history of philosophy- 第75部分

1。　Nachrichten　von　dem　Leben　und　den　Schriften　des　Bischofs　Berkeley　（in　Berkeley's　philosph。
Werk。　Pt。　I。　Leipzig；　1781）；　pp。　1；　45；　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；
pp。　86…90。
2。　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　pp。　90；　91；　The　Works　of　George　Berkeley；
Prof。　Fraser's　edition　（Dialogues　between　Hylas　and　Philonous）；　Vol。　I。　p。　264；　seq。　et　passim。
3。　Buhle；　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　92；　93；　The　Works　of　George
Berkeley；　Vol。　I。　p。　279　seq。
4。　Buhle；　ibidem；　pp。　91；　92；　Berkeley；　ibidem；　pp。　288　seq。；　300　seq。　et　passim。
5。　Buhle；　ibidem；　pp。　93；　94；　Berkeley；　ibidem；　pp。　289；　308。　seq。
6。　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　94；　95；　The　Works　of　George
Berkeley；　Vol。　I。　pp。　308；　335。
7。　Buhle；　ibidem；　pp。　96…99；　Berkeley；　ibidem；　p。　325；　seq。　et　passim。
8。　Cf。　Berkeley；　ibidem；　passim。



Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　II。　—　Transition　Period；　A　Idealism　&　Scepticism
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2。　HUME。

We　must　add　to　what　has　preceded　an　account　of　the　Scepticism　of　Hume；　which　has　been　given
a　more　important　place　in　history　than　it　deserves　from　its　intrinsic　nature；　its　historic　importance　is
due　to　the　fact　that　Kant　really　derives　the　starting　point　of　his　philosophy　from　Hume。

David　Hume　was　born　in　1711　at　Edinburgh　and　died　there　in　1776。　He　held　a　librarian's　post　in
that　town　for　some　time；　then　he　became　secretary　to　the　Embassy　in　Paris；　for　quite　a　long
period；　indeed；　he　moved　in　diplomatic　circles。　In　Paris　he　came　to　know　Jean　Jacques　Rousseau
and　invited　him　to　England；　but　Rousseau's　terribly　distrustful　and　suspicious　nature　very　soon
estranged　the　two。　（1）　Hume　is　more　celebrated　as　a　writer　of　history　than　through　his　philosophic
works。　He　wrote：　“A　Treatise　of　human　nature；”　3　vols。；　1739；　translated　into　German　by　Jacob；
Halle；　1790；　8vo；　likewise　“Essays　and　Treatises　on　several　subjects；”　2　vols。　（Vol。　1。　containing
“Essays　moral；　political　and　literary；”　printed　for　the　first　time　in　Edinburgh；　1742；　Vol。　II。
containing　an　“Inquiry　concerning　human　understanding”　a　further　development　of　the　Treatise；
and　first　printed　separately　in　London；　1748；　8vo）。　In　his　“Essays；”　which　contributed　most　to　his
fame　as　far　as　the　philosophic　side　is　concerned；　he　treated　philosophic　subjects　as　an　educated；
thoughtful　man　of　the　world　would　do　—　not　in　a　systematic　connection；　nor　showing　the　wide
range　which　his　thoughts　should　properly　have　been　able　to　attain；　in　fact　in　some　of　his　treatises
he　merely　dealt　with　particular　points　of　view。

We　must　shortly　deal　with　the　main　aspects　of　Hume's　philosophy。　He　starts　directly　from　the
philosophic　standpoint　of　Locke　and　Bacon；　which　derives　our　conceptions　from　experience；　and
his　scepticism　has　the　idealism　of　Berkeley　as　its　object。　The　sequence　of　thought　is　this：　Berkeley
allows　all　ideas　to　hold　good　as　they　are；　in　Hume　the　antithesis　of　the　sensuous　and　universal　has
cleared　and　more　sharply　defined　itself；　sense　being　pronounced　by　him　to　be　devoid　of
universality。　Berkeley　does　not　make　any　distinction　as　to　whether　in　his　sensations　there　is　a
necessary　connection　or　not。　Formerly　experience　was　a　mixture　of　the　two　elements。　Hume　tells
us　that　all　perceptions　of　the　mind　may　be　divided　into　two　classes　or　species；　that　of　impressions；
i。e。　sensuous　perceptions；　and　thoughts　or　ideas；　the　latter　are　similar　in　content　to　the　former；　but
less　forcible　and　lively。　All　objects　of　reason　are　consequently　either　relations　of　thoughts　such　as
mathematical　axioms；　or　facts　of　experience。　（2）　Since　Hume　makes　these　into　the　content　he
naturally　rejects　innate　ideas。　（3）

Now　when　Hume　goes　on　to　consider　more　closely　what　is　subsumed　under　experience；　he　finds
categories　of　the　understanding　present　there；　and　more　especially　the　determination　of　the
universal　and　of　universal　necessity；　he　took　under　his　consideration　more　particularly　the　category
of　cause　and　effect；　and　in　it　set　forth　the　rational　element；　inasmuch　as　in　this　causal　relationship
necessity　is　especially　contained。　Here　Hume　really　completed　the　system　of　Locke；　since　he
consistently　drew　attention　to　the　fact　that　if　this　point　of　view　be　adhered　to；　experience　is　indeed
the　principle　of　whatever　one　knows；　or　perception　itself　contains　everything　that　happens；　but
nevertheless　the　determination　of　universality　and　necessity　are　not　contained　in；　nor　were　they
given　us　by　experience。　Hume　has　thus　destroyed　the　objectivity　or　absolute　nature　of
thought…determinations。　“Our　conviction　of　the　truth　of　a　fact　rests　on　feeling；　memory；　and　the
reasonings　founded　on　the　causal　connection；　i。e。　on　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect。　The
knowledge　of　this　relation　is　not　attained　by　reasonings　a　priori；　but　arises　entirely　from
experience；　and　we　draw　inferences；　since　we　expect　similar　results　to　follow　from　similar　causes；
by　reason　of　the　principle　of　the　custom　or　habit　of　conjoining　different　manifestations；　i。e。　by
reason　of　the　principle　of　the　association　of　ideas。　Hence　there　is　no　knowledge　and　no
metaphysics　beyond　experience。”　（4）

The　simple　thought　we　have　here　is　exactly　what　Locke　says；　that　we　must　receive　the　conception
of　cause　and　effect；　and　thus　of　a　necessary　connection；　from　experience；　but　experience；　as
sensuous　perception；　contains　no　necessity；　has　no　causal　connection。　For　in　what　we　term　such；
that　which　we　properly　speaking　perceive　is　merely　the　fact　that　something　first　of　all　happens　and
that　then　something　else　follows。　Immediate　perception　relates　only　to　a　content　of　conditions　or
things　which　are　present　alongside　of　and　in　succession　to　one　another；　but　not　to　what　we　call
cause　and　effect；　in　time…succession　there　is　thus　no　relation　of　cause　and　effect；　and　consequently
no　necessity　either。　（5）　When　we　say　the　pressure　of　the　water　is　the　cause　of　the　destruction　of
this　house；　that　is　no　pure　experience。　We　have　merely　seen　the　water　pressing　or　moving　along　in
this　direction；　and　subsequently　the　house　falling　down；　and　so　with　other　examples。　Necessity　is
thus　not　justified　by　experience；　but　we　carry　it　into　experience；　it　is　accidentally　arrived　at　by　us
and　is　subjective　merely。　This　kind　of　universality　which　we　connect　with　necessity；　Hume　calls
custom。　Because　we　have　often　seen　results　to　follow　we　are　accustomed　to　regard　the
connection　as　a　necessary　one；　the　necessity　to　him　is　thus　a　quite　contingent　association　of　ideas；
which　is　custom。

It　is　the　same　thing　in　respect　of　the　universal。　What　we　perceive　are　individual　phenomena　and
sensations　in　which　we　see　that　this　is　now　one　thing　and　now　another。　It　may　likewise　be　that　we
perceive　the　same　determination　frequently　repeated　and　in　manifold　ways。　But　this　is　still　far
removed　from　universality；　universality　is　a　determination　which　is　not　given　to　us　through
experience。　It　may　be　said　that　this　is　quite　a　correct　remark　on　Hume's　part；　if　by　experience　we
understand　outward　experience。　Experience　is　sensible　that　something　exists；　but　nevertheless　the
universal　is　not　as　yet　present　in　it。　Indeed；　sensuous　existence　as　such　is　something　which　is　set
forth　as　indifferent；　not　differentiated　from　anything　else；　but　sensuous　existence　is　likewise
universal　in　itself；　or　the　indifference　of　its　determinateness　is　not　its　only　determinateness。　But
since　Hume　regards　necessity；　the　unity　of　opposites；　as　resting　quite　subjectively　on　custom；　we
cannot　get　any　deeper　in　thought。　Custom　is　indeed　so　far　a　necessity　in　consciousness；　and　to　this
extent　we　really　see　the　principle　of　this　idealism　in　it；　but　in　the　second　place　this　necessity　is
represented　as　something　quite　devoid　of　thought　or　Notion。

This　custom　obtains　both　in　our　perception　which　relates　to　sensuous　nature；　and　in　relation　to　law
and　morality。　The　ideas　of　justice　and　morality　rest　upon　an　instinct；　on　a　subjective；　but　very　often
deceptive　moral　feeling。　（6）　From　a　sceptical　point　of　view　the　opposite　may　likewise　be
demonstrated。　From　this　side　Hume　considers　justice；　morality；　religious　determinations；　and
disputes　their　absolute　validity。　That　is　to　say　when　it　is　assumed　that　our　knowledge　arises　from
experience；　and　that　we　must　consider　only　what　we　obtain　thereby　to　be　the　truth；　we　find　indeed
in　our　feeling；　the　sentiment　e。g。　that　the　murderer；　the　thief；　&c。；　must　be　punished；　and　because
this　is　likewise　felt　by　others　it　is　universally　allowed。　But　Hume；　like　the　sceptics　of　former　days；
appeals　to　the　various　opinions　of　various　nations：　amongst　different　nations　and　in　different　times
various　standards　of　right　have　been　held。　（7）　There　are　those　who　in　this　case　do　not　have　the
feeling　of　wrongdoing　in　respect　of　stealing；　e。g。　the　Laced？monians　or　the　so…called　innocent
inhabitants　of　the　South　Sea　Islands。　What　is　by　one　nation　called　immoral；　shameful　and
irreligious；　is　by　another　not　considered　so　at　all。　Thus　because　such　matters　rest　upon　experience；
one　subject　has　such　and　such　an　experience；　finds；　for　instance；　in　his　religious　feelings　th