other individual things； attain to existence； and can preserve itself in existence only as thus
connected； combined and associated with others；” i。e。； in infinite progress； the body can by no
means be conceived from itself。 “The soul's consciousness expresses a certain determinate form of
a Notion； as the Notion itself expresses a determinate form of an individual thing。 But the individual
thing； its Notion； and the Notion of this Notion are altogether and entirely one and the same thing；
only regarded under different attributes。 As the soul is nothing else than the immediate Notion of
the body； and is one and the same thing with this； the excellence of the soul can never be anything
else than the excellence of the body。 The capacities of the understanding are nothing but the
capacities of the body； if they are looked at from the corporeal point of view； and the decisions of
the will are likewise determinations of the body。 Individual things are derived from God in an
eternal and infinite manner” （i。e。； once and for all）； “and not in a transitory； finite and evanescent
manner； they are derived from one another merely inasmuch as they mutually produce and destroy
each other； but in their eternal existence they endure unchangeable。 All individual things mutually
presuppose each other； one cannot be thought without the other； that is to say they constitute
together an inseparable whole； they exist side by side in one utterly indivisible； infinite Thing； and in
no other way whatever。
3。 We have now to speak of Spinoza's system of morals； and that is a subject of importance。 Its
great principle is no other than this； that the finite spirit is moral in so far as it has the true Idea； i。e。；
in so far as it directs its knowledge and will on God； for truth is merely the knowledge of God。 It
may be said that there is no morality loftier than this； since its only requisite is to have a clear idea
of God。 The first thing Spinoza speaks of in this regard is the affections： “Everything strives after
self…preservation。 This striving is the actual essence of the thing； and involves only indefinite time；
when referred exclusively to mind； it is termed will； when referred to both mind and body together；
it is called desire。 Determination of the will （volitio） and Idea are one and the same thing。 The
sense of liberty rests on this； that men do not know the determining causes of their actions。 The
affection is a confused Idea； the more clearly and distinctly； therefore； we know the affection； the
more it is under our control。”（11） The influence of the affections； as confused and limited
（inadequate） ideas； upon human action； constitutes therefore； according to Spinoza； human
slavery； of the passionate affections the principal are joy and sorrow； we are in suffering and
slavery in so far as we relate ourselves as a part。（12）
“Our happiness and liberty consist in an enduring and eternal love to God； this intellectual love
follows from the nature of mind in so far as it is regarded as eternal truth through the nature of
God。 The more a man recognizes God's existence and loves Him； the less does he suffer from evil
affections and the less is his fear of death。”（13） Spinoza requires in addition the true kind of
knowledge。 There are； according to him； three kinds of knowledge； in the first； which he calls
opinion and imagination； he includes the knowledge which we obtain from an individual object
through the senses — a knowledge fragmentary and ill…arranged — also knowledge drawn from
signs； pictorial conceptions and memory。 The second kind of knowledge is for Spinoza that which
we derive from general conceptions and adequate ideas of the properties of things。 The third is
intuitive knowledge （scientia intuitiva） which rises from the adequate idea of the formal essence
of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things。”（14） Regarding
this last he then says： “The nature of reason is not to contemplate things as contingent； but as
necessary 。 。 。 to think of all things under a certain form of eternity （sub quadam specie
？ternitatis）；” i。e。； in absolutely adequate Notions； i。e。 in God。 “For the necessity of things is the
necessity of the eternal nature of God Himself。 Every idea of an individual thing necessarily
includes the eternal and infinite essence of God in itself。 For individual things are modes of an
attribute of God； therefore they must include in themselves His eternal essence。 Our mind； in so far
as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity； has to that extent necessarily the
knowledge of God； and knows that it is itself in God and is conceived through God。 All Ideas； in
so far as they are referable to God； are true。”（15） Man must trace back all things to God； for God
is the One in All； the eternal essence of God is the one thing that is； the eternal truth is the only
thing for man to aim at in his actions。 With Spinoza this is not a knowledge arrived at through
philosophy； but only knowledge of a truth。 “The mind can succeed in tracing back all affections of
the body or images of things to God。 In proportion as the mind regards all things as necessary； it
has a greater power over its affections；” which are arbitrary and contingent。 This is the return of
the mind to God； and this is human freedom； as mode； on the other hand； the spirit has no
freedom； but is determined from without。 “From the third kind of knowledge there arises the
repose of the mind； the supreme good of the mind is to know God； and this is the highest virtue。
This knowledge necessarily produces the intellectual love of God； for it produces a joyfulness
accompanied by the Idea of God as cause — i。e。 the intellectual love of God。 God Himself loves
Himself with an infinite intellectual love。”（16） For God can have only Himself as aim and cause；
and the end of the subjective mind is to be directed on Him。 This is therefore the purest； but also a
universal morality。
In the thirty…sixth Letter （pp。 581…582） Spinoza； speaks of Evil。 The allegation is made that God；
as the originator of all things and everything； is also the originator of evil； is consequently Himself
evil； in this identity all things are one； good and evil are in themselves the same thing； in God's
substance this difference has disappeared。 Spinoza says in answer to this “I assert the fact that
God absolutely and truly” （as cause of Himself） “is the cause of everything that has an essential
content” （i。e。； affirmative reality） “be it what it may。 Now if you can prove to me that evil； error；
crime； etc。； are something that expresses an essence； I will freely admit to you that God is the
originator of crime and evil and error。 But I have elsewhere abundantly demonstrated that the form
of evil cannot subsist in anything that expresses an essence； and therefore it cannot be said that
God is the cause of evil。” Evil is merely negation； privation； limitation； finality； mode — nothing in
itself truly real。 “Nero's murder of his mother； in so far as it had positive content； was no crime。
For Orestes did the same external deed； and had in doing itthe same end in view — to kill his
mother； and yet he is not blamed；” and so on。 The affirmative is the will； the intention； the act of
Nero。 “Wherein then consists Nero's criminality？ In nothing else but that he proved himself
ungrateful； merciless； and disobedient。 But it is certain that all this expresses no essence； and
therefore God was not the cause of it； though He was the cause of Nero's action and intention。”
These last are something positive； but yet they do not constitute the crime as such； it is only the
negative element； such as mercilessness； etc。 that makes the action a crime。 “We know that
whatever exists； regarded in itself and without taking anything else into consideration； contains a
perfection which extends as widely as the essence of the thing itself extends； for the essence is in
no way different therefrom。〃 — 〃Because then；” we find in the thirty…second letter （pp。 541； 543）；
“God does not regard things abstractly； or form general definitions；” （of what the thing ought to
be） “and no more reality is required of things than the Divine understanding and power has given
and actually meted out to them； therefore it clearly follows that such privation exists only and solely
in respect to our understanding； but not in respect to God；” for God is absolutely real。 It is all
very well to say this； but it does not meet the case。 For in this way God and the respect to our
understanding are different。 Where is their unity？ How is this to be conceived？ Spinoza continues
in the thirty…sixth letter： “Although the works of the righteous （i。e。； of those who have a clear idea
of God； to which they direct all their actions and even their thoughts）； and” also the works “of the
wicked （i。e。； of those who have no idea of God； but only ideas of earthly things；〃 — individual；
personal interests and opinions； — 〃by which their actions and thoughts are directed）； and all
whatsoever exists； necessarily proceed from God's eternal laws and counsels； and perpetually
depend on God； they are yet not distinguished fro