马基雅维里 君主论英文prince- 第10部分

Bartolomeo　da　Bergamo；　Roberto　da　San　Severino；　the　Count　of　Pitigliano；

and　the　like；　under　whom　they　had　to　dread　loss　and　not　gain；　as

happened　afterwards　at　Vaila；　where　in　one　battle　they　lost　that　which

in　eight　hundred　years　they　had　acquired　with　so　much　trouble。　Because

from　such　arms　conquests　e　but　slowly；　long　delayed　and

inconsiderable；　but　the　losses　sudden　and　portentous。



And　as　with　these　examples　I　have　reached　Italy；　which　has　been　ruled

for　many　years　by　mercenaries；　I　wish　to　discuss　them　more　seriously；　in

order　that；　having　seen　their　rise　and　progress；　one　may　be　better

prepared　to　counteract　them。　You　must　understand　that　the　empire　has

recently　e　to　be　repudiated　in　Italy；　that　the　Pope　has　acquired　more

temporal　power；　and　that　Italy　has　been　divided　up　into　more　states；　for

the　reason　that　many　of　the　great　cities　took　up　arms　against　their

nobles；　who；　formerly　favoured　by　the　emperor；　were　oppressing　them；

whilst　the　Church　was　favouring　them　so　as　to　gain　authority　in　temporal

power：　in　many　others　their　citizens　became　princes。　From　this　it　came

to　pass　that　Italy　fell　partly　into　the　hands　of　the　Church　and　of

republics；　and；　the　Church　consisting　of　priests　and　the　republic　of

citizens　unaccustomed　to　arms；　both　menced　to　enlist　foreigners。



The　first　who　gave　renown　to　this　soldiery　was　Alberigo　da　Conio；　a

native　of　the　Romagna。　From　the　school　of　this　man　sprang；　among　others；

Braccio　and　Sforza；　who　in　their　time　were　the　arbiters　of　Italy。　After

these　came　all　the　other　captains　who　till　now　have　directed　the　arms　of

Italy；　and　the　end　of　all　their　valour　has　been；　that　she　has　been

overrun　by　Charles；　robbed　by　Louis；　ravaged　by　Ferdinand；　and　insulted

by　the　Switzers。　The　principle　that　has　guided　them　has　been；　first；　to

lower　the　credit　of　infantry　so　that　they　might　increase　their　own。　They

did　this　because；　subsisting　on　their　pay　and　without　territory；　they

were　unable　to　support　many　soldiers；　and　a　few　infantry　did　not　give

them　any　authority；　so　they　were　led　to　employ　cavalry；　with　a　moderate

force　of　which　they　were　maintained　and　honoured；　and　affairs　were

brought　to　such　a　pass　that；　in　an　army　of　twenty　thousand　soldiers；

there　were　not　to　be　found　two　thousand　foot　soldiers。　They　had；　besides

this；　used　every　art　to　lessen　fatigue　and　danger　to　themselves　and

their　soldiers；　not　killing　in　the　fray；　but　taking　prisoners　and

liberating　without　ransom。　They　did　not　attack　towns　at　night；　nor　did

the　garrisons　of　the　towns　attack　encampments　at　night；　they　did　not

surround　the　camp　either　with　stockade　or　ditch；　nor　did　they　campaign

in　the　winter。　All　these　things　were　permitted　by　their　military　rules；

and　devised　by　them　to　avoid；　as　I　have　said；　both　fatigue　and　dangers；

thus　they　have　brought　Italy　to　slavery　and　contempt。



1。　With　which　to　chalk　up　the　billets　for　his　soldiers。



2。　As　Sir　John　Hawkwood；　the　English　leader　of　mercenaries；　was　called

by　the　Italians。



CHAPTER　XIII



CONCERNING　AUXILIARIES；　MIXED　SOLDIERY；　AND　ONE'S　OWN



AUXILIARIES；　which　are　the　other　useless　arm；　are　employed　when　a　prince

is　called　in　with　his　forces　to　aid　and　defend；　as　was　done　by　Pope

Julius　in　the　most　recent　times；　for　he；　having；　in　the　enterprise

against　Ferrara；　had　poor　proof　of　his　mercenaries；　turned　to

auxiliaries；　and　stipulated　with　Ferdinand；　King　of　Spain；　for　his

assistance　with　men　and　arms。　These　arms　may　be　useful　and　good　in

themselves；　but　for　him　who　calls　them　in　they　are　always

disadvantageous；　for　losing；　one　is　undone；　and　winning；　one　is　their

captive。



And　although　ancient　histories　may　be　full　of　examples；　I　do　not　wish　to

leave　this　recent　one　of　Pope　Julius　II；　the　peril　of　which　cannot　fall

to　be　perceived；　for　he；　wishing　to　get　Ferrara；　threw　himself　entirely

into　the　hands　of　the　foreigner。　But　his　good　fortune　brought　about　a

third　event；　so　that　he　did　not　reap　the　fruit　of　his　rash　choice；

because；　having　auxiliaries　routed　at　Ravenna；　and　the　Switzers　having

risen　and　driven　out　the　conquerors　（against　all　expectation；　both　his

and　others）；　it　so　came　to　pass　that　he　did　not　bee　prisoner　to　his

enemies；　they　having　fled；　nor　to　his　auxiliaries；　he　having　conquered

by　other　arms　than　theirs。



The　Florentines；　being　entirely　without　arms；　sent　ten　thousand

Frenchmen　to　take　Pisa；　whereby　they　ran　more　danger　than　at　any　other

time　of　their　troubles。



The　Emperor　of　Constantinople；　to　oppose　his　neighbours；　sent　ten

thousand　Turks　into　Greece；　who；　on　the　war　being　finished；　were　not

willing　to　quit；　this　was　the　beginning　of　the　servitude　of　Greece　to

the　infidels。



Therefore；　let　him　who　has　no　desire　to　conquer　make　use　of　these　arms；

for　they　are　much　more　hazardous　than　mercenaries；　because　with　them　the

ruin　is　ready　made；　they　are　all　united；　all　yield　obedience　to　others；

but　with　mercenaries；　when　they　have　conquered；　more　time　and　better

opportunities　are　needed　to　injure　you；　they　are　not　all　of　one

munity；　they　are　found　and　paid　by　you；　and　a　third　party；　which　you

have　made　their　head；　is　not　able　all　at　once　to　assume　enough　authority

to　injure　you。　In　conclusion；　in　mercenaries　dastardy　is　most　dangerous；

in　auxiliaries；　valour。　The　wise　prince；　therefore；　has　always　avoided

these　arms　and　turned　to　his　own；　and　has　been　willing　rather　to　lose

with　them　than　to　conquer　with　others；　not　deeming　that　a　real　victory

which　is　gained　with　the　arms　of　others。



I　shall　never　hesitate　to　cite　Cesare　Borgia　and　his　actions。　This　duke

entered　the　Romagna　with　auxiliaries；　taking　there　only　French　soldiers；

and　with　them　he　captured　Imola　and　Forli；　but　afterwards；　such　forces

not　appearing　to　him　reliable；　he　turned　to　mercenaries；　discerning　less

danger　in　them；　and　enlisted　the　Orsini　and　Vitelli；　whom　presently；　on

handling　and　finding　them　doubtful；　unfaithful；　and　dangerous；　he

destroyed　and　turned　to　his　own　men。　And　the　difference　between　one　and

the　other　of　these　forces　can　easily　be　seen　when　one　considers　the

difference　there　was　in　the　reputation　of　the　duke；　when　he　had　the

French；　when　he　had　the　Orsini　and　Vitelli；　and　when　he　relied　on　his

own　soldiers；　on　whose　fidelity　he　could　always　count　and　found　it　ever

increasing；　he　was　never　esteemed　more　highly　than　when　every　one　saw

that　he　was　plete　master　of　his　own　forces。



I　was　not　intending　to　go　beyond　Italian　and　recent　examples；　but　I　am

unwilling　to　leave　out　Hiero；　the　Syracusan；　he　being　one　of　those　I

have　named　above。　This　man；　as　I　have　said；　made　head　of　the　army　by　the

Syracusans；　soon　found　out　that　a　mercenary　soldiery；　constituted　like

our　Italian　condottieri；　was　of　no　use；　and　it　appearing　to　him　that　he

could　neither　keep　them　nor　let　them　go；　he　had　them　all　cut　to　pieces；

and　afterwards　made　war　with　his　own　forces　and　not　with　aliens。



I　wish　also　to　recall　to　memory　an　instance　from　the　Old　Testament

applicable　to　this　subject。　David　offered　himself　to　Saul　to　fight　with

Goliath；　the　Philistine　champion；　and；　to　give　him　courage；　Saul　armed

him　with　his　own　weapons；　which　David　rejected　as　soon　as　he　had　them　on

his　back；　saying　he　could　make　no　use　of　them；　and　that　he　wished　to

meet　the　enemy　with　his　sling　and　his　knife。　In　conclusion；　the　arms　of

others　either　fall　from　your　back；　or　they　weigh　you　down；　or　they　bind

you　fast。



Charles　VII；　the　father　of　King　Louis　XI；　having　by　good　fortune　and

valour　liberated　France　from　the　English；　recognized　the　necessity　of

being　armed　with　forces　of　his　own；　and　he　established　in　his　kingdom

ordinances　concerning　men…at…arms　and　infantry。　Afterwards　his　son；　King

Louis；　abolished　the　infantry　and　began　to　enlist　the　Switzers；　which

mistake；　followed　by　others；　is；　as　is　now　seen；　a　source　of　peril　to

that　kingdom；　because；　having　raised　the　reputation　of　the　Switzers；　he

has　entirely　diminished　the　value　of　his　own　arms；　for　he　has　destroyed

the　infantry　altogether；　and　his　men…at…arms　he　has　subordinated　to

others；　for；　being　as　they　are　so　accustomed　to　fight　along　with

Switzers；　it　does　not　appear　that　they　can　now　conquer　without　them。

Hence　it　arises　that　the　French　cannot　stand　against　the　Switzers；　and

without　the　Switzers　they　do　not　e　off　well　against　others。　The

armies　of　the　French　have　thus　bee　mixed；　partly　mercenary　and　partly

national；　both　of　which　arms　together　are　much　better　than　mercenaries

alone　or　auxiliaries　alone；　yet　much　inferior　to　one's　own　forces。　And

this　example　proves　it；　the　kingdom　of　France　would　be　unconquerable　if

the　ordinance　of　Charles　had　been　enlarged　or　maintained。



But　the　scanty　wisdom　of　man；　on　entering　into　an　affair　which　looks

well　at　first；　cannot　discern　the　poison　that　is　hidden　in　it；　as　I　have

said　above　of　hectic　fevers。　Therefore；　if　he　who　rules　a　principality

cannot　recognize　evils　until　they　are　upon　him；　he　is　not　truly　w