fact； nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of
self…consciousness in thought； whilst we remain perfectly ignorant
whether the subject is posite or not。
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the
Substantiality or Permanence of the Soul。
This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the
mon argument which attempts to prove that the soul… it being
granted that it is a simple being… cannot perish by dissolution or
deposition； he saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by
extinction； or disappearance。 He endeavoured to prove in his Phaedo；
that the soul cannot be annihilated； by showing that a simple being
cannot cease to exist。 Inasmuch as； be said； a simple existence cannot
diminish； nor gradually lose portions of its being； and thus be by
degrees reduced to nothing （for it possesses no parts； and therefore
no multiplicity）； between the moment in which it is； and the moment in
which it is not； no time can be discovered… which is impossible。 But
this philosopher did not consider that； granting the soul to possess
this simple nature； which contains no parts external to each other and
consequently no extensive quantity； we cannot refuse to it any less
than to any other being； intensive quantity； that is； a degree of
reality in regard to all its faculties； nay； to all that constitutes
its existence。 But this degree of reality can bee less and less
through an infinite series of smaller degrees。 It follows；
therefore； that this supposed substance… this thing； the permanence of
which is not assured in any other way； may； if not by deposition；
by gradual loss （remissio） of its powers （consequently by
elanguescence； if I may employ this expression）； be changed into
nothing。 For consciousness itself has always a degree； which may be
lessened。* Consequently the faculty of being conscious may be
diminished； and so with all other faculties。 The permanence of the
soul； therefore； as an object of the internal sense； remains
undemonstrated； nay； even indemonstrable。 Its permanence in life is
evident； per se； inasmuch as the thinking being （as man） is to itself；
at the same time； an object of the external senses。 But this does
not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm； from mere
conceptions； its permanence beyond life。*＇2＇
*Clearness is not； as logicians maintain； the consciousness of a
representation。 For a certain degree of consciousness； which may
not； however； be sufficient for recollection； is to be met with in
many dim representations。 For without any consciousness at all； we
should not be able to recognize any difference in the obscure
representations we connect； as we really can do with many conceptions；
such as those of right and justice； and those of the musician； who
strikes at once several notes in improvising a piece of music。 But a
representation is clear； in which our consciousness is sufficient
for the consciousness of the difference of this representation from
others。 If we are only conscious that there is a difference； but are
not conscious of the difference… that is； what the difference is…
the representation must be termed obscure。 There is； consequently；
an infinite series of degrees of consciousness down to its entire
disappearance。
*＇2＇ There are some who think they have done enough to establish a
new possibility in the mode of the existence of souls； when they
have shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on
this subject。 Such are those who affirm the possibility of thought… of
which they have no other knowledge than what they derive from its
use in connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human
life… after this life bas ceased。 But it is very easy to embarrass
them by the introduction of counter…possibilities； which rest upon
quite as good a foundation。 Such； for example； is the possibility of
the division of a simple substance into several substances； and
conversely； of the coalition of several into one simple substance。
For； although divisibility presupposes position； it does not
necessarily require a position of substances； but only of the
degrees （of the several faculties） of one and the same substance。
Now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul… even
that of consciousness… as diminished by one half； the substance
still remaining。 In the same way we can represent to ourselves without
contradiction； this obliterated half as preserved； not in the soul；
but without it； and we can believe that； as in this case every。
thing that is real in the soul； and has a degree… consequently its
entire existence… has been halved； a particular substance would
arise out of the soul。 For the multiplicity； which has been divided；
formerly existed； but not as a multiplicity of substances； but of
every reality as the quantum of existence in it； and the unity of
substance was merely a mode of existence； which by this division alone
has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence。 In the same
manner several simple substances might coalesce into one； without
anything being lost except the plurality of subsistence； inasmuch as
the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the
former substances。 Perhaps； indeed； the simple substances； which
appear under the form of matter； might （not indeed by a mechanical
or chemical influence upon each other； but by an unknown influence； of
which the former would be but the phenomenal appearance）； by means
of such a dynamical division of the parent…souls； as intensive
quantities； produce other souls； while the former repaired the loss
thus sustained with new matter of the same sort。 I am far from
allowing any value to such chimeras； and the principles of our
analytic have clearly proved that no other than an empirical use of
the categories… that of substance； for example… is possible。 But if
the rationalist is bold enough to construct； on the mere authority
of the faculty of thought… without any intuition； whereby an object is
given… a self…subsistent being； merely because the unity of
apperception in thought cannot allow him to believe it a posite
being； instead of declaring； as he ought to do； that he is unable to
explain the possibility of a thinking nature； what ought to hinder the
materialist； with as plete an independence of experience； to employ
the principle of the rationalist in a directly opposite manner…
still preserving the formal unity required by his opponent？
If； now； we take the above propositions… as they must be accepted as
valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology… in
synthetical connection； and proceed； from the category of relation；
with the proposition： 〃All thinking beings are； as such；
substances；〃 backwards through the series； till the circle is
pleted； we e at last to their existence； of which； in this
system of rational psychology； substances are held to be conscious；
independently of external things； nay； it is asserted that； in
relation to the permanence which is a necessary characteristic of
substance； they can of themselves determine external things。 It
follows that idealism… at least problematical idealism； is perfectly
unavoidable in this rationalistic system。 And； if the existence of
outward things is not held to be requisite to the determination of the
existence of a substance in time； the existence of these outward
things at all； is a gratuitous assumption which remains without the
possibility of a proof。
But if we proceed analytically… the 〃I think〃 as a proposition
containing in itself an existence as given； consequently modality
being the principle… and dissect this proposition； in order to
ascertain its content； and discover whether and how this Ego
determines its existence in time and space without the aid of anything
external； the propositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin
with the conception of a thinking being； but with a reality； and the
properties of a thinking being in general would be deduced from the
mode in which this reality is cogitated； after everything empirical
had been abstracted； as is shown in the following table：
1
I think；
2 3
as Subject； as simple Subject；
4
as identical Subject；
in every state of my thought。
Now； inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition；
whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject； and not also
as a predicate of another being； the conception of a subject is here
taken in a merely logical sense； and it remains undetermined；
whether substance is to be cogitated under the conception or not。
But in the third proposition； the absolute unity of apperception…
the simple Ego in the representation to which all connection and
separation； which constitute thought； relate； is of itself
important； even although it presents us with no information about
the constitution or subsistence of the subject。 Apperception is
something real； and the simplicity of its nature is given in the
very fact of its possibility。 Now in space there is nothing rea