human liberty （De potentia intellectus seu de libertate humana）。 （2） Kirchenrath Professor
Paulus published Spinoza's works in Jena； I had a share in the bringing out of this edition； having
been entrusted with the collation of French translations。
As regards the philosophy of Spinoza； it is very simple； and on the whole easy to comprehend； the
difficulty which it presents is due partly to the limitations of the method in which Spinoza presents
his thoughts； and partly to his narrow range of ideas； which causes him in an unsatisfactory way to
pass over important points of view and cardinal questions。 Spinoza's system is that of Descartes
made objective in the form of absolute truth。 The simple thought of Spinoza's idealism is this： The
true is simply and solely the one substance； whose attributes are thought and extension or nature：
and only this absolute unity is reality； it alone is God。 It is； as with Descartes； the unity of thought
and Being； or that which contains the Notion of its existence in itself。 The Cartesian substance； as
Idea； has certainly Being included in its Notion； but it is only Being as abstract； not as real Being or
as extension （supra； p。 241）。 With Descartes corporeality and the thinking 'I' are altogether
independent Beings； this independence of the two extremes is done away with in Spinozism by
their becoming moments of the one absolute Being。 This expression signifies that Being must be
grasped as the unity of opposites； the chief consideration is not to let slip the opposition and set it
aside； but to reconcile and resolve it。 Since then it is thought and Being； and no longer the
abstractions of the finite and infinite； or of limit and the unlimited； that form the opposition （supra；
p。 161）； Being is here more definitely regarded as extension； for in its abstraction it would be really
only that return into itself； that simple equality with itself； which constitutes thought （supra； p。 229）。
The pure thought of Spinoza is therefore not the simple universal of Plato； for it has likewise come
to know the absolute opposition of Notion and Being。
Taken as a whole； this constitutes the Idea of Spinoza； and it is just what pure being was to the
Eleatics （Vol。 1。 pp。 244； 252）。 This Idea of Spinoza's we must allow to be in the main true and
well…grounded； absolute substance is the truth； but it is not the whole truth； in order to be this it
must also be thought of as in itself active and living； and by that very means it must determine itself
as mind。 But substance with Spinoza is only the universal and consequently the abstract
determination of mind； it may undoubtedly be said that this thought is the foundation of all true
views — not； however； as their absolutely fixed and permanent basis； but as the abstract unity
which mind is in itself。 It is therefore worthy of note that thought must begin by placing itself at the
standpoint of Spinozism； to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all
Philosophy。 For as we saw above （Vol。 I。 p。 144）； when man begins to philosophize； the soul
must commence by bathing in this ether of the One Substance； in which all that man has held as
true has disappeared； this negation of all that is particular； to which every philosopher must have
come； is the liberation of the mind and its absolute foundation。 The difference between our
standpoint and that of the Eleatic philosophy is only this； that through the agency of Christianity
concrete individuality is in the modern world present throughout in spirit。 But in spite of the infinite
demands on the part of the concrete； substance with Spinoza is not yet determined as in itself
concrete。 As the concrete is thus not present in the content of substance； it is therefore to be found
within reflecting thought alone； and it is only from the endless oppositions of this last that the
required unity emerges。 Of substance as such there is nothing more to be said； all that we can do is
to speak of the different ways in which Philosophy has dealt with it； and the opposites which in it
are abrogated。 The difference depends on the nature of the opposites which are held to be
abrogated in substance。 Spinoza is far from having proved this unity as convincingly as was done
by the ancients； but what constitutes the grandeur of Spinoza's manner of thought is that he is able
to renounce all that is determinate and particular； and restrict himself to the One； giving heed to this
alone。
1。 Spinoza begins （Eth。 P。 I pp。 35； 36） with a series of definitions； from which we take the
following。
a。 Spinoza's first definition is of the Cause of itself。 He says： “By that which is causa sui； its own
cause； I understand that whose essence” （or Notion） “involves existence； or which cannot be
conceived except as existent。” The unity of existence and universal thought is asserted from the
very first； and this unity will ever be the question at issue。 “The cause of itself” is a noteworthy
expression； for while we picture to ourselves that the effect stands in opposition to the cause； the
cause of itself is the cause which； while it operates and separates an “other；” at the same time
produces only itself； and in the production therefore does away with this distinction。 The
establishing of itself as an other is loss or degeneration； and at the same time the negation of this
loss； this is a purely speculative Notion； indeed a fundamental Notion in all speculation。 The cause
in which the cause is identical with the effect； is the infinite cause （infra； p。 263）； if Spinoza had
further developed what lies in causa sui； substance with him would not have been rigid and
unworkable。
b。 The second definition is that of the finite。 “That thing is said to be finite in its kind which can be
limited by another of the same nature。” For it comes then to an end； it is not there； what is there is
something else。 This something else must； however； be of a like nature； for those things which are
to limit each other must； in order to be able to limit each other； touch each other； and consequently
have a relation to each other； that is to say they must be of one nature； stand on a like basis； and
have a common sphere。 That is the affirmative side of the limit。 “Thus a thought is” only “limited
by another thought； a body by another body； but thoughts are not limited by bodies nor〃
conversely 〃bodies by thoughts。” We saw this （p。 244） with Descartes： thought is an independent；
totality and so is extension； they have nothing to do with one another； they do not limit each other；
each is included in itself。
c。 The third definition is that of substance。 “By substance I understand that which exists in itself
and is conceived by itself； i。e。 the conception of which does not require the aid of the conception
of any other thing for its formation （a quo formari debeat）；” otherwise it would be finite；
accidental。 What cannot have a conception formed of it without the aid of something else； is not
independent； but is dependent upon that something else。
d。 In the fourth place Spinoza defines attributes； which； as the moment coming； second to
substance； belong to it。 “By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives as constituting the
essence of substance；” and to Spinoza this alone is true。 This is an important determination； the
attribute is undoubtedly a determinateness； but at the same time it remains a totality。 Spinoza； like
Descartes； accepts only two attributes； thought and extension。 The understanding grasps them as
the reality of substance； but the reality is not higher than the substance； for it is only reality in the
view of the understanding； which falls outside substance。 Each of the two ways of regarding
substance — extension and thought — contains no doubt the whole content of substance； but only
in one form； which the understanding brings with it； and for this very reason both sides are in
themselves identical and infinite。 This is the true completion； but where substance passes over into
attribute is not stated。
e。 The fifth definition has to do with what comes third in relation to substance； the mode。 “By
mode I understand the affections of substance； or that which is in something else； through the aid
of which also it is conceived。” Thus substance is conceived through itself； attribute is not
conceived through itself； but has a relation to the conceiving understanding； in so far as this last
conceives reality； mode； finally； is what is not conceived as reality； but through and in something
else。
These last three moments Spinoza ought not merely to have established in this way as conceptions；
he ought to have deduced them； they are especially important； and correspond with what we more
definitely distinguish as universal； particular and individual。 They must not； however； be taken as
formal； but in their true concrete sense； the concrete universal is substance； the concrete particular
is the concrete species； the Father and Son in the Christian dogma are similarly particular； but each
of them contains the whole nature of God； only under a different form。 The mode is the individual；
the finite as such； which enters into external con