human spirit： in it we have the source of the knowledge of God； and all externality of authority is
thus abrogated in this principle。 The principle is hereby gained； but only the principle of freedom of
spirit； and the greatness of our time rests in the fact that freedom； the peculiar possession of mind
whereby it is at home with itself in itself； is recognized； and that mind has this consciousness within
itself。 This however is merely abstract； for the next step is that the principle of freedom is again
purified and comes to its true objectivity； so that not everything which strikes me or springs up
within me must； because it is manifested in me； hold good its true。 It is only through thought； which
casts off the particular and accidental； that the principle receives this objectivity which is
independent of mere subjectivity and in and for itself — though in such a way that the freedom of
mind still remains respected。 One's own spirit must bear witness to spirit that God is Spirit； the
content must be true。 But this does not give authenticity to itself by its being revealed with certainty
to me。 This is the standpoint； and we have thus seen its deficiency and the greatness of the
principle which is involved in it。
1。 Tenneman's Grundriss von Wendt； § 406； p。 531； Rixner： Handbuch der geschichte der
Philosophie； Vol。 III。 § 145； p。 317； Jacobi's Werke； Vol。 IV。 Sec。 1； p。 3。
2。 Jacobi： Brief über die Lehre des Spinoza （second edition； 1789）； pp。 85； 86 （Werke； Vol。 IV。
Sec。 1； p。 110）。
3。 Buhle： Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie； Part VIII。 pp。 386； 387； Mendelssohn's
Morgenstunden （second edition； 1786）； pp。 293…296。
4。 Jacobi： Briefe über die Lehre des Spinoza； IV。 Prop。 pp。 225； 223 （pp。 223； 216）。
5。 Infra； pp。 418； 419。
6。 Jacobi's Werke； Vol。 II； pp。 7 seq。； p。 221； note。
7。 Jacobi： Brief über die Lehre des Spinoza； supplement vii。 pp。 419…421； and note （Werke； Vol。
IV。 Sec。 2； pp。 149…151）。
8。 Jacobi： Briefe über die Lehre des Spinoza； supplement vii。 pp。 422…426 （pp。 151…156）。
9。 Ibidem； pp。 426； 427 （pp。 155； 156）。
10。 Cf。 Jacobi's Werke； Vol。 III。 p。 277。
11。 Jacobi： Briefe über die Lehre des Spinoza； pp。 216； 217 （p。 211）。
Section Three： Recent German Philosophy
B。 Kant。
The philosophy of Kant； which we have now more parcularly to consider； made its appearance at
the same time as the above。 While Descartes asserted certainty to be the unity of thought and
Being； we now have the consciousness of thought in its subjectivity； i。e。 in the first place； as
determinateness in contrast with objectivity； and then as finitude and progression in finite
determinations。 Abstract thought； as personal conviction is that which is maintained as certain； its
contents are experience； but the methods adopted by experience are once more formal thought
and argument。 Kant turns back to the standpoint of Socrates； we see in him the freedom of the
subject as we saw it with the Stoics； but the task in respect of content is now placed on a higher
level。 An endless aiming at the concrete is required for thought； a filling up in accordance with the
rule which completion prescribes； which signifies that the content is itself the Idea as the unity of
the Notion and reality。 With Jacobi thought； demonstration； does not in the first place reach
beyond the finite and conditioned； and in the Second place； even when God is likewise the
metaphysical object； the demonstration is really the making Him conditioned and finite； in the third
place the unconditioned； what is then immediately certain； only exists in faith； a subjectively fixed
point of view but an unknowable one； that is to say an undetermined； indeterminable； and
consequently an unfruitful one。 The standpoint of the philosophy of Kant； on the contrary； is in the
first place to be found in the fact that thought has through its reasoning got so far as to grasp itself
not as contingent but rather as in itself the absolute ultimate。 In the finite； in connection with the
finite； an absolute standpoint is raised which acts as a connecting bond； it binds together the finite
and leads up to the infinite。 Thought grasped itself as all in all； as absolute in judgment； for it
nothing external is authoritative； since all authority can receive validity only through thought。 This
thought； determining itself within itself and concrete； is； however； in the second place； grasped as
subjective； and this aspect of subjectivity is the form which from Jacobi’s point of view is
predominant； the fact that thought is concrete Jacobi has on the other hand for the most part set
aside。 Both standpoints remain philosophies of subjectivity； since thought is subjective； the
capacity of knowing the absolute is denied to it。 To Kant God cannot on the one hand be found in
experience； He can neither be found in outward experience — as Lalande discovered when he
swept the whole heavens and found no God — nor can He be discovered within； though no doubt
mystics and enthusiasts can experience many things in themselves； and amongst these God； i。e。 the
Infinite。 On the other hand Kant argues to prove the existence of God； who is to him an hypothesis
necessary for the explanation of things； a postulate of practical reason。 But in this connection
another French astronomer made the following reply to the Emperor Napoleon： “Je n’ai pas eu
besoin de cette hypothèse。” According to this the truth underlying the Kantian philosophy is the
recognition of freedom。 Even Rousseau represented the absolute to be found in freedom； Kant has
the same principle； but taken rather from the theoretic side。 The French regard it from the side of
will； which is represented in their proverb： 〃Il a la tête près du bonnet。” France possesses the
sense of actuality； of promptitude； because in that country conception passes more immediately
into action； men have there applied themselves more practically to the affairs of actuality。 But
however much freedom may be in itself concrete； it was as undeveloped and in its abstraction that
it was there applied to actuality； and to make abstractions hold good in actuality means to destroy
actuality。 The fanaticism which characterized the freedom which was put into the hands of the
people was frightful。 In Germany the same principle asserted the rights of consciousness on its
own account； but it has been worked out in a merely theoretic way。 We have commotions of
every kind within us and around us； but through them all the German head quietly keeps its
nightcap on and silently carries on its operations beneath it。
Immanuel Kant was born at K？nigsberg in 1724； and there studied theology to begin with； in the
year 1755 he entered upon his work as an academic teacher； in 1770 he became professor of
logic； and in 1801 he died at K？nigsberg on the 12th of February； having almost attained his
eightieth year （Tennemann’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie by Wendt； § 380； pp。
465； 466）； without ever having left his native town。
While to Wolff thought as thought was merely positive self…identity and grasped itself as such； we
saw the negative self…moving thought； the absolute Notion； appear in all its power in France； and
in the Aufkl？rung it likewise made its way to Germany in such a manner that all existence； all
action； was called upon to serve a useful purpose； i。e。 the implicit was done away with and
everything had to be for another； and that for which everything had to be is man；
self…consciousness； taken； however； as signifying all men generally。 The consciousness of this
action in abstract form is the Kantian philosophy。 It is thus the self…thinking absolute Notion that
passes into itself which we see making its appearance in Germany through this philosophy； in such
a way that all reality falls within self…consciousness； it is the idealism which vindicates all moments
of the implicit to self…consciousness； but which at first itself remains subject to a contradiction；
inasmuch as it still separates this implicit from itself。 In other words the Kantian philosophy no
doubt leads reality back to self…consciousness； but it can supply no reality to this essence of
self…consciousness； or to this pure self…consciousness； nor can it demonstrate Being in the same。 It
apprehends simple thought as having difference in itself； but does not yet apprehend that all reality
rests on this difference； it does not know how to obtain mastery over the individuality of
self…consciousness； and although it describes reason very well； it does this in an unthinking empiric
way which again robs it of the truth it has。 Theoretically the Kantian philosophy is the
“Illumination” or Aufkl？rung reduced to method； it states that nothing true can be known； but
only the phenomenal； it leads knowledge into consciousness and self…consciousness； but from this
standpoint maintains it to be a subjective and finite knowledge。 Thus although it deals with the
infinite Idea； expressing its formal categories and arriving at its concrete claims； it yet again denies
this to be the truth； making it a simple subjective； because it has once for all accepted finite
knowle