the critique of pure reason- 第105部分

possible　perception　has　been　added　to　the　experience　of　the　mind。

But　if　we　cogitate　existence　by　the　pure　category　alone；　it　is　not

to　be　wondered　at；　that　we　should　find　ourselves　unable　to　present　any

criterion　sufficient　to　distinguish　it　from　mere　possibility。

　　Whatever　be　the　content　of　our　conception　of　an　object；　it　is

necessary　to　go　beyond　it；　if　we　wish　to　predicate　existence　of　the

object。　In　the　case　of　sensuous　objects；　this　is　attained　by　their

connection　according　to　empirical　laws　with　some　one　of　my

perceptions；　but　there　is　no　means　of　cognizing　the　existence　of

objects　of　pure　thought；　because　it　must　be　cognized　completely　a

priori。　But　all　our　knowledge　of　existence　（be　it　immediately　by

perception；　or　by　inferences　connecting　some　object　with　a　perception）

belongs　entirely　to　the　sphere　of　experience…　which　is　in　perfect

unity　with　itself；　and　although　an　existence　out　of　this　sphere　cannot

be　absolutely　declared　to　be　impossible；　it　is　a　hypothesis　the

truth　of　which　we　have　no　means　of　ascertaining。

　　The　notion　of　a　Supreme　Being　is　in　many　respects　a　highly　useful

idea；　but　for　the　very　reason　that　it　is　an　idea；　it　is　incapable　of

enlarging　our　cognition　with　regard　to　the　existence　of　things。　It

is　not　even　sufficient　to　instruct　us　as　to　the　possibility　of　a　being

which　we　do　not　know　to　exist。　The　analytical　criterion　of

possibility；　which　consists　in　the　absence　of　contradiction　in

propositions；　cannot　be　denied　it。　But　the　connection　of　real

properties　in　a　thing　is　a　synthesis　of　the　possibility　of　which　an

a　priori　judgement　cannot　be　formed；　because　these　realities　are　not

presented　to　us　specifically；　and　even　if　this　were　to　happen；　a

judgement　would　still　be　impossible；　because　the　criterion　of　the

possibility　of　synthetical　cognitions　must　be　sought　for　in　the

world　of　experience；　to　which　the　object　of　an　idea　cannot　belong。　And

thus　the　celebrated　Leibnitz　has　utterly　failed　in　his　attempt　to

establish　upon　a　priori　grounds　the　possibility　of　this　sublime

ideal　being。

　　The　celebrated　ontological　or　Cartesian　argument　for　the　existence

of　a　Supreme　Being　is　therefore　insufficient；　and　we　may　as　well

hope　to　increase　our　stock　of　knowledge　by　the　aid　of　mere　ideas；　as

the　merchant　to　augment　his　wealth　by　the　addition　of　noughts　to　his

cash　account。



　　　　　SECTION　V。　Of　the　Impossibility　of　a　Cosmological　Proof

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　Existence　of　God。



　　It　was　by　no　means　a　natural　course　of　proceeding；　but；　on　the

contrary；　an　invention　entirely　due　to　the　subtlety　of　the　schools；　to

attempt　to　draw　from　a　mere　idea　a　proof　of　the　existence　of　an　object

corresponding　to　it。　Such　a　course　would　never　have　been　pursued；　were

it　not　for　that　need　of　reason　which　requires　it　to　suppose　the

existence　of　a　necessary　being　as　a　basis　for　the　empirical　regress；

and　that；　as　this　necessity　must　be　unconditioned　and　a　priori；　reason

is　bound　to　discover　a　conception　which　shall　satisfy；　if　possible；

this　requirement；　and　enable　us　to　attain　to　the　a　priori　cognition　of

such　a　being。　This　conception　was　thought　to　be　found　in　the　idea　of

an　ens　realissimum；　and　thus　this　idea　was　employed　for　the　attainment

of　a　better　defined　knowledge　of　a　necessary　being；　of　the　existence

of　which　we　were　convinced；　or　persuaded；　on　other　grounds。　Thus

reason　was　seduced　from　her　natural　courage；　and；　instead　of

concluding　with　the　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum；　an　attempt　was

made　to　begin　with　it；　for　the　purpose　of　inferring　from　it　that

idea　of　a　necessary　existence　which　it　was　in　fact　called　in　to

complete。　Thus　arose　that　unfortunate　ontological　argument；　which

neither　satisfies　the　healthy　common　sense　of　humanity；　nor　sustains

the　scientific　examination　of　the　philosopher。

　　The　cosmological　proof；　which　we　are　about　to　examine；　retains　the

connection　between　absolute　necessity　and　the　highest　reality；　but；

instead　of　reasoning　from　this　highest　reality　to　a　necessary

existence；　like　the　preceding　argument；　it　concludes　from　the　given。

unconditioned　necessity　of　some　being　its　unlimited　reality。　The　track

it　pursues；　whether　rational　or　sophistical；　is　at　least　natural；

and　not　only　goes　far　to　persuade　the　common　understanding；　but

shows　itself　deserving　of　respect　from　the　speculative　intellect；

while　it　contains；　at　the　same　time；　the　outlines　of　all　the　arguments

employed　in　natural　theology…　arguments　which　always　have　been；　and

still　will　be；　in　use　and　authority。　These；　however　adorned；　and　hid

under　whatever　embellishments　of　rhetoric　and　sentiment；　are　at　bottom

identical　with　the　arguments　we　are　at　present　to　discuss。　This　proof；

termed　by　Leibnitz　the　argumentum　a　contingentia　mundi；　I　shall　now

lay　before　the　reader；　and　subject　to　a　strict　examination。

　　It　is　framed　in　the　following　manner：　If　something　exists；　an

absolutely　necessary　being　must　likewise　exist。　Now　I；　at　least；

exist。　Consequently；　there　exists　an　absolutely　necessary　being。　The

minor　contains　an　experience；　the　major　reasons　from　a　general

experience　to　the　existence　of　a　necessary　being。*　Thus　this

argument　really　begins　at　experience；　and　is　not　completely　a

priori；　or　ontological。　The　object　of　all　possible　experience　being

the　world；　it　is　called　the　cosmological　proof。　It　contains　no

reference　to　any　peculiar　property　of　sensuous　objects；　by　which

this　world　of　sense　might　be　distinguished　from　other　possible　worlds；

and　in　this　respect　it　differs　from　the　physico…theological　proof；

which　is　based　upon　the　consideration　of　the　peculiar　constitution

of　our　sensuous　world。



　　*This　inference　is　too　well　known　to　require　more　detailed

discussion。　It　is　based　upon　the　spurious　transcendental　law　of

causality；　that　everything　which　is　contingent　has　a　cause；　which；

if　itself　contingent；　must　also　have　a　cause；　and　so　on；　till　the

series　of　subordinated　causes　must　end　with　an　absolutely　necessary

cause；　without　which　it　would　not　possess　completeness。



　　The　proof　proceeds　thus：　A　necessary　being　can　be　determined　only　in

one　way；　that　is；　it　can　be　determined　by　only　one　of　all　possible

opposed　predicates；　consequently；　it　must　be　completely　determined

in　and　by　its　conception。　But　there　is　only　a　single　conception　of　a

thing　possible；　which　completely　determines　the　thing　a　priori：　that

is；　the　conception　of　the　ens　realissimum。　It　follows　that　the

conception　of　the　ens　realissimum　is　the　only　conception　by　and　in

which　we　can　cogitate　a　necessary　being。　Consequently；　a　Supreme　Being

necessarily　exists。

　　In　this　cosmological　argument　are　assembled　so　many　sophistical

propositions　that　speculative　reason　seems　to　have　exerted　in　it　all

her　dialectical　skill　to　produce　a　transcendental　illusion　of　the　most

extreme　character。　We　shall　postpone　an　investigation　of　this　argument

for　the　present；　and　confine　ourselves　to　exposing　the　stratagem　by

which　it　imposes　upon　us　an　old　argument　in　a　new　dress；　and　appeals

to　the　agreement　of　two　witnesses；　the　one　with　the　credentials　of

pure　reason；　and　the　other　with　those　of　empiricism；　while；　in　fact；

it　is　only　the　former　who　has　changed　his　dress　and　voice；　for　the

purpose　of　passing　himself　off　for　an　additional　witness。　That　it

may　possess　a　secure　foundation；　it　bases　its　conclusions　upon

experience；　and　thus　appears　to　be　completely　distinct　from　the

ontological　argument；　which　places　its　confidence　entirely　in　pure　a

priori　conceptions。　But　this　experience　merely　aids　reason　in　making

one　step…　to　the　existence　of　a　necessary　being。　What　the　properties

of　this　being　are　cannot　be　learned　from　experience；　and　therefore

reason　abandons　it　altogether；　and　pursues　its　inquiries　in　the　sphere

of　pure　conception；　for　the　purpose　of　discovering　what　the　properties

of　an　absolutely　necessary　being　ought　to　be；　that　is；　what　among

all　possible　things　contain　the　conditions　（requisita）　of　absolute

necessity。　Reason　believes　that　it　has　discovered　these　requisites

in　the　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum…　and　in　it　alone；　and　hence

concludes：　The　ens　realissimum　is　an　absolutely　necessary　being。　But

it　is　evident　that　reason　has　here　presupposed　that　the　conception

of　an　ens　realissimum　is　perfectly　adequate　to　the　conception　of　a

being　of　absolute　necessity；　that　is；　that　we　may　infer　the

existence　of　the　latter　from　that　of　the　former…　a　proposition　which

formed　the　basis　of　the　ontological　argument；　and　which　is　now

employed　in　the　support　of　the　cosmological　argument；　contrary　to

the　wish　and　professions　of　its　inventors。　For　the　existence　of　an

absolutely　necessary　being　is　given　in　conceptions　alone。　But　if　I

say：　〃The　conception　of　the　ens　realissimum　is　a　conception　of　this

kind；　and　in　fact　the　only　conception　which　is　adequate　to　our　idea　of

a　necessary　being；〃　I　am　obliged　to　admit；　that　the　latter　may　be

inferred　from　the　former。　Thus　it　is　properly　the　ontolog