here possible； or； if so； in what cases； we can regard a science of
the mere criticism of pure reason； its sources and limits； as the
propaedeutic to a system of pure reason。 Such a science must not be
called a doctrine； but only a critique of pure reason； and its use； in
regard to speculation； would be only negative； not to enlarge the
bounds of； but to purify； our reason； and to shield it against
error… which alone is no little gain。 I apply the term
transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with
objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects； so far
as this mode of cognition is possible a priori。 A system of such
conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy。 But this；
again； is still beyond the bounds of our present essay。 For as such
a science must contain a plete exposition not only of our
synthetical a priori； but of our analytical a priori knowledge； it
is of too wide a range for our present purpose； because we do not
require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to
understand； in their full extent； the principles of synthesis a
priori； with which alone we have to do。 This investigation； which we
cannot properly call a doctrine； but only a transcendental critique；
because it aims not at the enlargement； but at the correction and
guidance； of our knowledge； and is to serve as a touchstone of the
worth or worthlessness of all knowledge a priori； is the sole object
of our present essay。 Such a critique is consequently； as far as
possible； a preparation for an organon； and if this new organon should
be found to fail； at least for a canon of pure reason； according to
which the plete system of the philosophy of pure reason； whether it
extend or limit the bounds of that reason； might one day be set
forth both analytically and synthetically。 For that this is
possible； nay； that such a system is not of so great extent as to
preclude the hope of its ever being pleted； is evident。 For we have
not here to do with the nature of outward objects； which is
infinite； but solely with the mind； which judges of the nature of
objects； and； again； with the mind only in respect of its cognition
a priori。 And the object of our investigations； as it is not to be
sought without； but； altogether within； ourselves； cannot remain
concealed； and in all probability is limited enough to be pletely
surveyed and fairly estimated； according to its worth or
worthlessness。 Still less let the reader here expect a critique of
books and systems of pure reason； our present object is exclusively
a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself。 Only when we make
this critique our foundation； do we possess a pure touchstone for
estimating the philosophical value of ancient and modern writings on
this subject； and without this criterion； the inpetent historian or
judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions of others
with his own； which have themselves just as little foundation。
Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science； for which the
Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan
architectonically； that is； from principles； with a full guarantee for
the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the
building。 It is the system of all the principles of pure reason。 If
this Critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental
philosophy； it is only because； to be a plete system； it ought to
contain a full analysis of all human knowledge a priori。 Our
critique must； indeed； lay before us a plete enumeration of all the
radical conceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge。 But from
the plete analysis of these conceptions themselves； as also from
a plete investigation of those derived from them； it abstains
with reason； partly because it would be deviating from the end in view
to occupy itself with this analysis； since this process is not
attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the
synthesis； to which our critique is entirely devoted； and partly
because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to
burden this essay with the vindication of the pleteness of such
an analysis and deduction； with which； after all； we have at present
nothing to do。 This pleteness of the analysis of these radical
conceptions； as well as of the deduction from the conceptions a priori
which may be given by the analysis； we can； however； easily attain；
provided only that we are in possession of all these radical
conceptions； which are to serve as principles of the synthesis； and
that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting。
To the Critique of Pure Reason； therefore； belongs all that
constitutes transcendental philosophy； and it is the plete idea
of transcendental philosophy； but still not the science itself；
because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to
the power of judging pletely of our synthetical knowledge a priori。
The principal thing we must attend to； in the division of the
parts of a science like this； is that no conceptions must enter it
which contain aught empirical； in other words； that the knowledge a
priori must be pletely pure。 Hence； although the highest principles
and fundamental conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions a
priori； yet they do not belong to transcendental philosophy；
because； though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain；
pleasure； desires； inclinations； etc。 （which are all of empirical
origin）； at the foundation of its precepts； yet still into the
conception of duty… as an obstacle to be overe； or as an incitement
which should not be made into a motive… these empirical conceptions
must necessarily enter； in the construction of a system of pure
morality。 Transcendental philosophy is consequently a philosophy of
the pure and merely speculative reason。 For all that is practical；
so far as it contains motives； relates to feelings； and these belong
to empirical sources of cognition。
If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view
of a science in general； it ought to prehend； first； a Doctrine
of the Elements； and； secondly； a Doctrine of the Method of pure
reason。 Each of these main divisions will have its subdivisions； the
separate reasons for which we cannot here particularize。 Only so
much seems necessary； by way of introduction of premonition； that
there are two sources of human knowledge （which probably spring from a
mon； but to us unknown root）； namely； sense and understanding。 By
the former； objects are given to us； by the latter； thought。 So far as
the faculty of sense may contain representations a priori； which
form the conditions under which objects are given； in so far it
belongs to transcendental philosophy。 The transcendental doctrine of
sense must form the first part of our science of elements； because the
conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are
given must precede those under which they are thought。
I。
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS。
FIRST PART。 TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC。
SS I。 Introductory。
In whatsoever mode； or by whatsoever means； our knowledge may relate
to objects； it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which
it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition。 To this as
the indispensable groundwork； all thought points。 But an intuition can
take place only in so far as the object is given to us。 This； again；
is only possible； to man at least； on condition that the object affect
the mind in a certain manner。 The capacity for receiving
representations （receptivity） through the mode in which we are
affected by objects； objects； is called sensibility。 By means of
sensibility； therefore； objects are given to us； and it alone
furnishes us with intuitions； by the understanding they are thought；
and from it arise conceptions。 But an thought must directly； or
indirectly； by means of certain signs； relate ultimately to
intuitions； consequently； with us； to sensibility； because in no other
way can an object be given to us。
The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation； so far
as we are affected by the said object； is sensation。 That sort of
intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called
an empirical intuition。 The undetermined object of an empirical
intuition is called phenomenon。 That which in the phenomenon
corresponds to the sensation； I term its matter； but that which
effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under
certain relations； I call its form。 But that in which our sensations
are merely arranged； and by which they are susceptible of assuming a
certain form； cannot be itself sensation。 It is； then； the matter of
all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori； the form must lie
ready a priori for them in the mind； and consequently can be
regarded separately from all sensation。
I call all representations pure； in the transcendental meaning of
the word； wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation。 And
accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori； the pure form of
sensuous intuitions in general； in which all t