without detriment； however； to the employment of mathematics in this
sphere of cognition。
The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity
dictates this division； it is； therefore； architectonical… in
accordance with the highest aims of reason； and not merely
technical； or according to certain accidentally…observed
similarities existing between the different parts of the whole
science。 For this reason； also； is the division immutable and of
legislative authority。 But the reader may observe in it a few points
to which he ought to demur； and which may weaken his conviction of its
truth and legitimacy。
In the first place； how can I desire an a priori cognition or
metaphysic of objects； in so far as they are given a posteriori？ and
how is it possible to cognize the nature of things according to a
priori principles； and to attain to a rational physiology？ The
answer is this。 We take from experience nothing more than is requisite
to present us with an object （in general） of the external or of the
internal sense； in the former case； by the mere conception of matter
（impenetrable and inanimate extension）； in the latter； by the
conception of a thinking being… given in the internal empirical
representation； I think。 As to the rest； we must not employ in our
metaphysic of these objects any empirical principles （which add to the
content of our conceptions by means of experience）； for the purpose of
forming by their help any judgements respecting these objects。
Secondly； what place shall we assign to empirical psychology；
which has always been considered a part of metaphysics； and from which
in our time such important philosophical results have been expected；
after the hope of constructing an a priori system of knowledge had
been abandoned？ I answer： It must be placed by the side of empirical
physics or physics proper； that is； must be regarded as forming a part
of applied philosophy； the a priori principles of which are
contained in pure philosophy； which is therefore connected； although
it must not be confounded； with psychology。 Empirical psychology
must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics； and is
indeed excluded by the very idea of that science。 In conformity；
however； with scholastic usage； we must permit it to occupy a place in
metaphysics… but only as an appendix to it。 We adopt this course
from motives of economy； as psychology is not as yet full enough to
occupy our attention as an independent study； while it is； at the same
time； of too great importance to be entirely excluded or placed
where it has still less affinity than it has with the subject of
metaphysics。 It is a stranger who has been long a guest； and we make
it wele to stay； until it can take up a more suitable abode in a
plete system of anthropology… the pendant to empirical physics。
The above is the general idea of metaphysics； which； as more was
expected from it than could be looked for with justice； and as these
pleasant expectations were unfortunately never realized； fell into
general disrepute。 Our Critique must have fully convinced the reader
that； although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion；
it must always be one of its most important bulwarks； and that human
reason； which naturally pursues a dialectical course； cannot do
without this science； which checks its tendencies towards dialectic
and； by elevating reason to a scientific and clear self…knowledge；
prevents the ravages which a lawless speculative reason would
infallibly mit in the sphere of morals as well as in that of
religion。 We may be sure； therefore； whatever contempt may be thrown
upon metaphysics by those who judge a science not by its own nature；
but according to the accidental effects it may have produced； that
it can never be pletely abandoned； that we must always return to it
as to a beloved one who has been for a time estranged； because the
questions with which it is engaged relate to the highest aims of
humanity； and reason must always labour either to attain to settled
views in regard to these； or to destroy those which others have
already established。
Metaphysic； therefore… that of nature； as well as that of ethics；
but in an especial manner the criticism which forms the propaedeutic
to all the operations of reason… forms properly that department of
knowledge which may be termed； in the truest sense of the word；
philosophy。 The path which it pursues is that of science； which；
when it has once been discovered； is never lost； and never misleads。
Mathematics； natural science； the mon experience of men； have a
high value as means； for the most part； to accidental ends… but at
last also； to those which are necessary and essential to the existence
of humanity。 But to guide them to this high goal； they require the aid
of rational cognition on the basis of pure conceptions； which； be it
termed as it may； is properly nothing but metaphysics。
For the same reason； metaphysics forms likewise the pletion of
the culture of human reason。 In this respect； it is indispensable；
setting aside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science。
For its subject…matter is the elements and highest maxims of reason；
which form the basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the
use of all。 That； as a purely speculative science； it is more useful
in preventing error than in the extension of knowledge； does not
detract from its value； on the contrary； the supreme office of
censor which it occupies assures to it the highest authority and
importance。 This office it administers for the purpose of securing
order； harmony； and well…being to science； and of directing its
noble and fruitful labours to the highest possible aim… the
happiness of all mankind。
CHAPTER IV。 The History of Pure Reason。
This title is placed here merely for the purpose of designating a
division of the system of pure reason of which I do not intend to
treat at present。 I shall content myself with casting a cursory
glance； from a purely transcendental point of view… that of the nature
of pure reason… on the labours of philosophers up to the present time。
They have aimed at erecting an edifice of philosophy； but to my eye
this edifice appears to be in a very ruinous condition。
It is very remarkable； although naturally it could not have been
otherwise； that； in the infancy of philosophy； the study of the nature
of God and the constitution of a future world formed the mencement；
rather than the conclusion； as we should have it； of the speculative
efforts of the human mind。 However rude the religious conceptions
generated by the remains of the old manners and customs of a less
cultivated time； the intelligent classes were not thereby prevented
from devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence and nature
of God； and they easily saw that there could be no surer way of
pleasing the invisible ruler of the world； and of attaining to
happiness in another world at least； than a good and honest course
of life in this。 Thus theology and morals formed the two chief
motives； or rather the points of attraction in all abstract inquiries。
But it was the former that especially occupied the attention of
speculative reason； and which afterwards became so celebrated under
the name of metaphysics。
I shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the
greatest changes in metaphysics took place； but shall merely give a
hasty sketch of the different ideas which occasioned the most
important revolutions in this sphere of thought。 There are three
different ends in relation to which these revolutions have taken
place。
1。 In relation to the object of the cognition of reason；
philosophers may be divided into sensualists and intellectualists。
Epicurus may be regarded as the head of the former； Plato of the
latter。 The distinction here signalized； subtle as it is； dates from
the earliest times； and was long maintained。 The former asserted
that reality resides in sensuous objects alone； and that everything
else is merely imaginary； the latter； that the senses are the
parents of illusion and that truth is to be found in the understanding
alone。 The former did not deny to the conceptions of the understanding
a certain kind of reality； but with them it was merely logical； with
the others it was mystical。 The former admitted intellectual
conceptions； but declared that sensuous objects alone possessed real
existence。 The latter maintained that all real objects were
intelligible； and believed that the pure understanding possessed a
faculty of intuition apart from sense； which； in their opinion； served
only to confuse the ideas of the understanding。
2。 In relation to the origin of the pure cognitions of reason； we
find one school maintaining that they are derived entirely from
experience； and another that they have their origin in reason alone。
Aristotle may be regarded as the bead of the empiricists； and Plato of
the noologists。 Locke； the follower of Aristotle in modern times；
and Leibnitz of Plato （although he cannot be said to have imitated him
in his mysticism）； have not been able to bring this question to a
settled conclusion。 The procedure of