laws of nature； as it was in reference to them
alone that this idea was employed。 We cannot； I say； overlook the
general laws of nature； and regard this conformity to aims
observable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in its origin；
inasmuch as there is no ground which can justify us in the admission
of a being with such properties distinct from and above nature。 All
that we are authorized to assert is that this idea may be employed
as a principle； and that the properties of the being which is
assumed to correspond to it may be regarded as systematically
connected in analogy with the causal determination of phenomena。
For the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea
of the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements （for without these
we could not predicate anything of it）； we may regard it as
allowable to cogitate this cause as a being with understanding； the
feelings of pleasure and displeasure； and faculties of desire and will
corresponding to these。 At the same time； we may attribute to this
being infinite perfection… a perfection which necessarily transcends
that which our knowledge of the order and design in the world
authorize us to predicate of it。 For the regulative law of
systemati