existence of a Supreme Being； and the immortality of the soul。 I am
certain； on the contrary； that this will never be the case。 For on
what ground can reason base such synthetical propositions； which do
not relate to the objects of experience and their internal
possibility？ But it is also demonstratively certain that no one will
ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of
probability。 For； as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis
of pure reason； he is bound to prove that a Supreme Being； and a
thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence； are
impossible。 But where will he find the knowledge which can enable
him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to things which
transcend the region of experience？ We may； therefore； rest assured
that the opposite never will be demonstrated。 We need not； then；
have recourse to scholastic arguments； we may always admit the truth
of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative
interests of reason in the sphere of experience； and form； moreover；
the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest。
Our opponent； who must not be considered here as a critic solely； we
can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert
him； while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort； as we have on
our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of
reason； and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with
calm indifference。
From this point of view； there is properly no antithetic of pure
reason。 For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field
of pure theology and psychology； but on this ground there can appear
no batant whom we need to fear。 Ridicule and boasting can be his
only weapons； and these may be laughed at； as mere child's play。
This consideration restores to Reason her courage； for what source
of confidence could be found； if she； whose vocation it is to
destroy error； were at variance with herself and without any
reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose？
Everything in nature is good for some purpose。 Even poisons are
serviceable； they destroy the evil effects of other poisons
generated in our system； and must always find a place in every
plete pharmacopoeia。 The objections raised against the fallacies
and sophistries of speculative reason； are objections given by the
nature of this reason itself； and must therefore have a destination
and purpose which can only be for the good of humanity。 For what
purpose has Providence raised many objects； in which we have the
deepest interest； so far above us； that we vainly try to cognize
them with certainty； and our powers of mental vision are rather
excited than satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize？ It is
very doubtful whether it is for our benefit to advance bold
affirmations regarding subjects involved in such obscurity； perhaps it
would even be detrimental to our best interests。 But it is undoubtedly
always beneficial to leave the investigating； as well as the
critical reason； in perfect freedom； and permit it to take charge of
its own interests； which are advanced as much by its limitation； as by
its extension of its views； and which always suffer by the
interference of foreign powers forcing it； against its natural
tendencies； to bend to certain preconceived designs。
Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable； and bat him
only with the weapons of reason。 Have no anxiety for the practical
interests of humanity… these are never imperilled in a purely
speculative dispute。 Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the
antinomy of reason； which； as it has its source in the nature of
reason； ought to be thoroughly investigated。 Reason is benefited by
the examination of a subject on both sides； and its judgements are
corrected by being limited。 It is not the matter that may give
occasion to dispute； but the manner。 For it is perfectly permissible
to employ； in the presence of reason； the language of a firmly
rooted faith； even after we have been obliged to renounce all
pretensions to knowledge。
If we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume… a philosopher
endowed； in a degree that few are； with a well…balanced judgement：
What motive induced you to spend so much labour and thought in
undermining the consoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is
capable of assuring us of the existence； and presenting us with a
determinate conception of a Supreme Being？… his answer would be：
Nothing but the desire of teaching reason to know its own powers
better； and； at the same time； a dislike of the procedure by which
that faculty was pelled to support foregone conclusions； and
prevented from confessing the internal weaknesses which it cannot
but feel when it enters upon a rigid self…examination。 If； on the
other hand； we were to ask Priestley… a philosopher who had no taste
for transcendental speculation； but was entirely devoted to the
principles of empiricism… what his motives were for overturning
those two main pillars of religion… the doctrines of the freedom of
the will and the immortality of the soul （in his view the hope of a
future life is but the expectation of the miracle of resurrection）…
this philosopher； himself a zealous and pious teacher of religion；
could give no other answer than this： I acted in the interest of
reason； which always suffers； when certain objects are explained and
judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material
nature… the only laws which we know in a determinate manner。 It
would be unfair to decry the latter philosopher； who endeavoured to
harmonize his paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion； and
to undervalue an honest and reflecting man； because he finds himself
at a loss the moment he has left the field of natural science。 The
same grace must be accorded to Hume； a man not less well…disposed； and
quite as blameless in his moral character； and who pushed his abstract
speculations to an extreme length； because； as he rightly believed；
the object of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science；
and within the sphere of pure ideas。
What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in
the present case to menace the best interests of humanity？ The
course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain
and natural one。 Let each thinker pursue his own path； if he shows
talent； if be gives evidence of profound thought； in one word； if he
shows that he possesses the power of reasoning… reason is always the
gainer。 If you have recourse to other means； if you attempt to
coerce reason； if you raise the cry of treason to humanity； if you
excite the feelings of the crowd； which can neither understand nor
sympathize with such subtle speculations… you will only make
yourselves ridiculous。 For the question does not concern the advantage
or disadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries； the
question is merely how far reason can advance in the field of
speculation； apart from all kinds of interest； and whether we may
depend upon the exertions of speculative reason； or must renounce
all reliance on it。 Instead of joining the batants； it is your part
to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle… a laborious struggle for
the parties engaged； but attended； in its progress as well as in its
result； with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of
thought and knowledge。 It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by
Reason； and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the
question she must adopt。 Moreover； reason is sufficiently held in
check by its own power； the limits imposed on it by its own nature are
sufficient； it is unnecessary for you to place over it additional
guards； as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the
intellectual state。 In the dialectic of reason there is no victory
gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility。
The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason； and we cannot
but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect
freedom which ought to be its essential condition。 In this case； we
should have had at an earlier period a matured and profound criticism；
which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes； by exposing
the illusions and prejudices in which they originated。
There is in human nature an unworthy propensity… a propensity which；
like everything that springs from nature； must in its final purpose be
conducive to the good of humanity… to conceal our real sentiments； and
to give expression only to certain received opinions； which are
regarded as at once safe and promotive of the mon good。 It is true；
this tendency； not only to conceal our real sentiments； but to profess
those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society； has not only
civilized； but； in a certain measure； moralized us； as no one can
break through the outward covering of respectability； honour； and
morality； and thus the seemingly…good examples which we which we see
around us form an excellent school for moral improvement； so long as
our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken。 But this di