experience； from the present perception； upwards to the conditions
that determine it according to time。
If I represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time；
I do not thereby place these in space and time prior to all
experience； on the contrary； such a representation is nothing more
than the notion of a possible experience； in its absolute
pleteness。 In experience alone are those objects； which are nothing
but representations； given。 But； when I say they existed prior to my
experience； this means only that I must begin with the perception
present to me and follow the track indicated until I discover them
in some part or region of experience。 The cause of the empirical
condition of this progression… and consequently at what member therein
I must stop； and at what point in the regress I am to find this
member… is transcendental； and hence necessarily incognizable。 But
with this we have not to do； our concern is only with the law of
progression in experience； in which objects； that is； phenomena； are
given。 It is a matter of indifference； whether I say； 〃I may in the
progress of experience discover stars； at a hundred times greater
distance than the most distant of those now visible；〃 or； 〃Stars at
this distance may be met in space； although no one has； or ever will
discover them。〃 For； if they are given as things in themselves；
without any relation to possible experience； they are for me
non…existent； consequently； are not objects； for they are not
contained in the regressive series of experience。 But； if these
phenomena must be employed in the construction or support of the
cosmological idea of an absolute whole； and when we are discussing a
question that oversteps the limits of possible experience； the
proper distinction of the different theories of the reality of
sensuous objects is of great importance； in order to avoid the
illusion which must necessarily arise from the misinterpretation of
our empirical conceptions。
SECTION VII。 Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem。
The antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following
dialectical argument： 〃If that which is conditioned is given； the
whole series of its conditions is also given； but sensuous objects are
given as conditioned； consequently。。。〃 This syllogism； the major of
which seems so natural and evident； introduces as many cosmological
ideas as there are different kinds of conditions in the synthesis of
phenomena； in so far as these conditions constitute a series。 These
ideas require absolute totality in the series； and thus place reason
in inextricable embarrassment。 Before proceeding to expose the fallacy
in this dialectical argument； it will be necessary to have a correct
understanding of certain conceptions that appear in it。
In the first place； the following proposition is evident； and
indubitably certain： 〃If the conditioned is given； a regress in the
series of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required。〃 For
the very conception of a conditioned is a conception of something
related to a condition； and； if this condition is itself
conditioned； to another condition… and so on through all the members
of the series。 This proposition is； therefore； analytical and has
nothing to fear from transcendental criticism。 It is a logical
postulate of reason： to pursue； as far as possible； the connection
of a conception with its conditions。
If； in the second place； both the conditioned and the condition
are things in themselves； and if the former is given； not only is
the regress to the latter requisite； but the latter is really given
with the former。 Now； as this is true of all the members of the
series； the entire series of conditions； and with them the
unconditioned； is at the same time given in the very fact of the
conditioned； the existence of which is possible only in and through
that series； being given。 In this case； the synthesis of the
conditioned with its condition； is a synthesis of the understanding
merely； which represents things as they are； without regarding whether
and how we can cognize them。 But if I have to do with phenomena；
which； in their character of mere representations； are not given； if I
do not attain to a cognition of them （in other words； to themselves；
for they are nothing more than empirical cognitions）； I am not
entitled to say： 〃If the conditioned is given； all its conditions
（as phenomena） are also given。〃 I cannot； therefore； from the fact
of a conditioned being given； infer the absolute totality of the
series of its conditions。 For phenomena are nothing but an empirical
synthesis in apprehension or perception； and are therefore given
only in it。 Now； in speaking of phenomena it does not follow that；
if the conditioned is given； the synthesis which constitutes its
empirical condition is also thereby given and presupposed； such a
synthesis can be established only by an actual regress in the series
of conditions。 But we are entitled to say in this case that a
regress to the conditions of a conditioned； in other words； that a
continuous empirical synthesis is enjoined； that； if the conditions
are not given； they are at least required； and that we are certain
to discover the conditions in this regress。
We can now see that the major； in the above cosmological
syllogism； takes the conditioned in the transcendental signification
which it has in the pure category； while the minor speaks of it in the
empirical signification which it has in the category as applied to
phenomena。 There is； therefore； a dialectical fallacy in the
syllogism… a sophisma figurae dictionis。 But this fallacy is not a
consciously devised one； but a perfectly natural illusion of the
mon reason of man。 For； when a thing is given as conditioned； we
presuppose in the major its conditions and their series；
unperceived； as it were； and unseen； because this is nothing more than
the logical requirement of plete and satisfactory premisses for a
given conclusion。 In this case； time is altogether left out in the
connection of the conditioned with the condition； they are supposed to
be given in themselves； and contemporaneously。 It is； moreover； just
as natural to regard phenomena （in the minor） as things in
themselves and as objects presented to the pure understanding； as in
the major； in which plete abstraction was made of all conditions of
intuition。 But it is under these conditions alone that objects are
given。 Now we overlooked a remarkable distinction between the
conceptions。 The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition；
and the plete series of the latter （in the major） are not limited
by time； and do not contain the conception of succession。 On the
contrary； the empirical synthesis and the series of conditions in
the phenomenal world… subsumed in the minor… are necessarily
successive and given in time alone。 It follows that I cannot
presuppose in the minor； as I did in the major； the absolute
totality of the synthesis and of the series therein represented； for
in the major all the members of the series are given as things in
themselves… without any limitations or conditions of time； while in
the minor they are possible only in and through a successive
regress； which cannot exist； except it be actually carried into
execution in the world of phenomena。
After this proof of the viciousness of the argument monly
employed in maintaining cosmological assertions； both parties may
now be justly dismissed； as advancing claims without grounds or title。
But the process has not been ended by convincing them that one or both
were in the wrong and had maintained an assertion which was without
valid grounds of proof。 Nothing seems to be clearer than that； if
one maintains： 〃The world has a beginning；〃 and another： 〃The world
has no beginning；〃 one of the two must be right。 But it is likewise
clear that； if the evidence on both sides is equal； it is impossible
to discover on what side the truth lies； and the controversy
continues； although the parties have been remended to peace
before the tribunal of reason。 There remains； then； no other means
of settling the question than to convince the parties； who refute each
other with such conclusiveness and ability； that they are disputing
about nothing； and that a transcendental illusion has been mocking
them with visions of reality where there is none。 The mode of
adjusting a dispute which cannot be decided upon its own merits； we
shall now proceed to lay before our readers。
Zeno of Elea； a subtle dialectician； was severely reprimanded by
Plato as a sophist； who； merely from the base motive of exhibiting his
skill in discussion； maintained and subverted the same proposition
by arguments as powerful and convincing on the one side as on the
other。 He maintained； for example； that God （who was probably
nothing more； in his view； than the world） is neither finite nor
infinite； neither in motion nor in rest； neither similar nor
dissimilar to any other thing。 It seemed to those philosophers who
criticized his mode of discussion that his purpose was to deny
pletely both of two self…contradictory propositions… which is
absurd。 But I cannot believe that there is any justice in