gorgias- 第6部分

　Yes；　I　admit　that。　　　Soc。　How　then　can　the　rhetoricians　or　the　tyrants　have　great　power　in　states；　unless　Polus　can　refute　Socrates；　and　prove　to　him　that　they　do　as　they　will？　　　Pol。　This　fellow…　　　Soc。　I　say　that　they　do　not　do　as　they　will…now　refute　me。　　　Pol。　Why；　have　you　not　already　said　that　they　do　as　they　think　best？　　　Soc。　And　I　say　so　still。　　　Pol。　Then　surely　they　do　as　they　will？　　　Soc。　I　deny　it。　　　Pol。　But　they　do　what　they　think　best？　　　Soc。　Aye。　　　Pol。　That；　Socrates；　is　monstrous　and　absurd。　　　Soc。　Good　words；　good　Polus；　as　I　may　say　in　your　own　peculiar　style；　but　if　you　have　any　questions　to　ask　of　me；　either　prove　that　I　am　in　error　or　give　the　answer　yourself。　　　Pol。　Very　well；　I　am　willing　to　answer　that　I　may　know　what　you　mean。　　　Soc。　Do　men　appear　to　you　to　will　that　which　they　do；　or　to　will　that　further　end　for　the　sake　of　which　they　do　a　thing？　when　they　take　medicine；　for　example；　at　the　bidding　of　a　physician；　do　they　will　the　drinking　of　the　medicine　which　is　painful；　or　the　health　for　the　sake　of　which　they　drink？　　　Pol。　Clearly；　the　health。　　　Soc。　And　when　men　go　on　a　voyage　or　engage　in　business；　they　do　not　will　that　which　they　are　doing　at　the　time；　for　who　would　desire　to　take　the　risk　of　a　voyage　or　the　trouble　of　business？…But　they　will；　to　have　the　wealth　for　the　sake　of　which　they　go　on　a　voyage。　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　is　not　this　universally　true？　If　a　man　does　something　for　the　sake　of　something　else；　he　wills　not　that　which　he　does；　but　that　for　the　sake　of　which　he　does　it。　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　are　not　all　things　either　good　or　evil；　or　intermediate　and　indifferent？　　　Pol。　To　be　sure；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　Wisdom　and　health　and　wealth　and　the　like　you　would　call　goods；　and　their　opposites　evils？　　　Pol。　I　should。　　　Soc。　And　the　things　which　are　neither　good　nor　evil；　and　which　partake　sometimes　of　the　nature　of　good　and　at　other　times　of　evil；　or　of　neither；　are　such　as　sitting；　walking；　running；　sailing；　or；　again；　wood；　stones；　and　the　like：…these　are　the　things　which　you　call　neither　good　nor　evil？　　　Pol。　Exactly　so。　　　Soc。　Are　these　indifferent　things　done　for　the　sake　of　the　good；　or　the　good　for　the　sake　of　the　indifferent？　　　Pol。　Clearly；　the　indifferent　for　the　sake　of　the　good。　　　Soc。　When　we　walk　we　walk　for　the　sake　of　the　good；　and　under　the　idea　that　it　is　better　to　walk；　and　when　we　stand　we　stand　equally　for　the　sake　of　the　good？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　when　we　kill　a　man　we　kill　him　or　exile　him　or　despoil　him　of　his　goods；　because；　as　we　think；　it　will　conduce　to　our　good？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Men　who　do　any　of　these　things　do　them　for　the　sake　of　the　good？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　did　we　not　admit　that　in　doing　something　for　the　sake　of　something　else；　we　do　not　will　those　things　which　we　do；　but　that　other　thing　for　the　sake　of　which　we　do　them？　　　Pol。　Most　true。　　　Soc。　Then　we　do　not　will　simply　to　kill　a　man　or　to　exile　him　or　to　despoil　him　of　his　goods；　but　we　will　to　do　that　which　conduces　to　our　good；　and　if　the　act　is　not　conducive　to　our　good　we　do　not　will　it；　for　we　will；　as　you　say；　that　which　is　our　good；　but　that　which　is　neither　good　nor　evil；　or　simply　evil；　we　do　not　will。　Why　are　you　silent；　Polus？　Am　I　not　right？　　　Pol。　You　are　right。　　　Soc。　Hence　we　may　infer；　that　if　any　one；　whether　he　be　a　tyrant　or　a　rhetorician；　kills　another　or　exiles　another　or　deprives　him　of　his　property；　under　the　idea　that　the　act　is　for　his　own　interests　when　really　not　for　his　own　interests；　he　may　be　said　to　do　what　seems　best　to　him？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　But　does　he　do　what　he　wills　if　he　does　what　is　evil？　Why　do　you　not　answer？　　　Pol。　Well；　I　suppose　not。　　　Soc。　Then　if　great　power　is　a　good　as　you　allow；　will　such　a　one　have　great　power　in　a　state？　　　Pol。　He　will　not。　　　Soc。　Then　I　was　right　in　saying　that　a　man　may　do　what　seems　good　to　him　in　a　state；　and　not　have　great　power；　and　not　do　what　he　wills？　　　Pol。　As　though　you；　Socrates；　would　not　like　to　have　the　power　of　doing　what　seemed　good　to　you　in　the　state；　rather　than　not；　you　would　not　be　jealous　when　you　saw　any　one　killing　or　despoiling　or　imprisoning　whom　he　pleased；　Oh；　no！　　　Soc。　Justly　or　unjustly；　do　you　mean？　　　Pol。　In　either　case　is　he　not　equally　to　be　envied？　　　Soc。　Forbear；　Polus！　　　Pol。　Why　〃forbear〃？　　　Soc。　Because　you　ought　not　to　envy　wretches　who　are　not　to　be　envied；　but　only　to　pity　them。　　　Pol。　And　are　those　of　whom　spoke　wretches？　　　Soc。　Yes；　certainly　they　are。　　　Pol。　And　so　you　think　that　he　who　slays　any　one　whom　he　pleases；　and　justly　slays　him；　is　pitiable　and　wretched？　　　Soc。　No；　I　do　not　say　that　of　him：　but　neither　do　I　think　that　he　is　to　be　envied。　　　Pol。　Were　you　not　saying　just　now　that　he　is　wretched？　　　Soc。　Yes；　my　friend；　if　he　killed　another　unjustly；　in　which　case　he　is　also　to　be　pitied；　and　he　is　not　to　be　envied　if　he　killed　him　justly。　　　Pol。　At　any　rate　you　will　allow　that　he　who　is　unjustly　put　to　death　is　wretched；　and　to　be　pitied？　　　Soc。　Not　so　much；　Polus；　as　he　who　kills　him；　and　not　so　much　as　he　who　is　justly　killed。　　　Pol。　How　can　that　be；　Socrates？　　　Soc。　That　may　very　well　be；　inasmuch　as　doing　injustice　is　the　greatest　of　evils。　　　Pol。　But　is　it　the　greatest？　Is　not　suffering　injustice　a　greater　evil？　　　Soc。　Certainly　not。　　　Pol。　Then　would　you　rather　suffer　than　do　injustice？　　　Soc。　I　should　not　like　either；　but　if　I　must　choose　between　them；　I　would　rather　suffer　than　do。　　　Pol。　Then　you　would　not　wish　to　be　a　tyrant？　　　Soc。　Not　if　you　mean　by　tyranny　what　I　mean。　　　Pol。　I　mean；　as　I　said　before；　the　power　of　doing　whatever　seems　good　to　you　in　a　state；　killing；　banishing；　doing　in　all　things　as　you　like。　　　Soc。　Well　then；　illustrious　friend；　when　I　have　said　my　say；　do　you　reply　to　me。　Suppose　that　I　go　into　a　crowded　Agora；　and　take　a　dagger　under　my　arm。　Polus；　I　say　to　you；　I　have　just　acquired　rare　power；　and　become　a　tyrant；　for　if　I　think　that　any　of　these　men　whom　you　see　ought　to　be　put　to　death；　the　man　whom　I　have　a　mind　to　kill　is　as　good　as　dead；　and　if　I　am　disposed　to　break　his　head　or　tear　his　garment；　he　will　have　his　head　broken　or　his　garment　torn　in　an　instant。　Such　is　my　great　power　in　this　city。　And　if　you　do　not　believe　me；　and　I　show　you　the　dagger；　you　would　probably　reply：　Socrates；　in　that　sort　of　way　any　one　may　have　great　power…he　may　burn　any　house　which　he　pleases；　and　the　docks　and　triremes　of　the　Athenians；　and　all　their　other　vessels；　whether　public　or　private…but　can　you　believe　that　this　mere　doing　as　you　think　best　is　great　power？　　　Pol。　Certainly　not　such　doing　as　this。　　　Soc。　But　can　you　tell　me　why　you　disapprove　of　such　a　power？　　　Pol。　I　can。　　　Soc。　Why　then？　　　Pol。　Why；　because　he　who　did　as　you　say　would　be　certain　to　be　punished。　　　Soc。　And　punishment　is　an　evil？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　you　would　admit　once　more；　my　good　sir；　that　great　power　is　a　benefit　to　a　man　if　his　actions　turn　out　to　his　advantage；　and　that　this　is　the　meaning　of　great　power；　and　if　not；　then　his　power　is　an　evil　and　is　no　power。　But　let　us　look　at　the　matter　in　another　way　do　we　not　acknowledge　that　the　things　of　which　we　were　speaking；　the　infliction　of　death；　and　exile；　and　the　deprivation　of　property　are　sometimes　a　good　and　sometimes　not　a　good？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　About　that　you　and　I　may　be　supposed　to　agree？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Tell　me；　then；　when　do　you　say　that　they　are　good　and　when　that　they　are　evil…what　principle　do　you　lay　down？　　　Pol。　I　would　rather；　Socrates；　that　you　should　answer　as　well　as　ask　that　question。　　　Soc。　Well；　Polus；　since　you　would　rather　have　the　answer　from　me；　I　say　that　they　are　good　when　they　are　just；　and　evil　when　they　are　unjust。　　　Pol。　You　are　hard　of　refutation；　Socrates；　but　might　not　a　child　refute　that　statement？　　　Soc。　Then　I　shall　be　very　grateful　to　the　child；　and　equally　grateful　to　you　if　you　will　refute　me　and　deliver　me　from　my　foolishness。　And　I　hope　that　refute　me　you　will；　and　not　weary　of　doing　good　to　a　friend。　　　Pol。　Yes；　Socrates；　and　I　need　not　go　far　or　appeal　to　antiquity；　events　which　happened　only　a　few　days　ago　are　enough　to　refute　you；　and　to　prove　that　many　men　who　do　wrong　are　happy。　　　Soc。　What　events？　　　Pol。　You　see；　I　presume；　that　Archelaus　the　son　of　Perdiccas　is　now　the　ruler　of　Macedonia？　　　Soc。　At　any　rate　I　hear　that　he　is。　　　Pol。　And　do　you　think　that　he　is　happy　or　miserable？　　　Soc。　I　cannot　say；　Polus；　for　I　have　never　had　any　acquaintance　with　him。　　　Pol。　And　cannot　you　tell　at　once；　and　without　having　an　acquaintance　with　him；　whether　a　man　is　happy？　　　Soc。　Most　certainly　not。　　　Pol。　Then　clearly；　Socrates；　you　would　say　that　you　did　not　even　know　whether　the　great　king　was　a　happy　man？　　　Soc。　And　I　should　speak　the　truth；　for　I　do　not　know　how　he　stands　in　the　matter　of　education　and　justice。　　　Pol。　What！　and　does　all　happiness　consist　in　this？　　　Soc。　Yes；　indeed；　Polus；　that　is　my　doctrine；　the　men　and　women　who　are　gentle　and　good　are　also　happy；　as　I　maintain；　and　the　unjust　and　evil　are　miserable。　　　Pol。　Then；　according　to　your　doctrine；　the　said　Archelaus　is　miserable？　　　Soc。　Yes；　my　friend；　if　he　is　wicked。　　　Pol。　That　he　is　wicked　I　cannot　deny；　for　he　had　no　title　at　all　to　the　throne　which　he　now　occupies；　he　being　only　the　son　of　a　woma