fideicommissa and substitutiones （in order to favour sons by excluding daughters from inheriting；
or to favour the eldest son by excluding the other children） is an infringement of the principle of the
freedom of property （see § 62）； like the admission of any other inequality in the treatment of heirs。
And besides； such an institution depends on an arbitrariness which in and by itself has no right to
recognition； or more precisely on the thought of wishing to preserve intact not so much this family
but rather this clan or 'house'。 Yet it is not this clan or 'house'； but the family proper which is the
Idea and which therefore possesses the right to recognition； and both the ethical disposition and
family trees are much more likely to be preserved by freedom of property and equality of
inheritance than by the reverse of these。
Institutions of this kind； like the Roman； wholly ignore the right due to marriage； because by a
marriage the foundation of a unique actual family is eo ipso completed （see § 172）； and because
what is called； in contrast with the new family； the family in the wide sense； i。e。 the stirps or gens；
becomes only an abstraction （see § 177） growing less and less actual the further it recedes into
the background as one generation succeeds another。 Love； the ethical moment in marriage； is by
its very nature a feeling for actual living individuals； not for an abstraction。 This abstraction of the
Understanding ＇the gens＇ appears in history as the principle underlying the contribution of the
Roman Empire to world history （see § 357）。 In the higher sphere of the state； a right of
primogeniture arises together with estates rigidly entailed； it arises； however； not arbitrarily but as
the inevitable outcome of the Idea of the state。 On this point see below； § 306。
Addition： In earlier times； a Roman father had the right to disinherit his children and even kill
them。 Later he lost both these rights。 Attempts were made to forge into a legal system this
incoherence between unethical institutions and devices to rob them of that character； and it is the
retention of this incoherence which constitutes the deficiency and difficulty of the German law of
inheritance。 To be sure； the right to make a will must be conceded； but in conceding it our point of
view must be that this right of free choice arises or is magnified with the dispersion and
estrangement of the members of the family。 Further； the so…called 'family of friends' which
testamentary disposition brings with it may be admitted only in defect of members of the family
proper； i。e。 of spouse and children。 To make a will at all entails something obnoxious and
disagreeable； because in making it I reveal the names of my favourites。 Favour； however； is
arbitrary； it may be gained surreptitiously by a variety of expedients； it may depend on all sorts of
foolish reasons； and as a condition of having his name included in a will； a beneficiary may be
required to subject himself to the most abject servilities。 In England； the home of all sorts of
eccentricity； there is no end to the folly and whimsicality of bequests。
Transition of the Family into Civil Society
§ 181。
The family disintegrates （both essentially； through the working of the principle of
personality； and also in the course of nature） into a plurality of families； each of
which conducts itself as in principle a self…subsistent concrete person and
therefore as externally related to its neighbours。 In other words； the moments
bound together in the unity of the family； since the family is the ethical Idea still
in its concept； must be released from the concept to self…subsistent objective
reality。 This is the stage of difference。 This gives us； to use abstract language in
the first place； the determination of particularity which is related to universality
but in such a way that universality is its basic principle； though still only an inward
principle； for that reason； the universal merely shows in the particular as its form。
Hence this relation of reflection prima facie portrays the disappearance of ethical
life or； since this life as the essence necessarily shows itself； this relation
constitutes the world of ethical appearance … civil society。
Remark： The expansion of the family； as its transition into a new principle； is in the external
world sometimes its peaceful expansion until it becomes a people； i。e。 a nation； which thus has a
common natural origin； or sometimes the federation of scattered groups of families under the
influence of an overlord's power or as a result of a voluntary association produced by the tie of
needs and the reciprocity of their satisfaction。
Addition： The； starting…point for the universal here is the self…subsistence of the particular； and
the ethical order seems therefore to be lost at this point； since it is precisely the identity of the
family which consciousness takes to be the primary thing； the divine； and the source of obligation。
Now； however； a situation arises in which the particular is to be my primary determining principle；
and thus my determinacy by ethical factors has been annulled。 But this is nothing but a pure
mistake； since； while I suppose that I am adhering to the particular； the universal and the necessity
of the link between particulars remains the primary and essential thing。 I am thus altogether on the
level of show； and while my particularity remains my determining principle； i。e。 my end； I am for
that very reason the servant of the universal which properly retains power over me in the last
resort。
Third Part： Ethical Life
ii Civil Society
A： System of needs B： Justice C： Corporations
§ 182。
The concrete person； who is himself the object of his particular aims； is； as a
totality and a mixture of caprice and physical necessity； one principle of civil
society。 But the particular person is essentially so related to other particular
persons that each establishes himself and finds satisfaction by means of the
others； and at the same time purely and simply by means of the form of
universality； the second principle here。
Addition： Civil society is the ＇stage of＇ difference which intervenes between the family and
the state； even if its formation follows later in time than that of the state； because； as ＇the stage of＇
difference； it presupposes the state； to subsist itself； it must have the state before its eyes as
something self…subsistent。 Moreover； the creation of civil society is the achievement of the modern
world which has for the first time given all determinations of the Idea their due。 If the state is
represented as a unity of different persons； as a unity which is only a partnership； then what is
really meant is only civil society。 Many modem constitutional lawyers have been able to bring
within their purview no theory of the state but this。 In civil society each member is his own end；
everything else is nothing to him。 But except in contact with others he cannot attain the whole
compass of his ends； and therefore these others are means to the end of the particular member。 A
particular end； however； assumes the form of universality through this relation to other people； and
it is attained in the simultaneous attainment of the welfare of others。 Since particularity is inevitably
conditioned by universality； the whole sphere of civil Society is the territory of mediation where
there is free play for every idiosyncrasy； every talent； every accident of birth and fortune； and
where waves of every passion gush forth； regulated only by reason glinting through them。
Particularity； restricted by universality； is the only standard whereby each particular member
promotes his welfare。
§ 183。
In the course of the actual attainment of selfish ends — an attainment conditioned
in this way by universality — there is formed a system of complete
interdependence； wherein the livelihood； happiness； and legal status of one man is
interwoven with the livelihood； happiness； and rights of all。 On this system；
individual Happiness； &c。； depend； and only in this connected system are they
actualised and secured。 This system may be prima facie regarded as the external
state； the state based on need； the state as the Understanding envisages it。
§ 184。
The Idea in this its stage of division imparts to each of its moments a
characteristic embodiment； to particularity it gives the right to develop and launch
forth in all directions； and to universality the right to prove itself not only the
ground and necessary form of particularity； but also the authority standing over it
and its final end。 It is the system of the ethical order； split into its extremes and
lost； which constitutes the Idea’s abstract moment； its moment of reality。 Here
the Idea is present only as a relative totality and as the inner necessity behind this
outward appearance。
Addition： Here ethical life is split into its extremes and lost； the immediate unity of the family has
fallen apart into a plural