intuition。 Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative
extension。 That is to say； it is not limited by； but rather limits；
sensibility； by giving the name of noumena to things； not considered
as phenomena； but as things in themselves。 But it at the same time
prescribes limits to itself； for it confesses itself unable to cognize
these by means of the categories； and hence is pelled to cogitate
them merely as an unknown something。
I find； however； in the writings of modern authors； an entirely
different use of the expressions； mundus sensibilis and
intelligibilis； which quite departs from the meaning of the
ancients… an acceptation in which； indeed； there is to be found no
difficulty； but which at the same time depends on mere verbal
quibbling。 According to this meaning； some have chosen to call the
plex of phenomena； in so far as it is intuited； mundus
sensibilis； but in so far as the connection thereof is cogitated
according to general laws of thought； mundus intelligibilis。
Astronomy； in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of
the starry heaven； may represent the former； a system of astronomy；
such as the Copernican or Newtonian； the latter。 But such twisting
of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge； to avoid a difficult
question； by modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience。 To
be sure； understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of
phenomena； but the question is； whether these can be applied when
the object is not a phenomenon and in this sense we regard it if it is
cogitated as given to the understanding alone； and not to the
senses。 The question therefore is whether； over and above the
empirical use of the understanding； a transcendental use is
possible； which applies to the noumenon as an object。 This question we
have answered in the negative。
When therefore we say； the senses represent objects as they
appear； the understanding as they are； the latter statement must not
be understood in a transcendental； but only in an empirical
signification； that is； as they must be represented in the plete
connection of phenomena； and not according to what they may be；
apart from their relation to possible experience； consequently not
as objects of the pure understanding。 For this must ever remain
unknown to us。 Nay； it is also quite unknown to us whether any such
transcendental or extraordinary cognition is possible under any
circumstances； at least； whether it is possible by means of our
categories。 Understanding and sensibility； with us； can determine
objects only in conjunction。 If we separate them； we have intuitions
without conceptions； or conceptions without intuitions； in both cases；
representations； which we cannot apply to any determinate object。
If； after all our inquiries and explanations； any one still
hesitates to abandon the mere transcendental use of the categories；
let him attempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition。 It
would； of course； be unnecessary for this purpose to construct an
analytical proposition； for that does not extend the sphere of the
understanding； but； being concerned only about what is cogitated in
the conception itself； it leaves it quite undecided whether the
conception has any relation to objects； or merely indicates the
unity of thought… plete abstraction being made of the modi in which
an object may be given： in such a proposition； it is sufficient for
the understanding to know what lies in the conception… to what it
applies is to it indifferent。 The attempt must therefore be made
with a synthetical and so…called transcendental principle； for
example： 〃Everything that exists； exists as substance；〃 or；
〃Everything that is contingent exists as an effect of some other
thing； viz。； of its cause。〃 Now I ask； whence can the understanding
draw these synthetical propositions； when the conceptions contained
therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in
themselves （noumena）？ Where is to be found the third term； which is
always requisite PURE site in a synthetical proposition； which may
connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical
（analytical） connection with each other？ The proposition never will be
demonstrated； nay； more； the possibility of any such pure assertion
never can be shown； without making reference to the empirical use of
the understanding； and thus； ipso facto； pletely renouncing pure
and non…sensuous judgement。 Thus the conception of pure and merely
intelligible objects is pletely void of all principles of its
application； because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be
given； and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for
them serves only； like a void space； to limit the use of empirical
principles； without containing at the same time any other object of
cognition beyond their sphere。
APPENDIX
APPENDIX。
Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of
Reflection from the Confusion of the Transcendental with
the Empirical use of the Understanding。
Reflection （reflexio） is not occupied about objects themselves；
for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them； but is that
state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective
conditions under which we obtain conceptions。 It is the
consciousness of the relation of given representations to the
different sources or faculties of cognition； by which alone their
relation to each other can be rightly determined。 The first question
which occurs in considering our representations is to what faculty
of cognition do they belong？ To the understanding or to the senses？
Many judgements are admitted to be true from mere habit or
inclination； but； because reflection neither precedes nor follows；
it is held to be a judgement that has its origin in the understanding。
All judgements do not require examination； that is； investigation into
the grounds of their truth。 For； when they are immediately certain
（for example： 〃Between two points there can be only one straight
line〃）； no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found
than that which they themselves contain and express。 But all
judgement； nay； all parisons require reflection； that is； a
distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions
belong。 The act whereby I pare my representations with the
faculty of cognition which originates them； and whereby I
distinguish whether they are pared with each other as belonging
to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition； I term
transcendental reflection。 Now； the relations in which conceptions can
stand to each other are those of identity and difference； agreement
and opposition； of the internal and external； finally； of the
determinable and the determining （matter and form）。 The proper
determination of these relations rests on the question； to what
faculty of cognition they subjectively belong； whether to
sensibility or understanding？ For； on the manner in which we solve
this question depends the manner in which we must cogitate these
relations。
Before constructing any objective judgement； we pare the
conceptions that are to be placed in the judgement； and observe
whether there exists identity （of many representations in one
conception）； if a general judgement is to be constructed； or
difference； if a particular； whether there is agreement when
affirmative； and opposition when negative judgements are to be
constructed； and so on。 For this reason we ought to call these
conceptions； conceptions of parison （conceptus parationis）。
But as； when the question is not as to the logical form； but as to the
content of conceptions； that is to say； whether the things
themselves are identical or different； in agreement or opposition； and
so on； the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of
cognition； to wit； a relation either to sensibility or to the
understanding； and as on this relation depends their relation to
each other； transcendental reflection； that is； the relation of
given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition； can
alone determine this latter relation。 Thus we shall not be able to
discover whether the things are identical or different； in agreement
or opposition； etc。； from the mere conception of the things by means
of parison （paratio）； but only by distinguishing the mode of
cognition to which they belong； in other words； by means of
transcendental reflection。 We may； therefore； with justice say； that
logical reflection is mere parison； for in it no account is taken
of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong； and
they are consequently； as far as regards their origin； to be treated
as homogeneous； while transcendental reflection （which applies to
the objects themselves） contains the ground of the possibility of
objective parison of representations with each other； and is
therefore very different from the former； because the faculties of
cognition to which they belong are not even the same。 Transcendental
reflection is a duty which no one can neglect who wishes to
establish an a priori judgement upon things。 We shall now proceed to
fulfil this duty； a