‘Therefore’ which binds the two sides together is not the ‘Therefore’ of a syllogism； the
connection between Being and Thought is only immediately posited。 This certainty is thus the
prius； all other propositions come later。 The thinking subject as the simple immediacy of
being…at…home…with…me is the very same thing as what is called Being； and it is quite easy to
perceive this identity。 As universal； thought is contained in all that is particular； and thus is pure
relation to itself； pure oneness with itself。 We must not make the mistake of representing Being to
ourselves as a concrete content； and hence it is the same immediate identity which thought likewise
is。 Immediacy is； however； a one…sided determination； thought does not contain it alone； but also
the determination to mediate itself with itself； and thereby — by the mediation being at the same
time the abrogation of the mediation — it is immediacy。 In thought we thus have Being； Being is；
however； a poor determination； it is the abstraction from the concrete of thought。 This identity of
Being and Thought； which constitutes the most interesting idea of modern times； has not been
further worked out by Descartes； he has relied on consciousness alone； and for the time being
placed it in the forefront。 For with Descartes the necessity to develop the differences from the ‘I
think’ is not yet present； Fichte first applied himself to the deduction of all determinations from
this culminating point of absolute certainty。
Other propositions have been set against that of Descartes。 Gassendi； （8） for example； asks if we
might not just as well say Ludificor； ergo sum： I am made a fool of by my consciousness；
therefore I exist — or properly speaking； therefore I am made a fool of。 Descartes himself
recognized that this objection merited consideration； but he here repels it； inasmuch as it is the ‘I’
alone and not the other content which has to be maintained。 Being alone is identical with pure
thought； and not its content； be it what it may。 Descartes further says： “By thought I； however；
understand all that takes place in us within our consciousness； in as far as we are conscious of it；
thus will； conception； and even feeling are identical with thought。 For if I say ’ I see；’ or ‘I walk
out；’ and ‘therefore I am；’ and understand by this the seeing and walking which is
accomplished by the body； the conclusion is not absolutely certain； because； as often happens in a
dream； I may imagine that I can see or walk even if I do not open my eyes nor move from my
place； and I might also possibly do so supposing I had no body。 But if I understand it of the
subjective feeling or the consciousness of seeing or walking itself； because it is then related to the
mind that alone feels or thinks that it sees or walks； this conclusion is perfectly certain。” （9） “In a
dream” is an empirical mode of reasoning； but there is no other objection to it。 In willing； seeing；
hearing； &c。； thought is likewise contained； it is absurd to suppose that the soul has thinking in one
special pocket； and seeing； willing； &c。； in others。 But if I say ‘I see；’ ‘I walk out；’ there is
present on the one hand my consciousness ‘I；’ and consequently thought； on the other hand；
however； there is present willing； seeing； hearing； walking； and thus a still further modification of
the content。 Now because of this modification I cannot say ‘I walk； and therefore I am；’ for I
can undoubtedly abstract from the modification； since it is no longer universal Thought。 Thus we
must merely look at the pure consciousness contained in the concrete ‘I。’ Only when I
accentuate the fact that I am present there as thinking； is pure Being implied； for only with the
universal is Being united。
“In this it is implied；” says Descartes； “that thought is more certain to me than body。 If from the
fact that I touch or see the earth I judge that it exists； I must more certainly judge from this that my
thought exists。 For it may very well happen that I judge the earth to exist； even if it does not exist；
but it cannot be that I judge this； and that my mind which judges this does not exist。” （10） That is
to say； everything which is for me I may assert to be non…existent； but when I assert myself to be
non…existent； I myself assert； or it is my judgment。 For I cannot set aside the fact that I judge；
even if I can abstract from that respecting which I judge。 In this Philosophy has regained its own
ground that thought starts from thought as what is certain in itself； and not from something external；
not from something given； not from an authority； but directly from the freedom that is contained in
the ‘I think。’ Of all else I may doubt； of the existence of bodily things； of my body itself； or this
certainty does not possess immediacy in itself。 For ‘I’ is just certainty itself； but in all else this
certainty is only predicate； my body is certain to me； it is not this certainty itself。 （11） As against
the certainty we feel of having a body； Descartes adduces the empirical phenomenon that we often
hear of persons imagining they feel pain in a limb which they have lost long ago。 （12） What is
actual； he says is a substance； the soul is a thinking substance； it is thus for itself； separate from all
external material things and independent。 That it is thinking is evident from its nature： it would think
and exist even if no material things were present； the soul can hence know itself more easily than
its body： （13）
All else that we can hold as true rests on this certainty； for in order that anything should be held as
true； evidence is requisite； but nothing is true which has not this inward evidence in consciousness。
“Now the evidence of everything rests upon our perceiving it as clearly and vividly as that certainty
itself； and on its so entirely depending from； and harmonizing with this principle； that if we wished
to doubt it we should also have to doubt this principle likewise” （our ego）。 （14） This knowledge
is indeed on its own account perfect evidence； but it is not yet the truth； or if we take that Being as
truth； it is an empty content； and it is with the content that we have to do。
c。 What comes third is thus the transition of this certainty into truth； into the determinate；
Descartes again makes this transition in a na？ve way； and with it we for the first time begin to
consider his metaphysics。 What here takes place is that an interest arises in further representations
and conceptions of the abstract unity of Being and Thought； there Descartes sets to work in an
externally reflective manner。 “The consciousness which merely knows itself to be certain now
however seeks to extend its knowledge； and finds that it has conceptions of many things — in
which conceptions it does not deceive itself； so long as it does not assert or deny that something
similar outside corresponds to them。” Deception in the conceptions has meaning only in relation
to external existence。 “Consciousness also discovers universal conceptions； and obtains from them
proofs which are evident； e。g。 the geometric proposition that the three angles of a triangle are
together equal to two right angles is a conception which follows incontrovertibly from others。 But
in reflecting whether such things really exist doubts arise。” （15） That there is such a thing as a
triangle is indeed in this case by no means certain； since extension is not contained in the immediate
certainty of myself。 The soul may exist without the bodily element； and this last without it； they are
in reality different； one is conceivable without the other。 The soul thus does not think and know the
other as clearly as the certainty of itself。 （16）
Now the truth of all knowledge rests on the proof of the existence of God。 The soul is an
imperfect substance； but it has the Idea of an absolute perfect existence within itself； this perfection
is not begotten in itself； just because it is an imperfect substance； this Idea is thus innate。 In
Descartes the consciousness of this fact is expressed by his saying that as long as the existence of
God is not proved and perceived the possibility of our deceiving ourselves remains； because we
cannot know whether we do not possess a nature ordered and disposed to err （supra； p。 226）。
（17） The form is rather a mistaken one； and it only generally expresses the opposition in which
self…consciousness stands to the consciousness of what is different； of the objective； and we have
to deal with the unity of both — the question being whether what is in thought likewise possesses
objectivity。 This unity rests in God or is God Himself。 I shall put these assertions in the manner of
Descartes： “Amongst these various conceptions possessed by us there likewise is the conception
of a supremely intelligent； powerful； and absolutely perfect Being； and this is the most excellent of
all conceptions。” This all…embracing universal conception has therefore this distinguishing feature；
that in its case the uncertainty respecting Being which appears in the other conceptions； finds no
place。 It has the characteristic that “In it we do not recognize existence as something merely