such as remorse； guilt； and the like； on the ground that these could be explained only as
proceeding out of a will that is free。 Then from these phenomena was deduced the so…called proof
that the will is free。 But it is more convenient to take a short cut and hold that freedom is given as a
fact of consciousness； and must be believed in。
The nature of the will and of freedom； and the proof that the will is free； can be shown； as has
already been observed （§ 2）； only in connection with the whole。 The ground principles of the
premises that spirit is in the first instance intelligence； and that the phases； through which it passes
in its development； namely from feeling； through imaginative thinking to thought； are the way by
which it produces itself as will； which； in turn； as the practical spirit in general； is the most direct
truth of intelligence … I have presented in my Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences
（1817）； and hope some day to be able to give of them a more complete exposition。 There is； to
my mind； so much the more need for me to give my contribution to； as I hope； the more thorough
knowledge of the nature of spirit； Since； as I have there said； it would be difficult to find a
philosophic science in a more neglected and evil plight than is that theory of spirit； which is
commonly called psychology。 Some elements of the conception of will； resulting from the premises
enumerated above are mentioned in this and the following paragraphs。 As to these； appeal may
moreover be made to every individual to see them in his own self…consciousness。 Everyone will； in
the first place； find in himself the ability to abstract himself from all that he is； and in this way prove
himself able of himself to set every content within himself； and thus have in his own consciousness
an illustration of all the subsequent phases。
§ 5。
The will contains ＇a＇ the element of pure indeterminateness； i。e。； the pure
doubling of the I back in thought upon itself。 In this process every limit or
content； present though it be directly by way of nature； as in want； appetite or
impulse； or given in any specific way； is dissolved。 Thus we have the limitless
infinitude of absolute abstraction； or universality； the pure thought of itself。
Remark： Those who treat thinking and willing as two special peculiar and separate faculties；
and； further； look upon thought is detrimental to the will； especially the good will； show from the
very start that they know nothing of the nature of willing a remark which we shall be called upon to
a number of times upon the same attitude of mind。 The will on one side is the possibility of
abstraction from every aspect in which the I finds itself or has set itself up。 It reckons any content
as a limit； and flees from it。 This is one of the forms of the self…direction of the will； and is by
imaginative thinking insisted upon as of itself freedom。 It is the negative side of the will； or freedom
as apprehended by the understanding。 This freedom is that of the void； which his taken actual
shape； and is stirred to passion。 It； while remaining purely theoretical； appears in Hindu religion as
the fanaticism of pure contemplation； but becoming actual it assumes both in politics and religion
the form of a fanaticism； which would destroy the established social order； remove all individuals
suspected of desiring any kind of order； and demolish any organisation which then sought to rise
out of the ruins only in devastation does the negative will feel that it has reality。 It intends； indeed；
to bring to pass some positive social condition； such as universal equality or universal religious life。
But in fact it does not will the positive reality of any such condition； since that would carry in its
train a system； and introduce a separation by way of institutions and between individuals。 But
classification and objective system attain self consciousness only by destroying negative freedom。
Negative freedom is actuated by a mere solitary idea； whose realisation is nothing but the fury of
desolation。
Addition。 This phase of will implies that I break loose from everything； give up all ends； and
bury myself in abstraction。 It is man alone who can let go everything； even life。 He can commit
suicide； an act impossible for the animal； which always remains only negative； abiding in a state
foreign to itself； to which it must merely get accustomed is pure thought of himself； and only in
thinking has he the power to give himself universality and distinguish in himself all that is particular
and definite。
Negative freedom； or freedom of the understanding； is one…sided； yet as this one…sidedness
contains an essential feature； it is not to be discarded。 But the defect of the understanding is that it
exalts its one…sidedness to the sole highest place。 This form of freedom frequently occurs in
history。 By the Hindus； e。g。； the highest freedom is declared to be persistence in the consciousness
of one's simple identity with himself； to abide in the empty space of one's own inner being； like the
colourless light of pure intuition； and to renounce every； activity of life； every purpose and every
idea。 In this way man becomes Brahma； there is no longer any distinction between finite man and
Brahma； every difference having been swallowed up in this universality。 A more concrete
manifestation of this freedom is fanaticism of political and religious life。 Of this nature was the
terrible epoch of the French Revolution； by which all distinctions in talent and authority were to
have been superseded。 In this time of upheaval and commotion any specific thing was intolerable。
Fanaticism wills an abstraction and not an articulate association。 It finds all distinctions antagonistic
to its indefiniteness； and supersedes them。 Hence in the French Revolution the people abolished
the institutions which they themselves had set up； since every institution is inimical to the abstract
self…consciousness of equality。
§ 6。
＇b＇ The I is also the transition from blank indefiniteness to the distinct and
definite establishment of a definite content and object； whether this content be
given by nature or produced out of the conception of spirit。 Through this
establishment of itself as a definite thing the I becomes a reality。 This is the
absolute element of the finitude or specialisation of the I。
Remark： This second element in the characterisation of the I is just as negative as the first； since
it annuls and replaces the first abstract negativity。 As the particular is contained in the universal； so
this second phase is contained already in the first； and is only an establishing of what the first is
implicitly。 The first phase； if taken independents； is not the true infinitude； i。e。； the concrete
universal； or the conception； but limited and one…sided。 In that it is the abstraction from all definite
character； it has a definite character。 Its abstract and one…sided nature constitutes its definite
character； its defect and finitude。
The distinct characterisation of these two phases of the I is found in the philosophy of Fichte as
also in that of Kant。 Only； in the exposition of Fichte the I； when taken as unlimited； as it is in the
first proposition of his Wissenschaftslehre； is merely positive。 It is the universality and identity
made by the understanding。 Hence this abstract I is in its independence to be taken as the truth； to
which by way of mere addition comes in the second proposition； the limitation； or the negative in
general； whether it be in the form of a given external limit or of an activity of the I。 To apprehend
the negative as immanent in the universal or self…identical； and also as in the I； was the next step；
which speculative philosophy had to make。 Of this want they have no presentiment； who like
Fichte never apprehend that the infinite and finite are； if separated； abstract； and must be seen as
immanent one in the other。
Addition。 This second element makes its appearance as the opposite of the first ； it is to be
understood in its general form： it belongs to freedom but does not constitute the whole of it。 Here
the I passes over from blank indeterminateness to the distinct establishment of a specific character
as a content or object。 I do not will merely； but I will something。 Such a will； as is analysed in the
preceding paragraph； wills only the abstract universal； and therefore wills nothing。 Hence it is not a
will。 The particular thing； which the will wills is a limitation； since the will； in order to be a will； must
in general limit itself。 Limit or negation consists in the will willing something Particularising is thus as
a rule named finitude。 Ordinary reflection holds the first element； that of the indefinite； for the
absolute and higher。 and the limited for a mere negation of this indefiniteness。 But this indefiniteness
is itself only a negation； in contrast with the definite and finite。 The I is solitude and absolute
negation。 The indefinite will is thus quite as much one…sided as the will； which continues merely in
the definite。
§