captains of the civil war- 第39部分

Then　came　Chancellorsville；　doubts　at　Washington；　interference　by　Stanton；　ill…judged　orders　from　Halleck；　and　some　not　very　judicious　rejoinders　from　Hooker　himself；　who　became　rather　peevish；　to　Lincoln's　alarm。　So　when；　on　the　twentyseventh　of　June；　Hooker　tendered　his　resignation；　it　was　promptly　accepted。　With　Lee　in　Pennsylvania　there　was　no　time　for　discussion：　only　for　finding　some　one　to　trust。

Lee；　as　usual；　had　divined　the　political　forces　working　on　the　Union　armies　from　Washington　and　had　maneuvered　with　a　combination　of　skill　and　daring　that　exactly　met　the　situation。　Throwing　his　left　forward　（under　Ewell）　in　the　Shenandoah　Valley　he　had　driven　Milroy　out　of　Winchester　on　the　fourteenth　of　June　and　next　day　secured　a　foothold　across　the　Potomac。　Then　the　rest　of　his　army　followed。　It　was　so　much　stretched　out　（to　facilitate　its　food　supply）　that　Lincoln　again　wished　to　strike　it　at　any　vulnerable　spot。　But　the　Cabinet　in　general　（and　Stanton　in　particular）　were　still　determined　that　the　Union　army　should　be　their　passive　shield；　not　their　active　sword。　On　the　twenty…fourth　Ewell　was　already　beginning　to　semicircle　Gettysburg　from　the　Cumberland　Valley。　On　the　twenty…eighth；　the　day　on　which　Meade　succeeded　Hooker　in　the　Federal　command；　the　Confederate　semicircle；　now　formed　by　Lee's　whole　army；　stretched　from　Chambersburg　on　the　west；　through　Carlisle　on　the　north；　to　York　on　the　east；　while　the　massed　Federals　were　still　in　Maryland；　near　Middletown　and　Frederick；　thirty　miles　south　of　Gettysburg；　and　only　forty　miles　northwest　of　nervous　Washington。

Hooker's　successor；　George　G。　Meade；　was　the　fifth　defender　of　Washington　within　the　last　ten　months。　Luckily　for　the　Union；　Meade　was　a　sound；　though　not　a　great；　commander；　and　his　hands　were　fairly　free。　Luckily　again；　he　was　succeeded　in　command　of　the　Fifth　Corps　by　George　Sykes；　the　excellent　leader　of　those　magnificent　regulars　who　fought　so　well　at　Antietam　and　Second　Manassas。　The　change　from　interference　to　control　was　made　only　just　in　time　at　Washington；　for　three　days　after　Meade's　free　hand　began　to　feel　its　way　along　the　threatened　front　the　armies　met　upon　the　unexpected　battlefield　of　Gettysburg。

Lee　in　Pennsylvania　was　in　the　midst　of　a　very　hostile　population　and　facing　superior　forces　which　he　could　only　defeat　in　one　of　two　difficult　ways：　either　by　a　sudden；　bewildering；　and　unexpected　attack；　like　Jackson's　and　his　own　at　Chancellorsville；　or　by　an　impregnable　defense　on　ground　that　also　favored　a　victorious　counter…attack　and　the　subsequent　crushing　pursuit。　But　there　was　no　Jackson　now；　and　the　nature　of　the　country　did　not　favor　the　bewildering　of　Federals　who　were　fighting　at　home　under　excellent　generals　well　served　by　a　competent　staff　and　well　screened　by　cavalry。　So　the　〃fog　of　war〃　was　quite　as　dense　round　Lee's　headquarters　as　it　was　round　Meade's　on　the　first　of　July；　when　Lee　found　that　his　chosen　point　of　concentration　near　Gettysburg　was　already　occupied　by　Buford's　cavalry；　with　infantry　and　some　artillery　in　support。　The　surpriseand　no　very　great　surprisewas　mutual。　The　Federals　were　found　where　they　could　stand　on　their　defense　in　a　very　strong　position　if　the　rest　of　their　army　could　come　up　in　time。　And　Lee's　only　advantage　was　that；　having　already　ordered　concentration　round　the　same　position；　he　had　a　few　hours'　start　of　Meade　in　getting　there。

Each　commander　had　intended　to　make　the　other　one　attack　if　possible；　and　Meade　of　course　knew　that　Lee；　with　inferior　numbers　and　vastly　inferior　supplies；　could　not　afford　to　stay　long　among　gathering　enemies　in　the　hostile　North　without　decisive　action。　The　Confederates　must　either　fight　or　retreat　without　fighting；　and　make　their　choice　very　soon。　So；　when　the　two　armies　met　at　Gettysburg；　Lee　was　practically　forced　to　risk　an　immediate　action　or　begin　a　retreat　that　might　have　ruined　Confederate　morale。

Gettysburg　is　one　of　those　battles　about　which　men　will　always　differ。　The　numbers　present；　the　behavior　of　subordinates；　the　tactics　employed；　were；　and　still　are；　subjects　of　dispute。　Above　all；　there　is　the　vexed　question　of　what　Lee　should　or　should　not　have　done。　We　have　little　space　to　spare　for　any　such　discussions。　We　can　only　refer　inquirers　to　the　original　evidence　（some　of　which　is　most　conflicting）　and　give　the　gist　of　what　seems　to　be　indubitable　fact。　The　numbers　were　a　good　seventy　thousand　Confederates　against　about　eighty　thousand　Federals。　But　these　are　the　approximate　grand　totals；　and　it　must　be　remembered　that　the　Confederates；　having　the　start；　were　in　superior　numbers　during　the　first　two　days。　On　each　side　there　was　an　aggrieved　and　aggrieving　subordinate　general；　Sickles　on　the　Federal　side；　Longstreet　on　the　other。　But　Sickles　was　by　far　the　less　important　of　the　two。　In　tactics　the　Federals　displayed　great　judgment；　skill；　and　resolution。　The　Northern　people　called　Gettysburg　a　soldiers'　battle；　and　so；　in　many　ways；　it　was；　for　there　was　heroic　work　among　the　rank　and　file　on　both　sides。　But　it　most　emphatically　was　not　a　soldiers'　battle　in　the　sense　of　its　having　been　won　more　by　the　rank　and　file　than　by　the　generals　in　high　command；　for　never　did　so　many　Federal　chiefs　show　to　such　great　advantage。　No　less　than　five　commanded　in　succession　between　morning　and　midnight　on　the　first　day；　each　meeting　the　crisis　till　the　next　senior　came　up。　They　were　Buford；　Reynolds；　Howard；　Hancock；　Meade。　Hunt　also　excelled　in　command　of　the　artillery；　and　this　in　spite　of　much　misorganization　of　that　arm　at　Washington。　Warren　was　not　only　a　good　commander　of　the　engineers　but　a　good　all…round　general；　as　he　showed　by　seizing；　on　his　own　initiative；　the　Little　Round　Top；　without　which　the　left　flank　could　never　have　been　held。

Finally；　there　is　the　great　vexed　question　of　what　Lee　should　or　should　not　have　done。　First；　it　seems　clear　that　（like　Farragut　and　unlike　Grant　and　Jackson）　he　lacked　the　ruthless　power　of　making　every　subordinate　bend　or　break　in　every　time　of　crisis：　otherwise　he　would　have　bent　or　broken　Longstreet。　Next；　it　may　have　been　that　he　was　not　then　at　his　best。　Concludingly；　it　may　be　granted　to　armchair　（and　even　other）　critics　that　if　everything　had　been　something　else　the　results　might　not　have　been　the　same。


Lee；　having　invaded　the　North　by　marching　northeast　under　cover　of　the　mountains　and　wheeling　southeast　to　concentrate　at　Gettysburg；　found　Buford's　cavalry　suddenly　resisting　him；　as　they　formed　the　northwest　outpost　of　Meade's　army；　which　was　itself　concentrating　round　Pipe　Creek；　near　Taneytown　in　Maryland；　fifteen　miles　southeast。　Gettysburg　was　a　meeting　place　of　many　important　roads。　It　stood　at　the　western　end　of　a　branch　line　connecting　with　all　the　eastern　rails。　And　it　occupied　a　strong　strategic　point　in　the　vitally　important　triangle　formed　by　Pittsburgh；　Philadelphia；　and　Washington。　Thus；　like　a　magnet；　it　drew　the　contending　armies　to　what　they　knew　would　prove　a　field　decisive　of　the　whole　campaign。

The　Federal　line；　as　finally　held　on　the　third　of　July；　was　nearly　five　miles　long。　The　front　faced　west　and　was　nearly　three　miles　long。　The　flanks；　thrown　back　at　right　angles；　faced　north　and　south。　Near　the　north　end　of　the　front　stood　Cemetery　Hill；　near　the　south　the　Devil's　Den；　a　maze　of　gigantic　bowlders。　Along　the　front　the　ground　was　mostly　ridged；　and　even　the　lower　ground　about　the　center　was　a　rise　from　which　a　gradual　slope　went　down　to　the　valley　that　rose　again　to　the　opposite　heights　of　Seminary　Ridge；　where　Lee　had　his　headquarters　only　a　mile　away。　The　so…called　hills　were　no　more　than　hillocks；　the　ridges　were　low；　and　most　slopes　were　those　of　a　rolling　country。　But　the　general　contour　of　the　ground；　the　swelling　hillocks　on　the　flanks　（Culp's　Hill　on　the　right；　the　Round　Tops　on　the　left）　and　the　broad　glacis　up　which　attackers　must　advance　against　the　center；　all　combined　to　make　the　position　very　strong　indeed　when　held　by　even　or　superior　numbers。

The　first　day's　fight　began　when　A。P。　Hill's　Confederates；　with　Longstreet's　following；　closed　in　on　Gettysburg　from　the　west　to　meet　Ewell's；　who　were　coming　down　from　the　north。　Buford's　Federal　cavalry　resisted　Hill's　advanced　brigades　successfully　till　Reynolds　had　brought　the　First　Corps　forward　in　support　and　ordered　the　two　other　nearest　corps　to　follow　at　the　double　quick。　Reynolds　was　killed　early　in　the　day；　but　not　before　his　well　trained　eye　had　taken　in　the　situation　at　a　glance　and　his　sure　judgment　had　half　committed　both　armies　to　that　famous　field。

The　full　commitment　came　shortly　after；　when　Meade　sent　Hancock　forward　to　command　the　three　corps　and　Buford's　cavalry　in　their　attempt　to　stem　the　Confederate　advance。　Howard　was　then　the　senior　general　on　the　field；　having　taken　over　from　Doubleday；　who　had　succeeded　Reynolds。　But　he　at　once　agreed　that　such　a　strong　position　should　be　held　and　that　Hancock　should　proceed　to　rectify　the　lines。　This　was　no　easy　task；　for　Ewell's　Confederates　had　meanwhile　come　down　from　the　north　and　driven　in　the　Federal　flank　on　the　already　hard…pressed　front。　The　front　thereupon　gave　way　and　fell　back　in　confusion。　But　Hancock's　masterly　work　was　quickly　done　and　the　Federal　line　w