numbers： every one knows that it is impossible to undermine the
evidence of mathematics by mere discursive conceptions； I shall only
remark that； if in this case philosophy endeavours to gain an
advantage over mathematics by sophistical artifices； it is because
it forgets that the discussion relates solely to Phenomena and their
conditions。 It is not sufficient to find the conception of the
simple for the pure conception of the posite； but we must
discover for the intuition of the posite （matter）； the intuition of
the simple。 Now this； according to the laws of sensibility； and
consequently in the case of objects of sense； is utterly impossible。
In the case of a whole posed of substances； which is cogitated
solely by the pure understanding； it may be necessary to be in
possession of the simple before position is possible。 But this does
not hold good of the Totum substantiale phaenomenon； which； as an
empirical intuition in space； possesses the necessary property of
containing no simple part； for the very reason that no part of space
is simple。 Meanwhile； the Monadists have been subtle enough to
escape from this difficulty； by presupposing intuition and the
dynamical relation of substances as the condition of the possibility
of space； instead of regarding space as the condition of the
possibility of the objects of external intuition； that is； of
bodies。 Now we have a conception of bodies only as phenomena； and；
as such； they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of all
external phenomena。 The evasion is therefore in vain； as； indeed； we
have sufficiently shown in our Aesthetic。 If bodies were things in
themselves； the proof of the Monadists would be unexceptionable。
The second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of having
opposed to it a dogmatical proposition； which； among all such
sophistical statements； is the only one that undertakes to prove in
the case of an object of experience； that which is properly a
transcendental idea… the absolute simplicity of substance。 The
proposition is that the object of the internal sense； the thinking
Ego； is an absolute simple substance。 Without at present entering upon
this subject… as it has been considered at length in a former chapter…
I shall merely remark that； if something is cogitated merely as an
object； without the addition of any synthetical determination of its
intuition… as happens in the case of the bare representation； I… it is
certain that no manifold and no position can be perceived in such a
representation。 As； moreover； the predicates whereby I cogitate this
object are merely intuitions of the internal sense； there cannot be
discovered in them anything to prove the existence of a manifold whose
parts are external to each other； and； consequently； nothing to
prove the existence of real position。 Consciousness； therefore；
is so constituted that； inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the
same time its own object； it cannot divide itself… although it can
divide its inhering determinations。 For every object in relation to
itself is absolute unity。 Nevertheless； if the subject is regarded
externally； as an object of intuition； it must； in its character of
phenomenon； possess the property of position。 And it must always be
regarded in this manner； if we wish to know whether there is or is not
contained in it a manifold whose parts are external to each other。
THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS。
THESIS。
Causality according to the laws of nature； is not the only causality
operating to originate the phenomena of the world。 A causality of
freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena。
PROOF。
Let it be supposed； that there is no other kind of causality than
that according to the laws of nature。 Consequently； everything that
happens presupposes a previous condition； which it follows with
absolute certainty； in conformity with a rule。 But this previous
condition must itself be something that has happened （that has
arisen in time； as it did not exist before）； for； if it has always
been in existence； its consequence or effect would not thus
originate for the first time； but would likewise have always
existed。 The causality； therefore； of a cause； whereby something
happens； is itself a thing that has happened。 Now this again
presupposes； in conformity with the law of nature； a previous
condition and its causality； and this another anterior to the
former； and so on。 If； then； everything happens solely in accordance
with the laws of nature； there cannot be any real first beginning of
things； but only a subaltern or parative beginning。 There cannot；
therefore； be a pleteness of series on the side of the causes which
originate the one from the other。 But the law of nature is that
nothing can happen without a sufficient a priori determined cause。 The
proposition therefore… if all causality is possible only in accordance
with the laws of nature… is； when stated in this unlimited and general
manner； self…contradictory。 It follows that this cannot be the only
kind of causality。
From what has been said； it follows that a causality must be
admitted； by means of which something happens； without its cause being
determined according to necessary laws by some other cause
preceding。 That is to say； there must exist an absolute spontaneity of
cause； which of itself originates a series of phenomena which proceeds
according to natural laws… consequently transcendental freedom；
without which even in the course of nature the succession of phenomena
on the side of causes is never plete。
ANTITHESIS。
There is no such thing as freedom； but everything in the world
happens solely according to the laws of nature。
PROOF。
Granted； that there does exist freedom in the transcendental
sense； as a peculiar kind of causality； operating to produce events in
the world… a faculty； that is to say； of originating a state； and
consequently a series of consequences from that state。 In this case；
not only the series originated by this spontaneity； but the
determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the
series； that is to say； the causality itself must have an absolute
mencement； such that nothing can precede to determine this action
according to unvarying laws。 But every beginning of action presupposes
in the acting cause a state of inaction； and a dynamically primal
beginning of action presupposes a state； which has no connection… as
regards causality… with the preceding state of the cause… which does
not； that is； in any wise result from it。 Transcendental freedom is
therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect； and such a
conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of
the possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to be
found in experience… is consequently a mere fiction of thought。
We have； therefore； nothing but nature to which we must look for
connection and order in cosmical events。 Freedom… independence of
the laws of nature… is certainly a deliverance from restraint； but
it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule。 For it
cannot be alleged that； instead of the laws of nature； laws of freedom
may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature。 For；
if freedom were determined according to laws； it would be no longer
freedom； but merely nature。 Nature； therefore； and transcendental
freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness。
The former imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the
origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes；
inasmuch as causality is always conditioned thereby； while it
pensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity plete and in
conformity with law。 The latter； on the contrary； holds out to the
understanding the promise of a point of rest in the chain of causes；
by conducting it to an unconditioned causality； which professes to
have the power of spontaneous origination； but which； in its own utter
blindness； deprives it of the guidance of rules； by which alone a
pletely connected experience is possible。
OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY。
ON THE THESIS。
The transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the
entire content of the psychological conception so termed； which is for
the most part empirical。 It merely presents us with the conception
of spontaneity of action； as the proper ground for imputing freedom to
the cause of a certain class of objects。 It is； however； the true
stumbling…stone to philosophy； which meets with unconquerable
difficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of unconditioned
causality。 That element in the question of the freedom of the will；
which bas for so long a time placed speculative reason in such
perplexity； is properly only transcendental； and concerns the
question； whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous
origination of a series of successive things or states。 How such a
faculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry； for in the ca