determined in itself； and not through anything else。 “But if these substances were distinguished by
their affections； since substance is by nature prior to its affections it would follow that if from
substance its affections were abstracted and it were regarded in itself； i。e。； in its truth； it could
henceforth not be regarded as distinct from other substances。” “Eighth Proposition： All substance
is necessarily infinite。 Proof： For otherwise it must be limited by another substance of the same
nature； in which case there would be two substances of the same attribute； which is contrary to the
fifth proposition。” “Every attribute must be conceived for itself；” as determination reflected on
itself。 “For attribute is what the mind conceives of substance as constituting its essence； from
which it follows that it must be conceived through itself；” i。e。； substance is what is conceived
through itself （see the fourth and third definitions）。 “Therefore we may not argue from the plurality
of attributes to a plurality of substances； for each is conceived by itself； and they have all been；
always and at the same time； in substance； without the possibility of the one being produced by the
other。” “Substance is indivisible。 For if the parts retained the nature of the substance； there would
be several substances of the same nature； which is contrary to the fifth proposition。 If not； infinite
substance would cease to exist； which is absurd。”（3）
“Fourteenth Proposition： No other substance than God can either exist or be conceived。 Proof：
God is the absolutely infinite substance； to whom can be denied no attribute which expresses the
essence of substance； and He exists necessarily； therefore if there were a substance other than
God； it must be explained by means of an attribute of God。” Consequently the substance would
not have its own being； but that of God； and therefore would not be a substance。 Or if it were still
to be substance； “then there would necessarily follow the possibility of there being two
substances with the same attribute； which according to the fifth proposition is absurd。 From this it
then follows that the thing extended and the thing that thinks” are not substances； but “are either
attributes of God； or affections of His attributes。” By these proofs and others like them not much
is to be gained。 “Fifteenth proposition： What is； is in God； and cannot exist or be conceived
without God。” “Sixteenth proposition： By the necessity of the divine nature infinite things must
follow in infinite modes； i。e。； all that can fall under the infinite understanding。 God is therefore the
absolute First Cause。”
Spinoza then ascribes freedom and necessity to God： “God is the absolute free cause； who is
determined by nothing outside of Himself； for He exists solely by the necessity of His nature。 There
is no cause which inwardly or outwardly moves Him to act； except the perfection of His nature。
His activity is by the laws of His Being necessary and eternal； what therefore follows from His
absolute nature； from His attributes； is eternal as it follows from the nature of the triangle from
eternity and to eternity that it； three angles are equal to two right angles。〃 That is to say； His Being
is His absolute power； actus and potentia； Thought and Being； are in Him one。 God has not
therefore any other thoughts which He could not have actualized。 “God is the immanent cause of
all things； not the transient （transiens）；” i。e。； external cause。 “His essence and His existence are
the same； namely； the truth。 A thing which is determined to perform some action； is； since God is
cause； necessarily determined thereto by God； and a thing which is thus determined cannot render
itself undetermined。 In nature nothing is contingent。 Will is not a free cause； but only a necessary
cause； only a mode； it is therefore determined by another。 God acts in accordance with no final
causes （sub ratione boni）。 Those who assert that He does so； appear to establish something
apart from God； which does not depend on God； and which God in His working keeps in view； as
though it were an end。 If this view is taken； God is not a free cause； but is subject to fate。 It is
equally inadmissible to subject all things to the arbitrary pleasure of God； i。e。； to His indifferent
will。”（4） He is determined solely by His own nature； the activity of God is thus His power； and that
is necessity。 He is then absolute power in contrast to wisdom； which sets up definite aims； and
consequently limitations； particular aims； thoughts of what is about to come to pass； and the like
are therefore put out of the question。 But beyond this universal； no advance is made； for it must be
noticed a negation。 Moreover； if God is the cause of the world； it is implied that He is finite； for the
world is here put beside God as something different from Him。
b。 The greatest difficulty in Spinoza is； in the distinctions to which he comes； to grasp the relation
of this determinate to God； at the same time preserving the determination。 “God is a thinking
Being； because all individual thoughts are modes which express God's nature in a certain and
determinate manner； there pertains therefore to God an attribute the conception of which all
individual thoughts involve； and by means of this they also are conceived。 God is an extended
Being for the same reason。” This means that the same substance； under the attribute of thought； is
the intelligible world； and under the attribute of extension； is nature； nature and thought thus both
express the same Essence of God。 Or； as Spinoza says； “The order and system of natural things is
the same as the order of the thoughts。 Thus； for instance； the circle which exists in nature； and the
idea of the existing circle； which is also in God； are one and the same thing” （they are one and the
same content）； “which is” merely “expressed by means of different attributes。 If we therefore
regard nature either under the attribute of extension or of thought； or under any other attribute
whatever； we shall find one and the same connection of causes； i。e。； the same sequence of things。
The formal Being of the idea of the circle can be conceived only by means of the mode of thought；
as its proximate cause； and this mode again by means of another； and so on infinitely； so that we
must explain the order of the whole of nature； or the connection of causes； by the attribute of
thought alone； and if things are considered by the attribute of extension； they must be considered
only by the attribute of extension； — and the same holds good。 of other causes。”（5） It is one and
the same system； which at one time appears as nature； and at another time in the form of thought。
But Spinoza does not demonstrate how these two are evolved from the one substance； nor does
he prove why there can only be two of them。 Neither are extension and thought anything to him in
themselves； or in truth； but only externally； for their difference is a mere matter of the
understanding； which is ranked by Spinoza only among affections （Eth。 P。 I。 Prop。 XXXI。
Demonst。 p。 62）； and as such has no truth。 This has in recent times been served up again by
Schelling in the following form： In themselves； the intelligent world and the corporeal world are the
same； only under different forms； so that the intelligent universe is in itself the whole absolute divine
totality； and the corporeal universe is equally this same totality。 The differences are not in
themselves； but the different aspects from which the Absolute is regarded are matters external to
it。 We take a higher tone in saying that nature and mind are rational； but reason is for us no empty
word； for it means the totality which develops itself within itself。 Again； it is the standpoint of
reflection to regard aspects only； and nothing in itself。 This defect appears in Spinoza and Schelling
in the fact that they see no necessity why the Notion； as the implicit negative of its unity； should
make a separation of itself into different parts； so that out of the simple universal the real； the
opposed； itself becomes known。 Absolute substance； attribute and mode； Spinoza allows to
follow one another as definitions； he adopts them ready…made； without the attributes being
developed from the substance； or the modes from the attributes。 And more especially in regard to
the attributes； there is no necessity evident； why these are thought and extension in particular。
c。 When Spinoza passes on to individual things； especially to self…consciousness； to the freedom
of the 'I；' he expresses himself in such a way as rather to lead back all limitations to substance than
to maintain a firm grasp of the individual。 Thus we already found； the attributes not to be
independent； but only the forms in which the understanding grasps substance in its differences；
what comes third； the modes； is that under which for Spinoza all difference of things alone falls。 Of
the modes he says （Ethic。 P。 I。 Prop。 XXXII。 Demonst。 et Coroll。 11。 p。 63）： In every attribute
there are two modes； in extension； these are rest and motion； in thought they are understanding
and will （intellectus et voluntas）。 Th