objects； perceived by the mediation of ideas； which are their
images and representations。 Now； I own ideas do not exist without
the mind； but the latter sort of objects do。 I am sorry I did not
think of this distinction sooner； it would probably have cut
short your discourse。
。 Are those external objects perceived by sense or by
some other faculty？
。 They are perceived by sense。
。 Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is
not immediately perceived？
。 Yes； Philonous； in some sort there is。 For example；
when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar； I may be
said after a manner to perceive him （though not immediately） by
my senses。
。 It seems then you will have our ideas； which alone
are immediately perceived； to be pictures of external things： and
that these also are perceived by sense； inasmuch as they have a
conformity or resemblance to our ideas？
。 That is my meaning。
。 And； in the same way that Julius Caesar； in himself
invisible； is nevertheless perceived by sight； real things； in
themselves imperceptible； are perceived by sense。
。 In the very same。
。 Tell me； Hylas； when you behold the picture of
Julius Caesar； do you see with your eyes any more than some
colours and figures； with a certain symmetry and composition of
the whole？
。 Nothing else。
。 And would not a man who had never known anything of
Julius Caesar see as much？ ｛204｝
。 He would。
。 Consequently he hath his sight； and the use of it；
in as perfect a degree as you？
。 I agree with you。
。 Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed
to the Roman emperor； and his are not？ This cannot proceed from
the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived； since you
acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect。 It
should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory： should
it not？
。 It should。
。 Consequently； it will not follow from that instance
that anything is perceived by sense which is not； immediately
perceived。 Though I grant we may； in one acceptation； be said to
perceive sensible things mediately by sense： that is； when； from
a frequently perceived connexion； the immediate perception of
ideas by one sense to the mind others； perhaps
belonging to another sense； which are wont to be connected with
them。 For instance； when I hear a coach drive along the streets；
immediately I perceive only the sound； but； from the experience I
have had that such a sound is connected with a coach； I am said
to hear the coach。 It is nevertheless evident that； in truth and
strictness； nothing can be ； and the coach is
not then properly perceived by sense； but suggested from
experience。 So likewise when we are said to see a red…hot bar of
iron； the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of
sight； but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure
which are properly perceived by that sense。 In short； those
things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense；
which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then
been first conferred on us。 As for other things； it is plain they
are only suggested to the mind by experience； grounded on former
perceptions。 But； to return to your comparison of Caesar's
picture； it is plain； if you keep to that； you must hold the real
things； or archetypes of our ideas； are not perceived by sense；
but by some internal faculty of the soul； as reason or memory。 I
would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason
for the existence of what you call 。 Or； whether you remember to have seen them formerly as
they are in themselves； or； if you have heard or read of any one
that did。 ｛205｝
。 I see； Philonous； you are disposed to raillery； but
that will never convince me。
。 My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at
the knowledge of 。 Whatever we perceive is
perceived immediately or mediately： by sense； or by reason and
reflexion。 But； as you have excluded sense； pray shew me what
reason you have to believe their existence； or what you
can possibly make use of to prove it； either to mine or your own
understanding。
。 To deal ingenuously； Philonous； now I consider the
point； I do not find I can give you any good reason for it。 But；
thus much seems pretty plain； that it is at least possible such
things may really exist。 And； as long as there is no absurdity in
supposing them； I am resolved to believe as I did； till you bring
good reasons to the contrary。
。 What！ Is it come to this； that you only
the existence of material objects； and that your belief is
founded barely on the possibility of its being true？ Then you
will have me bring reasons against it： though another would think
it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the
affirmative。 And； after all； this very point which you are now
resolved to maintain； without any reason； is in effect what you
have more than once during this discourse seen good reason to
give up。 But； to pass over all this； if I understand you rightly；
you say our ideas do not exist without the mind； but that they
are copies； images； or representations； of certain originals that
do？
。 You take me right。
。 They are then like external things？
。 They are。
。 Have those things a stable and permanent nature；
independent of our senses； or are they in a perpetual change；
upon our producing any motions in our bodies suspending；
exerting； or altering； our faculties or organs of sense？
。 Real things； it is plain； have a fixed and real
nature； which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our
senses； or in the posture and motion of our bodies； which indeed
may affect the ideas in our minds； but it were absurd to think
they had the same effect on things existing without the mind。
。 How then is it possible that things perpetually
fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of
anything fixed and constant？ Or； in other words； since all
sensible ｛206｝ qualities； as size； figure； colour； &c。； that is；
our ideas； are continually changing； upon every alteration in the
distance； medium； or instruments of sensation； how can any
determinate material objects be properly represented or painted
forth by several distinct things； each of which is so different
from and unlike the rest？ Or； if you say it resembles some one
only of our ideas； how shall we be able to distinguish the true
copy from all the false ones？
。 I profess； Philonous； I am at a loss。 I know not what
to say to this。
。 But neither is this all。 Which are material objects
in themselves perceptible or imperceptible？
。 Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but
ideas。 All material things； therefore； are in themselves
insensible； and to be perceived only by our ideas。
。 Ideas then are sensible； and their archetypes or
originals insensible？
。 Right。
。 But how can that which is sensible be like that
which is insensible？ Can a real thing； in itself ； be
like a ； or a real thing； which is not ； be like
a ？ In a word； can anything be like a sensation or idea；
but another sensation or idea？
。 I must own； I think not。
。 Is it possible there should be any doubt on the
point？ Do。 you not perfectly know your own ideas？
。 I know them perfectly； since what I do not perceive
or know can be no part of my idea。
。 Consider； therefore； and examine them； and then tell
me if there be anything in them which can exist without the mind：
or if you can conceive anything like them existing without the
mind。
。 Upon inquiry； I find it is impossible for me to
conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be like an
idea。 And it is most evident that 。
。 You are therefore； by your principles； forced to
deny the of sensible things； since you made it to
consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind。 That is to
say； you are a downright sceptic。 So I have gained my point；
which was to shew your principles led to Scepticism。 ｛207｝
。 For the present I am； if not entirely convinced； at
least silenced。
。 I would fain know what more you would require in
order to a perfect conviction。 Have you not had the liberty of
explaining yourself all manner of ways？ Were any little slips in
discourse laid hold and insisted on？ Or were you not allowed to
retract or reinforce anything you had offered； as best served
your purpose？ Hath not everything you could say been heard and
examined with all the fairness imaginable？ In a word have you not
in every point been convinced out of your own mouth？ And； if you
can at present discover any flaw in any of your former
concessions； or