pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot
acknowledge and which are based solely upon a transcendental
amphiboly； that is； upon a substitution of an object of pure
understanding for a phenomenon。
For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic； and
consequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of
reflection； the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system
of the world； or rather； believed himself petent to cognize the
internal nature of things； by paring all objects merely with the
understanding and the abstract formal conceptions of thought。 Our
table of the conceptions of reflection gives us the unexpected
advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of
his system in all its parts； and at the same time of exposing the
fundamental principle of this peculiar mode of thought； which rested
upon naught but a misconception。 He pared all things with each
other merely by means of conceptions； and naturally found no other
differences than those by which the understanding distinguishes its
pure conceptions one from another。 The conditions of sensuous
intuition； which contain in themselves their own means of distinction；
he did not look upon as primitive； because sensibility was to him
but a confused mode of representation and not any particular source of
representations。 A phenomenon was for him the representation of the
thing in itself； although distinguished from cognition by the
understanding only in respect of the logical form… the former with its
usual want of analysis containing； according to him； a certain mixture
of collateral representations in its conception of a thing； which it
is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish。 In one
word； Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena； just as Locke； in his
system of noogony （if I may be allowed to make use of such
expressions）； sensualized the conceptions of the understanding； that
is to say； declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract
conceptions of reflection。 Instead of seeking in the understanding and
sensibility two different sources of representations； which；
however； can present us with objective judgements of things only in
conjunction； each of these great men recognized but one of these
faculties； which； in their opinion； applied immediately to things in
themselves； the other having no duty but that of confusing or
arranging the representations of the former。
Accordingly； the objects of sense were pared by Leibnitz as
things in general merely in the understanding。
1st。 He pares them in regard to their identity or difference…
as judged by the understanding。 As； therefore； he considered merely
the conceptions of objects； and not their position in intuition； in
which alone objects can be given； and left quite out of sight the
transcendental locale of these conceptions… whether； that is； their
object ought to be classed among phenomena； or among things in
themselves； it was to be expected that he should extend the
application of the principle of indiscernibles； which is valid
solely of conceptions of things in general； to objects of sense
（mundus phaenomenon）； and that he should believe that he had thereby
contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature。 In
truth； if I cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water as
a thing in itself； I cannot look upon one drop as different from
another； if the conception of the one is pletely identical with
that of the other。 But if it is a phenomenon in space； it has a
place not merely in the understanding （among conceptions）； but also in
sensuous external intuition （in space）； and in this case； the physical
locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal
determinations of things； and one place； B； may contain a thing
which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place； A； just as
well as if the two things were in every respect different from each
other。 Difference of place without any other conditions； makes the
plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena； not only possible
in itself； but even necessary。 Consequently； the above so…called law
is not a law of nature。 It is merely an analytical rule for the
parison of things by means of mere conceptions。
2nd。 The principle： 〃Realities （as simple affirmations） never
logically contradict each other；〃 is a proposition perfectly true
respecting the relation of conceptions； but； whether as regards
nature； or things in themselves （of which we have not the slightest
conception）； is without any the least meaning。 For real opposition； in
which A … B is = 0； exists everywhere； an opposition； that is； in
which one reality united with another in the same subject
annihilates the effects of the other… a fact which is constantly
brought before our eyes by the different antagonistic actions and
operations in nature； which； nevertheless； as depending on real
forces； must be called realitates phaenomena。 General mechanics can
even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in
an a priori rule； as it directs its attention to the opposition in the
direction of forces… a condition of which the transcendental
conception of reality can tell us nothing。 Although M。 Leibnitz did
not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new
principle； he yet employed it for the establishment of new
propositions； and his followers introduced it into their
Leibnitzio…Wolfian system of philosophy。 According to this
principle； for example； all evils are but consequences of the
limited nature of created beings； that is； negations； because these
are the only opposite of reality。 （In the mere conception of a thing
in general this is really the case； but not in things as phenomena。）
In like manner； the upholders of this system deem it not only
possible； but natural also； to connect and unite all reality in one
being； because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than
that of contradiction （by which the conception itself of a thing is
annihilated）； and find themselves unable to conceive an opposition
of reciprocal destruction； so to speak； in which one real cause
destroys the effect of another； and the conditions of whose
representation we meet with only in sensibility。
3rd。 The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than
on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of
the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding。
Substances； in general； must have something inward； which is therefore
free from external relations； consequently from that of position
also。 The simple… that which can be represented by a unit… is
therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in
themselves。 The internal state of substances cannot therefore
consist in place； shape； contact； or motion； determinations which
are all external relations； and we can ascribe to them no other than
that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself； that
is to say； the state of representation。 Thus； then； were constructed
the monads； which were to form the elements of the universe； the
active force of which consists in representation； the effects of
this force being thus entirely confined to themselves。
For the same reason； his view of the possible munity of
substances could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony；
and by no means as a physical influence。 For inasmuch as everything is
occupied only internally； that is； with its own representations； the
state of the representations of one substance could not stand in
active and living connection with that of another； but some third
cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the
different states correspond with one another。 And this did not
happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case （systema
assistentiae）； but through the unity of the idea of a cause occupied
and connected with all substances； in which they necessarily
receive； according to the Leibnitzian school； their existence and
permanence； consequently also reciprocal correspondence； according
to universal laws。
4th。 This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time； in
which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility； originated in
the same delusion of transcendental reflection。 If I attempt to
represent by the mere understanding； the external relations of things；
I can do so only by employing the conception of their reciprocal
action； and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with
another state； I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause
and effect。 And thus Leibnitz regarded space as a certain order in the
munity of substances； and time as the dynamical sequence of their
states。 That which space and time possess proper to themselves and
independent of things； he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our
conceptions of them； whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical
relations is held to be a self…existent intuition； antecedent even
to things themselves。 Thus space and time were the intelligible form
of the connection of things （substances and their states） in
themselves。 But things were inte