duties are not here in point。）
In the course of the inward development of the concrete Idea； however； its moments become
distinguished and their specific determinacy becomes at the same time a difference of content。 In
the family； the content of a son's duties to his father differs from the content of his rights against
him； the content of the rights of a member of civil society is not the same as the content of his
duties to his prince and government。
This concept of the union of duty and right is a point of vital importance and in it the inner strength
of states is contained。
Duty on its abstract side goes no farther than the persistent neglect and proscription of a man's
particular interest； on the ground that it is the inessential； even the discreditable； moment in his life。
Duty； taken concretely as Idea； reveals the moment of particularity as itself essential and so
regards its satisfaction as indisputably necessary。 In whatever way an individual may fulfil his duty；
he must at the same time find his account therein and attain his personal interest and satisfaction。
Out of his position in the state； a right must accrue to him whereby public affairs shall be his own
particular affair。 Particular interests should in fact not be set aside or completely suppressed；
instead； they should be put in correspondence with the universal； and thereby both they and the
universal are upheld。 The isolated individual； so far as his duties are concerned； is in subjection；
but as a member of civil society he finds in fulfilling his duties to it protection of his person and
property； regard for his private welfare； the satisfaction of the depths of his being； the
consciousness and feeling of himself as a member of the whole； and； in so far as he completely
fulfils his duties by performing tasks and services for the state； he is upheld and preserved。 Take
duty abstractly； and the universal's interest would consist simply in the completion as duties of the
tasks and services which it exacts。
Addition： In the state everything depends on the unity of universal and particular。 In the states
of antiquity； the subjective end simply coincided with the state's will。 In modern times； however；
we make claims for private judgement； private willing； and private conscience。 The ancients had
none of these in the modern sense； the ultimate thing with them was the will of the state。 Whereas
under the despots of Asia the individual had no inner life and no justification in himself； in the
modern world Man insists on respect being paid to his inner life。 The conjunction of duty and right
has a twofold aspect： what the state demands from us as a duty is eo ipso our right as individuals；
since the state is nothing but the articulation of the concept of freedom。 The determinations of the
individual will are given an objective embodiment through the state and thereby they attain their
truth and their actualisation for the first time。 The State is the one and only prerequisite of the
attainment of particular ends and welfare。
§ 262。
The actual Idea is mind； which； sundering itself into the two ideal spheres of its
concept； family and civil society； enters upon its finite phase； but it does so only
in order to rise above its ideality and become explicit as infinite actual mind。 It is
therefore to these ideal spheres that the actual Idea assigns the material of this its
finite actuality； viz。 human beings as a mass； in such a way that the function
assigned to any given individual is visibly mediated by circumstances； his caprice
and his personal choice of his station in life （see § 185 and the Remark thereto）。
Addition： In Plato's state； subjective freedom does not count； because people have their
occupations assigned to them by the Guardians。 In many oriental states； this assignment is
determined by birth。 But subjective freedom； which must be respected； demands that individuals
should have free choice in this matter。
§ 263。
In these spheres in which its moments； particularity and individuality； have their
immediate and reflected reality； mind is present as their objective universality
glimmering in them as the power of reason in necessity （see § 184）； i。e。 as the
institutions considered above。
Addition： The state； as mind； sunders itself into the particular determinations of its concept； of
its mode of being。 We might use here an illustration drawn from nature。 The nervous system is the
sensitive system proper； it is the abstract moment； the moment of being by oneself and so of
having identity with oneself。 But analysis of sensation reveals； that it has two aspects and these are
distinct in such a way that each of them seems to be a whole system by itself The first is feeling in
the abstract； keeping oneself self…enclosed； the dull movement which goes on internally；
reproduction； internal self…nutrition； growth； and digestion。 The second moment is that this
self…related existence has over against it the moment of difference； a movement outwards。 This is
irritability； sensation moving outwards。 This constitutes a system of its own； and there are some of
the lower types of animals which have developed this system alone； while they lack the
soul…charged unity of inner sensation。 If we compare these natural features with those of mind；
then the family must be paralleled with sensibility and civil society with irritability。 Now the third is
the state； the nervous system as I a whole； something inwardly organised； but this lives only in so
far as both moments （in this case family and civil society） are developed within it。 The laws
regulating family and civil society are the institutions of the rational order which glimmers in them。
But the ground and final truth of these institutions is mind； their universal end and known objective。
The family too is ethical； only its end is not known as such； while it is the separation between one
man and another which makes civil society what it is。
§ 264。
Mind is the nature of human beings en masse and their nature is therefore
twofold： （i） at one extreme； explicit individuality of consciousness and will； and
（ii） at the other extreme； universality which knows and wills what is substantive。
Hence they attain their right in both these respects only in so far as both their
private personality and its substantive basis are actualised。 Now in the family and
civil society they acquire their right in the first of these respects directly and in the
second indirectly； in that （i） they find their substantive self…consciousness in social
institutions which are the universal implicit in their particular interests； and （ii） the
Corporation supplies them with an occupation and an activity directed on a
universal end。
§ 265。
These institutions are the components of the constitution （i。e。 of rationality
developed and actualised） in the sphere of particularity。 They are； therefore； the
firm foundation not only of the state but also of the citizen's trust in it and
sentiment towards it。 They are the pillars of public freedom since in them
particular freedom is realised and rational； and therefore there is implicitly present
even in them the union of freedom and necessity。
Addition： As was remarked earlier on； the sanctity of marriage and the institutions in which civil
society is an appearance of ethical life constitute the stability of the whole； i。e。 stability is secured
when universal affairs are the affairs of each member in his particular capacity。 What is of the
utmost importance is that the law of reason should be shot through and through by the law of
particular freedom； and that my particular end should become identified with the universal end； or
otherwise the state is left in the air。 The state is actual only when its members have a feeling of their
own self…hood and it is stable only when public and private ends are identical。 It has often been
said that the end of the state is the happiness of the citizens。 That imperfectly true。 If all is not well
with them； if their subjective aims are not satisfied； if they do not find that the state as such is the
means to their satisfaction； then the footing of the state itself is insecure。
§ 266。
But mind is objective and actual to itself not merely as this necessity and as a
realm of appearance； but also as the ideality and the heart of this necessity。 Only
in this way is this substantive universality aware of itself as its own object and
end； with the result that the necessity appears to itself in the shape of freedom as
well。
§ 267。
This necessity in ideality is the inner self…development of the Idea。 As the
substance of the individual subject； it is his political sentiment ＇patriotism＇； in
distinction therefrom； as the substance of the objective world； it is the organism
of the state； i。e。 it is the strictly political state and its constitution。
Addition： The unity of the freedom which knows and wills itself is present first of all as
necessity。