successors remain attached to an erroneous idea； which they cannot
render clear to themselves； and that they thus fail in determining the
true content； the articulation or systematic unity； and the limits
of their science。
It is unfortunate that； only after having occupied ourselves for a
long time in the collection of materials； under the guidance of an
idea which lies undeveloped in the mind； but not according to any
definite plan of arrangement… nay； only after we have spent much
time and labour in the technical disposition of our materials； does it
bee possible to view the idea of a science in a clear light； and to
project； according to architectonical principles； a plan of the whole；
in accordance with the aims of reason。 Systems seem； like certain
worms； to be formed by a kind of generatio aequivoca… by the mere
confluence of conceptions； and to gain pleteness only with the
progress of time。 But the schema or germ of all lies in reason； and
thus is not only every system organized according to its own idea； but
all are united into one grand system of human knowledge； of which they
form members。 For this reason； it is possible to frame an
architectonic of all human cognition； the formation of which； at the
present time； considering the immense materials collected or to be
found in the ruins of old systems； would not indeed be very difficult。
Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the
architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason； and we begin from
the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two； one
of which is reason。 By reason I understand here the whole higher
faculty of cognition； the rational being placed in contradistinction
to the empirical。
If I make plete abstraction of the content of cognition；
objectively considered； all cognition is； from a subjective point of
view； either historical or rational。 Historical cognition is
cognitio ex datis； rational； cognitio ex principiis。 Whatever may be
the original source of a cognition； it is； in relation to the person
who possesses it； merely historical； if he knows only what has been
given him from another quarter； whether that knowledge was
municated by direct experience or by instruction。 Thus the Person
who has learned a system of philosophy… say the Wolfian… although he
has a perfect knowledge of all the principles； definitions； and
arguments in that philosophy； as well as of the divisions that have
been made of the system； possesses really no more than an historical
knowledge of the Wolfian system； he knows only what has been told him；
his judgements are only those which he has received from his teachers。
Dispute the validity of a definition； and he is pletely at a loss
to find another。 He has formed his mind on another's； but the
imitative faculty is not the productive。 His knowledge has not been
drawn from reason； and although； objectively considered； it is
rational knowledge； subjectively； it is merely historical。 He has
learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a
living man。 Rational cognitions which are objective； that is； which
have their source in reason； can be so termed from a subjective
point of view； only when they have been drawn by the individual
himself from the sources of reason； that is； from principles； and it
is in this way alone that criticism； or even the rejection of what has
been already learned； can spring up in the mind。
All rational cognition is； again； based either on conceptions； or on
the construction of conceptions。 The former is termed philosophical；
the latter mathematical。 I have already shown the essential difference
of these two methods of cognition in the first chapter。 A cognition
may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical… as is
the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look
beyond the limits of their system； and who remain in a state of
pupilage all their lives。 But it is remarkable that mathematical
knowledge； when mitted to memory； is valid； from the subjective
point of view； as rational knowledge also； and that the same
distinction cannot be drawn here as in the case of philosophical
cognition。 The reason is that the only way of arriving at this
knowledge is through the essential principles of reason； and thus it
is always certain and indisputable； because reason is employed in
concreto… but at the same time a priori… that is； in pure and；
therefore； infallible intuition； and thus all causes of illusion and
error are excluded。 Of all the a priori sciences of reason； therefore；
mathematics alone can be learned。 Philosophy… unless it be in an
historical manner… cannot be learned； we can at most learn to
philosophize。
Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition。 We must use
this term in an objective sense； if we understand by it the
archetype of all attempts at philosophizing； and the standard by which
all subjective philosophies are to be judged。 In this sense；
philosophy is merely the idea of a possible science； which does not
exist in concreto； but to which we endeavour in various ways to
approximate； until we have discovered the right path to pursue… a path
overgrown by the errors and illusions of sense… and the image we
have hitherto tried in vain to shape has bee a perfect copy of
the great prototype。 Until that time； we cannot learn philosophy… it
does not exist； if it does； where is it； who possesses it； and how
shall we know it？ We can only learn to philosophize； in other words；
we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in accordance with
general principles； retaining at the same time； the right of
investigating the sources of these principles； of testing； and even of
rejecting them。
Until then； our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic
conception… a conception； that is； of a system of cognition which we
are trying to elaborate into a science； all that we at present know
being the systematic unity of this cognition； and consequently the
logical pleteness of the cognition for the desired end。 But there
is also a cosmical conception （conceptus cosmicus） of philosophy；
which has always formed the true basis of this term； especially when
philosophy was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a
philosopher。 In this view philosophy is the science of the relation of
all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason
（teleologia rationis humanae）； and the philosopher is not merely an
artist… who occupies himself with conceptions… but a lawgiver；
legislating for human reason。 In this sense of the word； it would be
in the highest degree arrogant to assume the title of philosopher； and
to pretend that we had reached the perfection of the prototype which
lies in the idea alone。
The mathematician； the natural philosopher； and the logician… how
far soever the first may have advanced in rational； and the two latter
in philosophical knowledge… are merely artists； engaged in the
arrangement and formation of conceptions； they cannot be termed
philosophers。 Above them all； there is the ideal teacher； who
employs them as instruments for the advancement of the essential
aims of human reason。 Him alone can we call philosopher； but he
nowhere exists。 But the idea of his legislative power resides in the
mind of every man； and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic
unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of reason。
This idea is； therefore； a cosmical conception。*
*By a cosmical conception； I mean one in which all men necessarily
take an interest； the aim of a science must accordingly be
determined according to scholastic conceptions； if it is regarded
merely as a means to certain arbitrarily proposed ends。
In view of the plete systematic unity of reason； there can only
be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind。 To this all
other aims are subordinate； and nothing more than means for its
attainment。 This ultimate end is the destination of man； and the
philosophy which relates to it is termed moral philosophy。 The
superior position occupied by moral philosophy； above all other
spheres for the operations of reason； sufficiently indicates the
reason why the ancients always included the idea… and in an especial
manner… of moralist in that of philosopher。 Even at the present day；
we call a man who appears to have the power of self…government； even
although his knowledge may be very limited； by the name of
philosopher。
The legislation of human reason； or philosophy； has two objects…
nature and freedom… and thus contains not only the laws of nature； but
also those of ethics； at first in two separate systems； which；
finally； merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition。 The
philosophy of nature relates to that which is； that of ethics to
that which ought to be。
But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure
reason； or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical
principles。 The former is termed pure； the latter empirical
philosophy。
The philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic； that is； an
inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure a priori
cognition； and is termed critical philosophy；