the Epicureans； Lipsius wished to be a Stoic； and so on。 The sense of opposition was so great；
ancient philosophy and Christianity … from or in which no special philosophy had developed … were
so diverse； that no philosophy peculiar to itself could develop in Christianity。 What was or could
be had as philosophy； either in conformity with or in opposition to Christianity； was a certain
ancient philosophy which was thus taken up anew。 But mummies when brought amongst living
beings cannot there remain。 Mind had for long possessed a more substantial life； a more profound
Notion of itself； and hence its thought had higher needs than such as could be satisfied by these
philosophies。 A revival such as this is then to be regarded only as the transitory period in which we
learn to know the forms which are implied and which have gone before； and as the renewal of
former struggles through the steps necessary in development。 Such reconstructions and repetitions
in a distant time of principles which have become foreign to Mind； are in history transitory only；
and formed in a language which is dead。 Such things are translations only and not originals； and
Mind does not find satisfaction excepting in knowledge of its own origination。
When modern times are in the same way called upon to revert to the standpoint of an ancient
philosophy （as is recommended specially in regard to the philosophy of Plato） in order to make
this a means of escaping from the complications and difficulties of succeeding times； this reversion
does not come naturally as in the first case。 This discreet counsel has the same origin as the
request to cultivated members of society to turn back to the customs and ideas of the savages of
the North American forests； or as the recommendation to adopt the religion of Melchisedec which
Fichte （6） has maintained to be the purest and simplest possible； and therefore the one at which
we must eventually arrive。 On the one hand； in this retrogression the desire for an origin and for a
fixed point of departure is unmistakable； but such must be sought for in thought and Idea alone and
not in an authoritatively given form。 On the other hand； the return of the developed； enriched Mind
to a simplicity such as this…which means to an abstraction； an abstract condition or thought is to be
regarded only as the escape of an incapacity which cannot enjoy the rich material of development
which it sees before it； and which demands to be controlled and comprehended in its very depths
by thought； but seeks a refuge in fleeing from the difficulty and in mere sterility。
From what has been said it is quite comprehensible how so many of those who； whether induced
by some special attraction such as this； or simply by the fame of a Plato or ancient philosophy in
general； direct their way thereto in order to draw their own philosophy from these sources； do not
find themselves satisfied by the study； and unjustifiably quit such altogether。 Satisfaction is found in
them to a certain extent only。 We must know in ancient philosophy or in the philosophy of any
given period； what we are going to look for。 Or at least we must know that in such a philosophy
there is before us a definite stage in the development of thought； and in it those forms and
necessities of Mind which lie within the limits of that stage alone are brought into existence。 There
slumber in the Mind of modern times ideas more profound which require for their awakening other
surroundings and another present than the abstract； dim； grey thought of olden times。 In Plato； for
instance； questions regarding the nature of freedom； the origin of evil and of sin； providence； &c。；
do not find their philosophic answer。 On such subjects we certainly may in part take the ordinary
serious views of the present time； and in part philosophically set their consideration altogether
aside； or else consider sin and freedom as something negative only。 But neither the one plan nor
the other gives freedom to Mind if such subjects have once been explicitly for it； and if the
opposition in self…consciousness has given it the power of sinking its interests therein。 The case is
similar with regard to questions regarding the limits of knowledge； the opposition between
subjectivity and objectivity which had not yet come up in Plato's age。 The independence of the
within itself and its explicit existence was foreign to him； man had not yet gone back within himself；
had not yet set himself forth as explicit。 The subject was indeed the individual as free； but as yet he
knew himself only as in unity with his Being。 The Athenian knew himself to be free； as such； just as
the Roman citizen would； as ingenuus。 But the fact that man is in and for himself free； in his
essence and as man； free born； was known neither by Plato； Aristotle； Cicero； nor the Roman
legislators； even though it is this conception alone which forms the source of law。 In Christianity the
individual； personal mind for the first time becomes of real； infinite and absolute value； God wills
that all men shall be saved。 It was in the Christian religion that the doctrine was advanced that all
men are equal before God； because Christ has set them free with the freedom of Christianity。
These principles make freedom independent of any such things as birth； standing or culture。 The
progress made through them is enormous； but they still come short of this； that to be free
constitutes the very idea of man。 The sense of this existent principle has been an active force for
centuries and centuries； and an impelling power which has brought about the most tremendous
revolutions； but the conception and the knowledge of the natural freedom of man is a knowledge
of himself which is not old。
Introduction
B。 Relation of Philosophy to Other
Departments of Knowledge。
The History of Philosophy has to represent this science in that form of time and individualities from
which its outward form has resulted。 Such a representation has； however； to shut out from itself
the external history of the time； and to take into account only the general character of the people
and time； and likewise their circumstances as a whole。 But as a matter of fact； the history of
Philosophy does present this character； and that indeed in the highest possible degree； its
connection with it is of the closest kind； and the particular appearance presented by a philosophy
belonging to one special period； is only a particular aspect or element in the character。 Because of
this inward correspondence we have partly to consider more closely the particular relation borne
by a philosophy to its historical surroundings； and partly； but pre…eminently； what is proper to
itself； from which alone； after separating everything related however closely； we can fix our
standpoint。 This connection； which is not merely external but essential； has thus two sides； which
we must consider。 The first is the distinctly historical side； the second is the connection with other
matters … the connection of Philosophy with Religion； for instance； by which we at once obtain a
deeper conception of Philosophy itself。
1。 The Historical Side of This Connection。
It is usually said that political affairs and such matters as Religion are to be taken into consideration
because they have exercised a great influence on the Philosophy of the time； and similarly it exerts
an influence upon them。 But when people are content with such a category as 〃great influence〃
they place the two in an external relationship； and start from the point of view that both sides are
for themselves independent。 Here； however； we must think of this relationship in another category；
and not according to the influence or effect of one upon the other。 The true category is the unity of
all these different forms； so that it is one Mind which manifests itself in； and impresses itself upon
these different elements。
a。 Outward and historical conditions imposed upon Philosophy。
It must be remarked in the first place； that a certain stage is requisite in the intellectual culture of a
people in order that it may have a Philosophy at all。 Aristotle says； 〃Man first begins to
philosophize when the necessities of life are supplied〃 （Metaphysics； I。 2）； because since
Philosophy is a free and not self…seeking activity； cravings of want must have disappeared； a
strength； elevation and inward fortitude of mind must have appeared； passions must be subdued
and consciousness set far advanced； before what is universal can be thought of。 Philosophy may
thus be called a kind of luxury； in so far as luxury signifies those enjoyments and pursuits which do
not belong to external necessity as such。 Philosophy in this respect seems more capable of being
dispensed with than anything else； but that depends on what is called indispensable。 From the
point of view of mind； Philosophy may even be said to be that which is most essential。
b。 The commencement in History of an intellectual necessity for
Philosophy。
However much Philosophy； as the thought and conception of the Mind of a particular time； is a
priori； it is at the same time just as really a result； since the thought