in their objective sense； but in so far as thought is the source of such synthetic relationships； the
necessary and universal thus here receive the significance of resting in our faculties of knowledge。
But from this faculty of knowledge Kant still separates the implicit； the thing…in…itself； so that the
universality and necessity are all the time a subjective conditionment of knowledge merely； and
reason with its universality and necessity does not attain to a knowledge of the truth。（5） For it
requires perception and experience； a material empirically given in order； as subjectivity； to attain
to knowledge。 As Kant says； these form its “constituent parts”； one part it has in itself； but the
other is empirically given。（6） When reason desires to be independent； to exist in itself and to derive
truth from itself； it becomes transcendent； it transcends experience because it lacks the other
constituent； and then creates mere hallucinations of the brain。 It is hence not constitutive in
knowledge but only regulative； it is the unity and rule for the sensuous manifold。 But this unity on its
own account is the unconditioned； which； transcending experience； merely arrives at
contradictions。 In the practical sphere alone is reason constitutive。 The critique of reason is
consequently not the knowing of objects； but of knowledge and its principles； its range and
limitations； so that it does not become transcendent。（7） This is an extremely general account of
what we shall now consider in its separate details。
In dealing with this matter Kant adopts the plan of first considering theoretic reason； the
knowledge which relates to outward objects。 In the second place he investigates the will as
self…actualization； and； in the third place； the faculty of judgment； the special consideration of the
unity of the universal and individual； how far he gets in this matter we shall likewise see。 But the
critique of the faculty of knowledge is the matter of main importance。
1。 Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft （sixth edition； Leipzig； 1818）； pp。 4； 11； 13； 93。
2。 Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft； pp。 3…5。
3。 Ibidem； Preface； pp。 xviii。； xix。
4。 Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft； pp。 8； 9； 75； 77； 15。
5。 Kant： Kritik der reinen Vernunft； pp。 255； 256。
6。 Ibidem； p。 107。
7。 Ibidem； pp。 497； 498； Kritik der prakt。 Vernunft （fourth edition； Riga； 1797）； p。 254； Kritik
der Urtheilskraft （third edition； Berlin； 1799）； Preface； p。 v。
Section Three： Recent German Philosophy
C。 Fichte。
Fichte created a great sensation in his time； his philosophy is the Kantian philosophy in its
completion； and； as we must specially notice； it is set forth in a more logical way。 He does not
pass beyond the fundamentals of Kant's philosophy； and at first regarded his own philosophy as
no more than a systematic working out of the other。（1） In addition to these systems of
philosophies； and that of Schelling； there are none。 Any that pretend to be such merely pick out
something from these； and over this they fight and wrangle among themselves。 Ils se sont battus
les flanes； pour être de grands hommes。 For in those times there were in Germany many
systems of philosophy； such as those of Reinhold； Krug； Bouterweck； Fries； Schulze； &c。； but in
them there is only an extremely limited point of view； combined with boastfulness — a strange
medley of stray thoughts and conceptions or facts which I find within me。 But their thoughts are all
derived from Fichte； Kant； or Schelling — that is in so far as there are thoughts there present at all。
Or else some slight modification is added； and this for the most part merely consists in making the
great principles barren； what points in them were living are destroyed； or else subordinate forms
are changed； whereby another principle is said to be set forth； though when we look closer we
find that these principles are but the principles of one of those philosophies that have gone before。
This may serve as a justification for my not speaking further of all these philosophies； any
exposition of them would be no more than a demonstration that everything in them is taken from
Kant； Fichte； or Schelling； and that the modification in form is only the semblance of a change；
while really it indicates a deterioration in the principles of those philosophies。
Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born on the 19th of May； 1762； at Rammenau； near Bischoffswerda；
in Upper Lusatia。 He studied at Jena； and for some time was a private tutor in Switzerland。 He
wrote a treatise on Religion； termed a “Critique of all Revelation；” where the Kantian phraseology
is employed throughout — so much so that it was thought to be the work of Kant。 After this he
was in 1793 summoned to Jena by Goethe as Professor of Philosophy； which appointment he；
however； resigned in the year 1799； on account of an unpleasantness which had arisen through his
essay “On the ground of our Belief in a Divine Government of the World。” For Fichte published a
journal in Jena； and a paper in it which was by someone else was regarded as atheistical。 Fichte
might have kept silence； but he published the above…mentioned essay as an introduction to the
article。 The authorities wished an investigation to be made into the matter。 Then Fichte wrote a
letter which contained threats； and respecting it Goethe said that a Government ought not to allow
itself to be threatened。 Fichte now taught privately for some time in Berlin； in 1805 he became
professor at Erlangen； and in 1809 at Berlin； at which place he died on the 27th January； 1814。（2）
We cannot here deal more particularly with the details of his life。
In what is termed the philosophy of Fichte a distinction must be made between his
properly…speaking speculative philosophy； in which the argument is most consistently worked out；
and which is less well known； and his popular philosophy； to which belong the lectures delivered in
Berlin before a mixed audience； and； for example； the work termed a “Guidance to a Blessed
Life。” These last have much in them that is affecting and edifying — many who call themselves the
disciples of Fichte know this side alone — and they are expressed in language most impressive to a
cultured； religious temperament。 In the history of Philosophy； however； such cannot be taken into
consideration； although through their matter they may have the highest possible value； the content
has to be speculatively developed； and that is done in Fichte's earlier philosophic works alone。（3）
1。 The First Principles of Fichte's Philosophy。
As we mentioned above （p。 478）； the shortcoming in the Kantian philosophy was its unthinking
inconsistency； through which speculative unity was lacking to the whole system； and this
shortcoming was removed by Fichte。 It is the absolute form which Fichte laid hold of； or in other
words； the absolute form is just the absolute Being…for…self； absolute negativity； not individuality；
but the Notion of individuality； and thereby the Notion of actuality； Fichte's philosophy is thus the
development of form in itself。 He maintained the ego to be the absolute principle； so that from it；
the direct and immediate certainty of self； all the matter in the universe must be represented as
produced； hence； according to Fichte； reason is in itself a synthesis of Notion and actuality。 But
this principle he once more in an equally one…sided manner set aside； it is from the very beginning
subjective； conditioned by an opposite； and its realization is a continual rushing onward in finitude；
a looking back at what has gone before。 The form in which it is presented has also the
disadvantage； and indeed； the real drawback of bringing the empiric ego ever before one's eyes；
which is absurd； and quite distracting to one's point of view。
The claims of Philosophy have advanced so far that in the first place self…consciousness refuses
any longer to regard absolute essence as immediate substance which does not in itself possess
difference； reality； and actuality。 Against this substance self…consciousness ever struggled； for it
does not find its explicit Being there； and consequently feels the lack of freedom。 But besides this it
demanded that this essence； objectively presented； should be personal； living； self…conscious；
actual； and not shut up in abstract metaphysical thoughts alone。 On the other hand consciousness；
for which the other is； demanded the moment of external actuality； Being as such； into which
thought must pass； truth in objective existence； and this is what we more especially noticed in
connection with the English。 This Notion； which is immediately actuality； and this actuality which is
immediately its Notion； and that indeed in such a way that there neither is a third thought above
this unity； nor is it an immediate unity which does not possess difference； separation； within it； is
the ego； it is the self…distinction of opposites within itself。 That whereby it distinguishes itself from
the simplicity of thought； and distinguishes this other； is likewise immediately for it； it is identical
with； or not distinguished from it。（4） Hence it is pure thought； o