point the philosophers of his time； as well as of all previous
times； have nothing to reproach each other with。 Those who reject at
once the method of Wolf； and of the Critique of Pure Reason； can
have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science； to change
labour into sport； certainty into opinion； and philosophy into
philodoxy。
In this second edition； I have endeavoured； as far as possible； to
remove the difficulties and obscurity which； without fault of mine
perhaps； have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute
thinkers。 In the propositions themselves； and in the demonstrations by
which they are supported； as well as in the form and the entire plan
of the work； I have found nothing to alter； which must be attributed
partly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole
before offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case。
For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there
is nothing isolated or independent； but every Single part is essential
to all the rest； and hence； the slightest imperfection； whether defect
or positive error； could not fail to betray itself in use。 I
venture； further； to hope； that this system will maintain the same
unalterable character for the future。 I am led to entertain this
confidence； not by vanity； but by the evidence which the equality of
the result affords； when we proceed； first； from the simplest elements
up to the plete whole of pure reason and； and then； backwards
from the whole to each part。 We find that the attempt to make the
slightest alteration； in any part； leads inevitably to contradictions；
not merely in this system； but in human reason itself。 At the same
time； there is still much room for improvement in the exposition of
the doctrines contained in this work。 In the present edition； I have
endeavoured to remove misapprehensions of the aesthetical part；
especially with regard to the conception of time； to clear away the
obscurity which has been found in the deduction of the conceptions
of the understanding； to supply the supposed want of sufficient
evidence in the demonstration of the principles of the pure
understanding； and； lastly； to obviate the misunderstanding of the
paralogisms which immediately precede the rational psychology。
Beyond this point… the end of the second main division of the
〃Transcendental Dialectic〃… I have not extended my alterations；*
partly from want of time； and partly because I am not aware that any
portion of the remainder has given rise to misconceptions among
intelligent and impartial critics； whom I do not here mention with
that praise which is their due； but who will find that their
suggestions have been attended to in the work itself。
*The only addition； properly so called… and that only in the
method of proof… which I have made in the present edition； consists of
a new refutation of psychological idealism； and a strict
demonstration… the only one possible； as I believe… of the objective
reality of external intuition。 However harmless idealism may be
considered… although in reality it is not so… in regard to the
essential ends of metaphysics； it must still remain a scandal to
philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume； as
an article of mere belief； the existence of things external to
ourselves （from which； yet； we derive the whole material of
cognition for the internal sense）； and not to be able to oppose a
satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question。 As there is
some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as it stands in
the text； I propose to alter the passage in question as follows：
〃But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me。 For all the
determining grounds of my existence which can be found in me are
representations and； as such； do themselves require a permanent；
distinct from them； which may determine my existence in relation to
their changes； that is； my existence in time； wherein they change。〃 It
may； probably； be urged in opposition to this proof that； after all； I
am only conscious immediately of that which is in me； that is； of my
representation of external things； and that； consequently； it must
always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this
representation does or does not exist externally to me。 But I am
conscious； through internal experience； of my existence in time
（consequently； also； of the determinability of the former in the
latter）； and that is more than the simple consciousness of my
representation。 It is； in fact； the same as the empirical
consciousness of my existence； which can only be determined in
relation to something； which； while connected with my existence； is
external to me。 This consciousness of my existence in time is；
therefore； identical with the consciousness of a relation to something
external to me； and it is； therefore； experience； not fiction；
sense； not imagination； which inseparably connects the external with
my internal sense。 For the external sense is； in itself； the
relation of intuition to something real； external to me； and the
reality of this something； as opposed to the mere imagination of it；
rests solely on its inseparable connection with internal experience as
the condition of its possibility。 If with the intellectual
consciousness of my existence； in the representation： I am； which
acpanies all my judgements； and all the operations of my
understanding； I could； at the same time； connect a determination of
my existence by intellectual intuition； then the consciousness of a
relation to something external to me would not be necessary。 But the
internal intuition in which alone my existence can be determined；
though preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness； is itself
sensible and attached to the condition of time。 Hence this
determination of my existence； and consequently my internal experience
itself； must depend on something permanent which is not in me； which
can be； therefore； only in something external to me； to which I must
look upon myself as being related。 Thus the reality of the external
sense is necessarily connected with that of the internal； in order
to the possibility of experience in general； that is； I am just as
certainly conscious that there are things external to me related to my
sense as I am that I myself exist as determined in time。 But in
order to ascertain to what given intuitions objects； external me；
really correspond； in other words； what intuitions belong to the
external sense and not to imagination； I must have recourse； in
every particular case； to those rules according to which experience in
general （even internal experience） is distinguished from
imagination； and which are always based on the proposition that
there really is an external experience。 We may add the remark that the
representation of something permanent in existence； is not the same
thing as the permanent representation； for a representation may be
very variable and changing… as all our representations； even that of
matter； are… and yet refer to something permanent； which must；
therefore； be distinct from all my representations and external to me；
the existence of which is necessarily included in the determination of
my own existence； and with it constitutes one experience… an
experience which would not even be possible internally； if it were not
also at the same time； in part； external。 To the question How？ we
are no more able to reply； than we are； in general； to think the
stationary in time； the coexistence of which with the variable；
produces the conception of change。
In attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible
as possible； I have been pelled to leave out or abridge various
passages which were not essential to the pleteness of the work； but
which many readers might consider useful in other respects； and
might be unwilling to miss。 This trifling loss； which could not be
avoided without swelling the book beyond due limits； may be
supplied； at the pleasure of the reader； by a parison with the
first edition； and will； I hope； be more than pensated for by the
greater clearness of the exposition as it now stands。
I have observed； with pleasure and thankfulness； in the pages of
various reviews and treatises； that the spirit of profound and
thorough investigation is not extinct in Germany； though it may have
been overborne and silenced for a time by the fashionable tone of a
licence in thinking； which gives itself the airs of genius； and that
the difficulties which beset the paths of criticism have not prevented
energetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters of the
science of pure reason to which these paths conduct… a science which
is not popular； but scholastic in its character； and which alone can
hope for a lasting existence or possess an abiding value。 To these
deserving men； who so happily bine profundity of view with a talent
for lucid exposition… a talent which I myself am not conscious of
possessing… I leave the task of removing any obscurity which may still
adhere to the statement of my doctrines。 For； in this case； the danger
is not that of being refuted； but of being misunderstood。 For my ow