fashion of thought places such writings in their hands； will the
so…called convictions of their youth stand firm？ The young thinker；
who has in his armoury none but dogmatical weapons with which to
resist the attacks of his opponent； and who cannot detect the latent
dialectic which lies in his own opinions as well as in those of the
opposite party； sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds
of proof which have the advantage of novelty； against as illusory
grounds of proof destitute of this advantage； and which； perhaps；
excite the suspicion that the natural credulity of his youth has
been abused by his instructors。 He thinks he can find no better
means of showing that he has out grown the discipline of his
minority than by despising those well…meant warnings； and； knowing
no system of thought but that of dogmatism； he drinks deep draughts of
the poison that is to sap the principles in which his early years were
trained。
Exactly the opposite of the system here remended ought to be
pursued in academical instruction。 This can only be effected； however；
by a thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason。
For； in order to bring the principles of this critique into exercise
as soon as possible； and to demonstrate their perfect even in the
presence of the highest degree of dialectical illusion； the student
ought to examine the assertions made on both sides of speculative
questions step by step； and to test them by these principles。 It
cannot be a difficult task for him to show the fallacies inherent in
these propositions； and thus he begins early to feel his own power
of securing himself against the influence of such sophistical
arguments； which must finally lose； for him； all their illusory power。
And； although the same blows which overturn the edifice of his
opponent are as fatal to his own speculative structures； if such he
has wished to rear； he need not feel any sorrow in regard to this
seeming misfortune； as he has now before him a fair prospect into
the practical region in which he may reasonably hope to find a more
secure foundation for a rational system。
There is； accordingly； no proper polemic in the sphere of pure
reason。 Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows； as
they pass beyond the limits of nature； and can find no tangible
point of attack… no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict。
Fight as vigorously as they may； the shadows which they hew down；
immediately start up again； like the heroes in Walhalla； and renew the
bloodless and unceasing contest。
But neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical
employment of pure reason； such as might be based upon the principle
of neutrality in all speculative disputes。 To excite reason against
itself； to place weapons in the hands of the party on the one side
as well as in those of the other； and to remain an undisturbed and
sarcastic spectator of the fierce struggle that ensues； seems； from
the dogmatical point of view； to be a part fitting only a malevolent
disposition。 But； when the sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy
and blindness； and a pride which no criticism can moderate； there is
no other practicable course than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy
similar feelings and pretensions on the other side； equally well or
ill founded； so that reason； staggered by the reflections thus
forced upon it； finds it necessary to moderate its confidence in
such pretensions and to listen to the advice of criticism。 But we
cannot stop at these doubts； much less regard the conviction of our
ignorance； not only as a cure for the conceit natural to dogmatism；
but as the settlement of the disputes in which reason is involved with
itself。 On the contrary； scepticism is merely a means of awakening
reason from its dogmatic dreams and exciting it to a more careful
investigation into its own powers and pretensions。 But； as
scepticism appears to be the shortest road to a permanent peace in the
domain of philosophy； and as it is the track pursued by the many who
aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their contemptuous
dislike of all inquiries of this kind； I think it necessary to present
to my readers this mode of thought in its true light。
Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason。
The consciousness of ignorance… unless this ignorance is
recognized to be absolutely necessary ought； instead of forming the
conclusion of my inquiries； to be the strongest motive to the
pursuit of them。 All ignorance is either ignorance of things or of the
limits of knowledge。 If my ignorance is accidental and not
necessary； it must incite me； in the first case； to a dogmatical
inquiry regarding the objects of which I am ignorant； in the second；
to a critical investigation into the bounds of all possible knowledge。
But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and unavoidable； and
that it consequently absolves from the duty of all further
investigation； is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical
grounds… from observation… but upon critical grounds alone； that is；
by a thoroughgoing investigation into the primary sources of
cognition。 It follows that the determination of the bounds of reason
can be made only on a priori grounds； while the empirical limitation
of reason； which is merely an indeterminate cognition of an
ignorance that can never be pletely removed； can take place only
a posteriori。 In other words； our empirical knowledge is limited by
that which yet remains for us to know。 The former cognition of our
ignorance； which is possible only on a rational basis； is a science；
the latter is merely a perception； and we cannot say how far the
inferences drawn from it may extend。 If I regard the earth； as it
really appears to my senses； as a flat surface； I am ignorant how
far this surface extends。 But experience teaches me that； how far
soever I go； I always see before me a space in which I can proceed
farther； and thus I know the limits… merely visual… of my actual
knowledge of the earth； although I am ignorant of the limits of the
earth itself。 But if I have got so far as to know that the earth is
a sphere； and that its surface is spherical； I can cognize a priori
and determine upon principles； from my knowledge of a small part of
this surface… say to the extent of a degree… the diameter and
circumference of the earth； and although I am ignorant of the
objects which this surface contains； I have a perfect knowledge of its
limits and extent。
The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us
to be a level surface； with an apparent horizon… that which forms
the limit of its extent； and which has been termed by us the idea of
unconditioned totality。 To reach this limit by empirical means is
impossible； and all attempts to determine it a priori according to a
principle； are alike in vain。 But all the questions raised by pure
reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon； or； at least； in
its boundary line。
The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human
reason who believe that they have given a sufficient answer to all
such questions by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our
knowledge… a horizon which； however； Hume was unable to determine。 His
attention especially was directed to the principle of causality； and
he remarked with perfect justice that the truth of this principle； and
even the objective validity of the conception of a cause； was not
monly based upon clear insight； that is； upon a priori cognition。
Hence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from
its universality and necessity； but merely from its general
applicability in the course of experience； and a kind of subjective
necessity thence arising； which he termed habit。 From the inability of
reason to establish this principle as a necessary law for the
acquisition of all experience； he inferred the nullity of all the
attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical。
This procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination；
and； if necessary； to disapproval； may be termed the censura of
reason。 This censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all
transcendent employment of principles。 But this is only the second
step in our inquiry。 The first step in regard to the subjects of
pure reason； and which marks the infancy of that faculty； is that of
dogmatism。 The second； which we have just mentioned； is that of
scepticism； and it gives evidence that our judgement has been improved
by experience。 But a third step is necessary… indicative of the
maturity and manhood of the judgement； which now lays a firm
foundation upon universal and necessary principles。 This is the period
of criticism； in which we do not examine the facta of reason； but
reason itself； in the whole extent of its powers； and in regard to its
capability of a priori cognition； and thus we determine not merely the
empirical and ever…shifting bounds of our knowledge； but its necessary
and eternal limits。 We demonstrate from indubitable principles； not
merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject； but in regard
to all possible questions of a certain class。 Thus scepticism is