《history of philosophy》

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history of philosophy- 第84部分


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God。 “Or” we know the thing if we “perceive its immediate conditions as they come in due
succession。 Thus; for instance; we comprehend a circle when we can clearly represent to
ourselves the mechanism of its origination or its physical conditions; we know the syllogistic
formul? when we have actually come to know the laws to which the human understanding is
subject in judgment and conclusion; its physical nature and its mechanism。 For this reason we have
no conceptions of qualities as such; but only intuitions。 Even of our present existence we have a
feeling only; but no conceptions。 Genuine conceptions we have merely of figure; number; position;
movement and the forms of thought; qualities are known and understood; if they are traced back
to these and objectively annulled。” This is undoubtedly really finite knowledge; which is to give
the determinate conditions of anything determinate; to demonstrate it as resulting from another
cause; in such a way that each condition is again conditioned and finite。 Jacobi continues: “The
business of reason is really progressive union and connection; and its speculative business is union
and connection in accordance with the known laws of necessity; i。e。 of identity。 Everything that
reason can bring forth by means of analysis; combination; judgment; conclusion; and
re…conception; consists in nothing but things of nature” (i。e。 finite things); “and reason itself; as a
limited existence; belongs to these things。 But the whole of nature; the sum of all conditioned
existence; cannot reveal more to the investigating understanding than what is contained in it;
namely; manifold existence; changes; a succession of forms” (the conditioned); “and not an actual
beginning” (of the world); “nor a real principle of any objective existence。〃(7)

But Jacobi in the second place here accepts reason in a wider sense and says: “If we understand
by reason the principle of knowledge generally; it is the mind from which the whole living nature of
man is constituted; through it man arises; he is a form which it has adopted。” With this Jacobi's
view of the attempt to know the unconditioned is connected。 “I take the whole human being and
find that his consciousness is composed of two original conceptions; the conceptions of the
conditioned and the unconditioned。 Both are inseparably bound up with one another; and yet in
such a way that the conception of the conditioned presupposes the conception of the
unconditioned; and can be given in this alone。 We are just as certain of its existence as we are of
our own conditioned existence; or even more so。 Since our conditioned existence rests on an
infinitude of mediations; there is opened up to our investigation a vast field which; for the sake of
our preservation even; we are forced to work upon。” It would; however; be quite another thing
to wish to know the unconditioned apart from this practical end。 However Jacobi here remarks;
“To try to discover the conditions of the unconditioned; to find a possibility for absolute necessity;
and to construct this last in order to be able to comprehend it; is what we undertake when we
endeavour to make nature an existence comprehensible to us; i。e。 a merely natural existence; and
to bring the mechanism of the principle of mechanism into the light of day。 For if everything which
can be said to arise and be present in a way comprehensible to us; must arise and be present in a
conditioned way; we remain; so long as we continue to comprehend; in a chain of conditioned
conditions。 Where this chain breaks off; we cease to comprehend; and there the connection which
we call nature likewise ceases。 The conception of the possibility of the outward existence of nature
would thus be the conception of an absolute beginning or origin of nature; it would be the
conception of the unconditioned itself in so far as it is a conditioning of nature not naturally
connected; i。e。 a conditioning of nature unconnected and unconditioned for us。 Now should a
conception of what is thus unconditioned and unconnected; and consequently supernatural; be
possible; the unconditioned must cease to be unconditioned; it must itself receive conditions; and
absolute necessity must commence to be possibility in order that it may allow itself to be
constructed。〃(8) This is contradictory。

Jacobi then passes on from this point to the second of his main propositions; “The unconditioned
is called the supernatural。 Now since everything which lies outside the connection of what is
conditioned; of what is naturally mediated; also lies outside the sphere of our clear and certain
knowledge; and cannot be understood through conceptions; the supernatural cannot be accepted
in any other way by us than that in which it is given to us — namely as a fact。 It is! This
supernatural; this essence of all essence; all tongues join in proclaiming to be God。〃(9) God as the
universal; the true; is here taken in the sense of a spiritual generally; in the sense of power;
wisdom; &c。 That God is; however; is to Jacobi not absolutely true; for to knowledge pertains His
objective absolute existence; but He cannot be said to be known。 It is thus merely a fact of my
consciousness that God exists independently apart from my consciousness; this; however; is itself
maintained through my consciousness; the subjective attitude of thought is thus to Jacobi the
element of most importance。 The consciousness of God; which is in our consciousness; is;
however; of such a nature that along with the thought of God we have immediately associated the
fact that He is。 The existence of the supernatural and super…sensuous; to which the thought of man
regarding the natural and finite passes on; is just as certain to Jacobi as he is himself。 This certainty
is identical with his self…consciousness; as certainly as I am; so certainly is God (Jacobi's Werke;
Vol。 III。 p。 35)。 Since he thus passes back into self…consciousness; the unconditioned is only for us
in an immediate way; this immediate knowledge Jacobi calls Faith; inward revelation (Werke; Vol。
II。 pp。 3; 4); to this appeal can be made in man。 God; the absolute; the unconditioned; cannot;
according; to Jacobi; be proved。 For proof; comprehension; means to discover conditions for
something; to derive it from conditions; but a derived absolute; God; &c。; would thus not be
absolute at all; would not be unconditioned; would not be God (Jacobi's Werke; Vol。 III。 p。 7)。
This immediate knowledge of God is then the point which is maintained in the philosophy of
Jacobi。 The faith of Kant and of Jacobi are; however; different。 To Kant it is a postulate of reason;
it is the demand for the solution of the contradiction between the world and goodness; to Jacobi it
is represented on its immediate knowledge。

Everything which has been written upon God since Jacobi's time; by philosophers such as Fries
and by theologians; rests on this conception of immediate intellectual knowledge; and men even
call this revelation; though in another sense than the revelation of theology。 Revelation as
immediate knowledge is in ourselves; while the Church holds revelation to be something imparted
from without。(10) In the theological sense; faith is faith in something which is given to us through
teaching。 It is a sort of deception when faith and revelation are spoken of and represented as if
faith and revelation in the theological sense were here in question; for the sense in which they are
used; and which may be termed philosophic; is quite a different one; however pious an air may be
assumed in using the terms。 This is Jacobi's standpoint; and whatever is by philosophers and
theologians said against it; this teaching is eagerly accepted and disseminated。 And nowhere is
there anything to be found but reflections originating from Jacobi; whereby immediate knowledge
is opposed to philosophic knowledge and to reason; and people speak of reason; philosophy;
&c。; as a blind man speaks of colours。 It is; indeed; allowed that a man cannot make shoes unless
he is a shoemaker; even although he have the measure and foot; and also the hands。 But when
Philosophy is concerned; immediate knowledge signifies that every man as he walks and stand is a
philosopher; that he can dogmatize as he chooses; and that he is completely acquainted with
Philosophy。

By reason; however; mediate knowledge merely is on the one hand understood; and on the other
the intellectual perception which speaks of facts (supra; pp。 413…415)。 In this respect it is true that
reason is the knowledge and revelation of absolute truth; since the understanding is the revelation
of the finite (Jacobi's Werke; Vol。 II。 pp。 8…14; 101)。 “We maintained that two different powers of
perception in man have to be accepted: a power of perception through visible and tangible and
consequently corporeal organs of perception; and another kind of power; viz。 through an invisible
organ which in no way represents itself to the outward senses; and whose existence is made
known to us through feeling alone。 This organ; a spiritual eye for spiritual objects; has been called
by men — generally speaking — reason。 He whom the pure feelings of the beautiful and
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