you have nothing to reproach me with。 My comfort is； you are as
much a sceptic as I am。
。 There； Hylas； I must beg leave to differ from you。
。 What！ Have you all along agreed to the premises； and
do you now deny the conclusion； and leave me to maintain those
paradoxes by myself which you led me into？ This surely is not
fair。
。 deny that I agreed with you in those notions
that led to Scepticism。 You indeed said the of sensible
things consisted in ； or distinct from their being perceived。 And pursuant to
this notion of reality； are obliged to deny sensible things
any ｛212｝ real existence： that is； according to your own
definition； you profess yourself a sceptic。 But I neither said
nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined
after that manner。 To me it is evident for the reasons you allow
of； that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or
spirit。 Whence I conclude； not that they have no real existence；
but that。； seeing they depend not on my thought； and have all
existence distinct from being perceived by me； 。 As sure； therefore； as the
sensible world really exists； so sure is there an infinite
omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it。
。 What！ This is no more than I and all Christians hold；
nay； and all others too who believe there is a God； and that He
knows and comprehends all things。
。 Aye； but here lies the difference。 Men commonly
believe that all things are known or perceived by God； because
they believe the being of a God； whereas I； on the other side；
immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God； because
all sensible things must be perceived by Him。
。 But； so long as we all believe the same thing； what
matter is it how we come by that belief？
。 But neither do we agree in the same opinion。 For
philosophers； though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be
perceived by God； yet they attribute to them an absolute
subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind
whatever； which I do not。 Besides； is there no difference between
saying； ； ；
and saying； ； ； ； ： ？ This
furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration； from a
most evident principle； of the 。 Divines and
philosophers had proved beyond all controversy； from the beauty
and usefulness of the several parts of the creation； that it was
the workmanship of God。 But that setting aside all help of
astronomy and natural philosophy； all contemplation of the
contrivance； order； and adjustment of things an infinite Mind
should be necessarily inferred from the bare ； is an advantage to them only who have made this
easy reflexion： that the sensible world is that which we perceive
by our several senses； and that nothing is perceived by the
senses beside ideas； and that no ｛213｝ idea or archetype of an
idea can exist otherwise than in a mind。 You may now； without any
laborious search into the sciences； without any subtlety of
reason； or tedious length of discourse； oppose and baffle the
most strenuous advocate for Atheism。 Those miserable refuges；
whether in an eternal succession of unthinking causes and
effects； or in a fortuitous concourse of atoms； those wild
imaginations of Vanini； Hobbes； and Spinoza： in a word； the whole
system of Atheism； is it not entirely overthrown； by this single
reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole； or
any part； even the most rude and shapeless； of the visible world；
to exist without a mind？ Let any one of those abettors of impiety
but look into his own thoughts； and there try if he can conceive
how so much as a rock； a desert； a chaos； or confused jumble of
atoms； how anything at all； either sensible or imaginable； can
exist independent of a Mind； and he need go no farther to be
convinced of his folly。 Can anything be fairer than to put a
dispute on such an issue； and leave it to a man himself to see if
he can conceive； even in thought； what he holds to be true in
fact； and from a notional to allow it a real existence？
。 It cannot be denied there is something highly
serviceable to religion in what you advance。 But do you not think
it looks very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns；
of ？
。 I would gladly know that opinion： pray explain it to
me。
。 They conceive that the soul； being immaterial； is
incapable of being united with material things； so as to perceive
them in themselves； but that she perceives them by her union with
the substance of God； which； being spiritual； is therefore purely
intelligible； or capable of being the immediate object of a
spirit's thought。 Besides the Divine essence contains in it
perfections correspondent to each created being； and which are；
for that reason； proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind。
。 I do not understand how our ideas； which are things
altogether passive and inert； can be the essence； or any part （or
like any part） of the essence or substance of God； who is an
｛214｝ impassive； indivisible； pure； active being。 Many more
difficulties and objections there are which occur at first view
against this hypothesis； but I shall only add that it is liable
to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis； in making a
created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit。
Besides all which it hath this peculiar to itself； that it makes
that material world serve to no purpose。 And； if it pass for a
good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences； that they
suppose Nature； or the Divine wisdom； to make something in vain；
or do that by tedious roundabout methods which might have been
performed in a much more easy and compendious way； what shall we
think of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in
vain？
。 But what say you？ Are not you too of opinion that we
see all things in God？ If I mistake not； what you advance comes
near it。
。 ＇Few men think； yet all have opinions。 Hence men's
opinions are superficial and confused。 It is nothing strange that
tenets which in themselves are ever so different； should
nevertheless be confounded with each other； by those who do not
consider them attentively。 I shall not therefore be surprised if
some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche；
though in truth I am very remote from it。 He builds on the most
abstract general ideas； which I entirely disclaim。 He asserts an
absolute external world； which I deny。 He maintains that we are
deceived by our senses； and； know not the real natures or the
true forms and figures of extended beings； of all which I hold
the direct contrary。 So that upon the whole there are no
Principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine。 It must
be owned that＇＇5＇ I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture
saith； 〃That in God we live and move and have our being。〃 But
that we see things in His essence； after the manner above set
forth； I am far from believing。 Take here in brief my meaning：
It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas； and
that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind： nor is it less
plain that these ideas or things by me perceived； either
themselves or their archetypes； exist independently of my mind；
since I know myself not to be their author； it being out of my
power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be
affected with upon opening my eyes or ears： they must therefore
exist in some other Mind； whose ｛215｝ Will it is they should be
exhibited to me。 The things； I say； immediately perceived are
ideas or sensations； call them which you will。 But how can any
idea or sensation exist in； or be produced by； anything but a
mind or spirit？ This indeed is inconceivable。 And to assert that
which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense： is it not？
。 Without doubt。
。 But； on the other hand； it is very conceivable that
they should exist in and be produced by a spirit； since this is
no more than I daily experience in myself； inasmuch as I perceive
numberless ideas； and； by an act of my will； can form a great
variety of them； and raise them up in my imagination： though； it
must be confessed； these creatures of the fancy are not
altogether so distinct； so strong； vivid； and permanent； as those
perceived by my senses which latter are called 。
From all which I conclude； 。
； from the variety； order； and manner of these； I conclude
； ； ； 。 it well； I do not say； I see things by
perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible
Substance of God。 This I do not understand；