conditions （in the synthesis of phenomena； or of thought in general）
extends to the unconditioned is objectively true； or not； what
consequences result therefrom affecting the empirical use of the
understanding； or rather whether there exists any such objectively
valid proposition of reason； and whether it is not； on the contrary； a
merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to still
higher conditions； to approach pleteness in the series of them； and
thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of
reason。 We must ascertain； I say； whether this requirement of reason
has not been regarded； by a misunderstanding； as a transcendental
principle of pure reason； which postulates a thorough pleteness
in the series of conditions in objects themselves。 We must show；
moreover； the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into
syllogisms； the major proposition of which pure reason has supplied… a
proposition which has perhaps more of the character of a petitio
than of a postulatum… and that proceed from experience upwards to
its conditions。 The solution of these problems is our task in
transcendental dialectic； which we are about to expose even at its
source； that lies deep in human reason。 We shall divide it into two
parts； the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions
of pure reason； the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms。
BOOK I。
OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON。
The conceptions of pure reason… we do not here speak of the
possibility of them… are not obtained by reflection； but by
inference or conclusion。 The conceptions of understanding are also
cogitated a priori antecedently to experience； and render it possible；
but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena；
in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical
consciousness。 Through them alone are cognition and the
determination of an object possible。 It is from them； accordingly；
that we receive material for reasoning； and antecedently to them we
possess no a priori conceptions of objects from which they might be
deduced； On the other hand； the sole basis of their objective
reality consists in the necessity imposed on them； as containing the
intellectual form of all experience； of restricting their
application and influence to the sphere of experience。
But the term； conception of reason； or rational conception； itself
indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of
experience； because its object…matter is a cognition； of which every
empirical cognition is but a part… nay； the whole of possible
experience may be itself but a part of it… a cognition to which no
actual experience ever fully attains； although it does always
pertain to it。 The aim of rational conceptions is the prehension；
as that of the conceptions of understanding is the understanding of
perceptions。 If they contain the unconditioned； they relate to that to
which all experience is subordinate； but which is never itself an
object of experience… that towards which reason tends in all its
conclusions from experience； and by the standard of which it estimates
the degree of their empirical use； but which is never itself an
element in an empirical synthesis。 If； notwithstanding； such
conceptions possess objective validity； they may be called conceptus
ratiocinati （conceptions legitimately concluded）； in cases where
they do not； they have been admitted on account of having the
appearance of being correctly concluded； and may be called conceptus
ratiocinantes （sophistical conceptions）。 But as this can only be
sufficiently demonstrated in that part of our treatise which relates
to the dialectical conclusions of reason； we shall omit any
consideration of it in this place。 As we called the pure conceptions
of the understanding categories； we shall also distinguish those of
pure reason by a new name and call them transcendental ideas。 These
terms； however； we must in the first place explain and justify。
SECTION I … Of Ideas in General。
Despite the great wealth of words which European languages
possess； the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression
exactly suited to his conception； for want of which he is unable to
make himself intelligible either to others or to himself。 To coin
new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom
successful； and； before recourse is taken to so desperate an
expedient； it is advisable to examine the dead and learned
languages； with the hope and the probability that we may there meet
with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds。 In
this case； even if the original meaning of the word has bee
somewhat uncertain； from carelessness or want of caution on the part
of the authors of it； it is always better to adhere to and confirm its
proper meaning… even although it may be doubtful whether it was
formerly used in exactly this sense… than to make our labour vain by
want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible。
For this reason； when it happens that there exists only a single
word to express a certain conception； and this word； in its usual
acceptation； is thoroughly adequate to the conception； the accurate
distinction of which from related conceptions is of great
importance； we ought not to employ the expression improvidently； or；
for the sake of variety and elegance of style； use it as a synonym for
other cognate words。 It is our duty； on the contrary； carefully to
preserve its peculiar signification； as otherwise it easily happens
that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly
attracted to the expression； and it is lost amid the multitude of
other words of very different import； the thought which it conveyed；
and which it alone conveyed； is lost with it。
Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he
meant by it something which is never derived from the senses； but
which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding （with
which Aristotle occupied himself）； inasmuch as in experience nothing
perfectly corresponding to them could be found。 Ideas are； according
to him； archetypes of things themselves； and not merely keys to
possible experiences； like the categories。 In his view they flow
from the highest reason； by which they have been imparted to human
reason； which； however； exists no longer in its original state； but is
obliged with great labour to recall by reminiscence… which is called
philosophy… the old but now sadly obscured ideas。 I will not here
enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this
sublime philosopher attached to this expression。 I shall content
myself with remarking that it is nothing unusual； in mon
conversation as well as in written works； by paring the thoughts
which an author has delivered upon a subject； to understand him better
than he understood himself inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently
determined his conception； and thus have sometimes spoken； nay even
thought； in opposition to his own opinions。
Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the
feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out
phenomena according to synthetical unity； for the purpose of being
able to read them as experience； and that our reason naturally
raises itself to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the
possibility of an object given by experience corresponding to them…
cognitions which are nevertheless real； and are not mere phantoms of
the brain。
This philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is
practical；* that is； which rests upon freedom； which in its turn ranks
under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason。 He who would
derive from experience the conceptions of virtue； who would make （as
many have really done） that； which at best can but serve as an
imperfectly illustrative example； a model for or the formation of a
perfectly adequate idea on the subject； would in fact transform virtue
into a nonentity changeable according to time and circumstance and
utterly incapable of being employed as a rule。 On the contrary；
every one is conscious that； when any one is held up to him as a model
of virtue； he pares this so…called model with the true original
which he possesses in his own mind and values him according to this
standard。 But this standard is the idea of virtue； in relation to
which all possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as
examples… proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that
which the conception of virtue demands… but certainly not as
archetypes。 That the actions of man will never be in perfect
accordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason； does
not prove the thought to be chimerical。 For only through this idea are
all judgements as to moral merit or demerit possible； it
consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to moral
perfection； however far removed from it the obstacles in human nature…
indeterminable as to degree… may keep us。
*He certainly extended the application of his conception to
speculative cognitions also； pro