philosophy of right- 第8部分

This　also　is　the　more　concrete　meaning　of　what　was　a　moment　ago　more
abstractly　called　the　unity　of　form　and　content。　Form　in　its　most　concrete
significance　is　reason；　as　an　intellectual　apprehension　which　conceives　its　object。
Content；　again；　is　reason　as　the　substantive　essence　of　social　order　and　nature。
The　conscious　identity　of　form　and　content　is　the　philosophical　idea。　

It　is　a　self…assertion；　which　does　honour　to　man；　to　recognise　nothing　in　sentiment
which　is　not　justified　by　thought。　This　self…will　is　a　feature　of　modern　times；　being
indeed　the　peculiar　principle　of　Protestantism。　What　was　initiated　by　Luther　as
faith　in　feeling　and　the　witness　of　the　spirit；　the　more　mature　mind　strives　to
apprehend　in　conception。　In　that　way　it　seeks　to　free　itself　in　the　present；　and　so
find　there　itself。　It　is　a　celebrated　saying　that　a　half　philosophy　leads　away　from
God；　while　a　true　philosophy　leads　to　God。　（It　is　the　same　halfness；　I　may　say　in
passing　which　regards　knowledge　as　an　approximation　to　truth。）　This　saying　is
applicable　to　the　science　of　the　state。　Reason　cannot　content　itself　with　a　mere
approximation；　something　which　is　neither　cold　not　hot；　and　must　be　spewed　out
of　the　mouth。　As　little　can　it　be　contented　with　the　cold　scepticism　that　in　this
world　of　time　things　go　badly；　or　at　best　only　moderately　well；　and　that　we　must
keep　the　peace　with　reality；　merely　because　there　is　nothing　better　to　be　had。
Knowledge　creates　a　much　more　vital　peace。　

Only　one　word　more　concerning　the　desire　to　teach　the　world　what　it　ought　to　be。
For　such　a　purpose　philosophy　at　least　always　comes　too　late。　Philosophy；　as　the
thought　of　the　world；　does　not　appear　until　reality　has　completed　its　formative
process；　and　made　itself　ready。　History　thus　corroborates　the　teaching　of　the
conception　that　only　in　the　maturity　of　reality　does　the　ideal　appear　as　counterpart
to　the　real；　apprehends　the　real　world　in　its　substance；　and　shapes　it　into　an
intellectual　kingdom。　When　philosophy　paints　its　grey　in　grey；　one　form　of　life　has
become　old；　and　by　means　of　grey　it　cannot　be　rejuvenated；　but　only　known。　The
owl　of　Minerva；　takes　its　flight　only　when　the　shades　of　night　are　gathering。　

But　it　is　time　to　close　this　preface。　As　a　preface　it　is　its　place　to　speak　only
externally　and　subjectively　of　the　standpoint　of　the　work　which　it　introduces。　A
philosophical　account　of　the　essential　content　needs　a　scientific　and　objective
treatment。　So；　too；　criticisms；　other　than　those　which　proceed　from　such　a
treatment；　must　be　viewed　by　the　author　as　unreflective　convictions。　Such
subjective　criticisms　must　be　for　him　a　matter　of　indifference。　

　　　　　BERLIN；　June　25th；　1820。
　　　　　Translated　by　S　W　Dyde；　1896　




Introduction

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　1。

THE　philosophic　science　of　right　has　as　its　object　the　idea　of　right；　i。e。；　the
conception　of　right　and　the　realisation　of　the　conception。　

Remark：　Philosophy　has　to　do　with　ideas　or　realised　thoughts；　and　hence　not　with　what　we　have
been　accustomed　to　call　mere　conceptions。　It　has　indeed　to　exhibit　the　one…sidedness　and　untruth
of　these　mere　conceptions；　and　to　show　that；　while　that　which　commonly　bears　the　name
〃conception；〃　is　only　an　abstract　product　of　the　understanding；　the　true　conception　alone　has
reality　and　gives　this　reality　to　itself。　Everything；　other　than　the　reality　which　is　established　by　the
conception；　is　transient　surface　existence；　external　attribute；　opinion；　appearance　void　of　essence；
untruth；　delusion；　and　so　forth。　Through　the　actual　shape；　which　it　takes　upon　itself　in　actuality；　is
the　conception　itself　understood。　This　shape　is　the　other　essential　element　of　the　idea；　and　is　to　be
distinguished　from　the　form；　which　exists　only　as　conception。　

Addition。　The　conception　and　its　existence　are　two　sides；　distinct　yet　united；　like　soul　and
body。　The　body　is　the　same　life　as　the　soul；　and　yet　the　two　can　be　named　independently。　A　soul
without　a　body　would　not　be　a　living　thing；　and　vice　versa。　Thus　the　visible　existence　of　the
conception　is　its　body；　just　as　the　body　obeys　the　soul　which　produced　it。　Seeds　contain　the　tree
and　its　whole　power；　though　they　are　not　the　tree　itself　；　the　tree　corresponds　accurately　to　the
simple　structure　of　the　seed。　If　the　body　does　not　correspond　to　the　soul；　it　is　defective。　The　unity
of　visible　existence　and　conception；　of　body　and　soul；　is　the　idea。　It　is　not　a　mere　harmony　of　the
two；　but　their　complete　interpenetration。　There　lives　nothing；　which　is　not　in　some　way　idea。　The
idea　of　right　is　freedom；　which；　if　it　is　to　be　apprehended　truly；　must　be　known　both　in　its
conception　and　in　the　embodiment　of　the　conception。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　2。

The　science　of　right　is　a　part　of　philosophy。　Hence　it　must　develop　the　idea；
which　is　the　reason　of　an　object；　out　of　the　conception。　It　is　the　same　thing　to　say
that　it　must　regard　the　peculiar　internal　development　of　the　thing　itself。　Since　it　is
a　part；　it　has　a　definite　beginning；　which　is　the　result　and　truth　of　what　goes
before；　and　this；　that　goes　before；　constitutes　its　so…called　proof。　Hence　the　origin
of　the　conception　of　right　falls　outside　of　the　science　of　right。　The　deduction　of
the　conception　is　presupposed　in　this　treatise；　and　is　to　be　considered　as　already
given。　

Addition。　Philosophy　forms　a　circle。　It　has；　since　it　must　somehow　make　a　beginning；　a　primary；
directly　given　matter；　which　is　not　proved　and　is　not　a　result。　But　this　starting…point　is　simply
relative；　since；　from　another　point　of　view　it　appears　as　a　result。　Philosophy　is　a　consequence；
which　does　not　hang　in　the　air　or　form　a　directly　new　beginning；　but　is　self…enclosed。　

According　to　the　formal　unphilosophic　method　of　the　sciences；　definition　is　the　first　desideratum；
as　regards；　at　least；　the　external　scientific　form。　The　positive　science　of　right；　however；　is　little
concerned　with　definition；　since　its　special　aim　is　to　give　what　it　is　that　is　right；　and　also　the
particular　phases　of　the　laws。　For　this　reason　it　has　been　said　as　a　warning；　Omnis　definitio　in
jure　civili　periculosa；　and　in　fact　the　more　disconnected　and　contradictory　the　phases　of　a　right
are；　the　less　possible　is　a　definition　of　it。　

A　definition　should　contain　only　universal　features；　but　these　forthwith　bring　to　light　contradictions；
which　in　the　case　of　law　are　injustice；　in　all　their　nakedness。　Thus　in　Roman　law；　for　instance；　no
definition　of　man　was　possible；　because　it　excluded　the　slave。　The　conception　of　man　was
destroyed　by　the　fact　of　slavery。　In　the　same　way　to　have　defined　property　and　owner　would　have
appeared　to　be　perilous　to　many　relations。　But　definitions　may　perhaps　be　derived　from
etymology；　for　the　reason；　principally；　that　in　this　way　special　cases　are　avoided；　and　a；　basis　is
found　in　the　feeling　and　imaginative　thought　of　men。　

The　correctness　of　a　definition　would　thus　consist　in　its　agreement　with　existing　ideas。　By　such　a
method　everything　essentially　scientific　is　cast　aside。　As　regards　the　content　there　is　cast　aside　the
necessity　of　the　self…contained　and　self…developed　object；　and　as　regards　the　form　there　is
discarded　the　nature　of　the　conception。　In　philosophic　knowledge　the　necessity　of　a；　conception　is
the　main　thing；　and　the　process；　by　which　it；　as　a　result；　has　come　into　being　is　the　proof　and
deduction。　After　the　content　is　seen　to　be　necessary　independently；　the　second　point　is　to　look
about　for　that　which　corresponds　to　it　in　existing　ideas　and　modes　of　speech。　But　the　way　in　which
a　conception　exists　in　its　truth；　and　the　way　it　presents　itself　in　random　ideas　not　only　are　but　must
be　different　both　in　form　and　structure。　If　a　notion　is　not　in　its　content　false；　the　conception　can　be
shown　to　be　contained　in　it　and　to　be　already　there　in　its　essential　traits。　

A　notion　may　thus　be　raised　to　the　form　of　a　conception。　But　so　little　is　any　notion　the　measure
and　criterion　of　an　independently　necessary　and　true　conception；　that　it　must　accept　truth　from　the
conception；　be　justified　by　it；　and　know　itself　through　it。　If　the　method　of　knowing；　which　proceeds
by　formal　definition；　inference　and　proof；　has　more　or　less　disappeared；　a　worse　one　has　come　to
take　its　place。　This　new　method　maintains　that　ideas；　as；　e。g。；　the　idea　of　right　in　all　its　aspects；　are
to　be　directly　apprehended　as　mere　facts　of　consciousness；　and　that　natural　feeling　or　that
heightened　form　of　it　which　is　known　as　the　inspiration　of　one's　own　breast；　is　the　source　of　right。
This　method　may　be　the　most　convenient　of　all；　but　it　is　also　the　most　unphilosophic。　Other
features　of　this　view；　referring　not　merely　to　knowledge　but　directly　to　action；　need　not　detain　us
here。　While　the　first　or　formal　method　went　so　far　as　to　require　in　definition　the　form　of　the
conception；　and　in　proof　the　form　of　a　necessity　of　knowledge；　the　method　of　the　intuitive
consciousness　and　feeling　takes　for　its　principle　the　arbitrary　contingent　consciousness　of　the
subject。　In　this　treatise　we　take　for　granted　the　scientific　procedure　of　philosophy；　which　has　been
set　forth　in　the　philosophic　logic。