the critique of pure reason- 第118部分

conception　of　what　the　soul　really　is；　reason　takes　the　conception

of　the　empirical　unity　of　all　thought；　and；　by　cogitating　this　unity

as　unconditioned　and　primitive；　constructs　the　rational　conception

or　idea　of　a　simple　substance　which　is　in　itself　unchangeable；

possessing　personal　identity；　and　in　connection　with　other　real　things

external　to　it；　in　one　word；　it　constructs　the　idea　of　a　simple

self…subsistent　intelligence。　But　the　real　aim　of　reason　in　this

procedure　is　the　attainment　of　principles　of　systematic　unity　for

the　explanation　of　the　phenomena　of　the　soul。　That　is；　reason

desires　to　be　able　to　represent　all　the　determinations　of　the　internal

sense　as　existing　in　one　subject；　all　powers　as　deduced　from　one

fundamental　power；　all　changes　as　mere　varieties　in　the　condition　of　a

being　which　is　permanent　and　always　the　same；　and　all　phenomena　in

space　as　entirely　different　in　their　nature　from　the　procedure　of

thought。　Essential　simplicity　（with　the　other　attributes　predicated　of

the　ego）　is　regarded　as　the　mere　schema　of　this　regulative

principle；　it　is　not　assumed　that　it　is　the　actual　ground　of　the

properties　of　the　soul。　For　these　properties　may　rest　upon　quite

different　grounds；　of　which　we　are　completely　ignorant；　just　as　the

above　predicates　could　not　give　us　any　knowledge　of　the　soul　as　it

is　in　itself；　even　if　we　regarded　them　as　valid　in　respect　of　it；

inasmuch　as　they　constitute　a　mere　idea；　which　cannot　be　represented

in　concreto。　Nothing　but　good　can　result　from　a　psychological　idea

of　this　kind；　if　we　only　take　proper　care　not　to　consider　it　as　more

than　an　idea；　that　is；　if　we　regard　it　as　valid　merely　in　relation

to　the　employment　of　reason；　in　the　sphere　of　the　phenomena　of　the

soul。　Under　the　guidance　of　this　idea；　or　principle；　no　empirical　laws

of　corporeal　phenomena　are　called　in　to　explain　that　which　is　a

phenomenon　of　the　internal　sense　alone；　no　windy　hypotheses　of　the

generation；　annihilation；　and　palingenesis　of　souls　are　admitted。　Thus

the　consideration　of　this　object　of　the　internal　sense　is　kept　pure；

and　unmixed　with　heterogeneous　elements；　while　the　investigation　of

reason　aims　at　reducing　all　the　grounds　of　explanation　employed　in

this　sphere　of　knowledge　to　a　single　principle。　All　this　is　best

effected；　nay；　cannot　be　effected　otherwise　than　by　means　of　such　a

schema；　which　requires　us　to　regard　this　ideal　thing　as　an　actual

existence。　The　psychological　idea　is；　therefore；　meaningless　and

inapplicable；　except　as　the　schema　of　a　regulative　conception。　For；　if

I　ask　whether　the　soul　is　not　really　of　a　spiritual　nature…　it　is　a

question　which　has　no　meaning。　From　such　a　conception　has　been

abstracted；　not　merely　all　corporeal　nature；　but　all　nature；　that

is；　all　the　predicates　of　a　possible　experience；　and　consequently；　all

the　conditions　which　enable　us　to　cogitate　an　object　to　this

conception　have　disappeared。　But；　if　these　conditions　are　absent；　it

is　evident　that　the　conception　is　meaningless。

　　The　second　regulative　idea　of　speculative　reason　is　the　conception

of　the　universe。　For　nature　is　properly　the　only　object　presented　to

us；　in　regard　to　which　reason　requires　regulative　principles。　Nature

is　twofold…　thinking　and　corporeal　nature。　To　cogitate　the　latter　in

regard　to　its　internal　possibility；　that　is；　to　determine　the

application　of　the　categories　to　it；　no　idea　is　required…　no

representation　which　transcends　experience。　In　this　sphere；　therefore；

an　idea　is　impossible；　sensuous　intuition　being　our　only　guide；　while；

in　the　sphere　of　psychology；　we　require　the　fundamental　idea　（I）；

which　contains　a　priori　a　certain　form　of　thought　namely；　the　unity　of

the　ego。　Pure　reason　has；　therefore；　nothing　left　but　nature　in

general；　and　the　completeness　of　conditions　in　nature　in　accordance

with　some　principle。　The　absolute　totality　of　the　series　of　these

conditions　is　an　idea；　which　can　never　be　fully　realized　in　the

empirical　exercise　of　reason；　while　it　is　serviceable　as　a　rule　for

the　procedure　of　reason　in　relation　to　that　totality。　It　requires

us；　in　the　explanation　of　given　phenomena　（in　the　regress　or　ascent　in

the　series）；　to　proceed　as　if　the　series　were　infinite　in　itself；　that

is；　were　prolonged　in　indefinitum；；　while　on　the　other　hand；　where

reason　is　regarded　as　itself　the　determining　cause　（in　the　region　of

freedom）；　we　are　required　to　proceed　as　if　we　had　not　before　us　an

object　of　sense；　but　of　the　pure　understanding。　In　this　latter　case；

the　conditions　do　not　exist　in　the　series　of　phenomena；　but　may　be

placed　quite　out　of　and　beyond　it；　and　the　series　of　conditions　may　be

regarded　as　if　it　had　an　absolute　beginning　from　an　intelligible

cause。　All　this　proves　that　the　cosmological　ideas　are　nothing　but

regulative　principles；　and　not　constitutive；　and　that　their　aim　is　not

to　realize　an　actual　totality　in　such　series。　The　full　discussion　of

this　subject　will　be　found　in　its　proper　place　in　the　chapter　on　the

antinomy　of　pure　reason。

　　The　third　idea　of　pure　reason；　containing　the　hypothesis　of　a

being　which　is　valid　merely　as　a　relative　hypothesis；　is　that　of　the

one　and　all…sufficient　cause　of　all　cosmological　series；　in　other

words；　the　idea　of　God。　We　have　not　the　slightest　ground　absolutely　to

admit　the　existence　of　an　object　corresponding　to　this　idea；　for

what　can　empower　or　authorize　us　to　affirm　the　existence　of　a　being　of

the　highest　perfection…　a　being　whose　existence　is　absolutely

necessary…　merely　because　we　possess　the　conception　of　such　a　being？

The　answer　is：　It　is　the　existence　of　the　world　which　renders　this

hypothesis　necessary。　But　this　answer　makes　it　perfectly　evident

that　the　idea　of　this　being；　like　all　other　speculative　ideas；　is

essentially　nothing　more　than　a　demand　upon　reason　that　it　shall

regulate　the　connection　which　it　and　its　subordinate　faculties

introduce　into　the　phenomena　of　the　world　by　principles　of

systematic　unity　and；　consequently；　that　it　shall　regard　all　phenomena

as　originating　from　one　all…embracing　being；　as　the　supreme　and

all…sufficient　cause。　From　this　it　is　plain　that　the　only　aim　of

reason　in　this　procedure　is　the　establishment　of　its　own　formal　rule

for　the　extension　of　its　dominion　in　the　world　of　experience；　that

it　does　not　aim　at　an　extension　of　its　cognition　beyond　the　limits

of　experience；　and　that；　consequently；　this　idea　does　not　contain

any　constitutive　principle。

　　The　highest　formal　unity；　which　is　based　upon　ideas　alone；　is　the

unity　of　all　things…　a　unity　in　accordance　with　an　aim　or　purpose；　and

the　speculative　interest　of　reason　renders　it　necessary　to　regard

all　order　in　the　world　as　if　it　originated　from　the　intention　and

design　of　a　supreme　reason。　This　principle　unfolds　to　the　view　of

reason　in　the　sphere　of　experience　new　and　enlarged　prospects；　and

invites　it　to　connect　the　phenomena　of　the　world　according　to

teleological　laws；　and　in　this　way　to　attain　to　the　highest　possible

degree　of　systematic　unity。　The　hypothesis　of　a　supreme

intelligence；　as　the　sole　cause　of　the　universe…　an　intelligence　which

has　for　us　no　more　than　an　ideal　existence…　is　accordingly　always　of

the　greatest　service　to　reason。　Thus；　if　we　presuppose；　in　relation　to

the　figure　of　the　earth　（which　is　round；　but　somewhat　flattened　at　the

poles）；*　or　that　of　mountains　or　seas；　wise　designs　on　the　part　of

an　author　of　the　universe；　we　cannot　fail　to　make；　by　the　light　of

this　supposition；　a　great　number　of　interesting　discoveries。　If　we

keep　to　this　hypothesis；　as　a　principle　which　is　purely　regulative；

even　error　cannot　be　very　detrimental。　For；　in　this　case；　error　can

have　no　more　serious　consequences　than　that；　where　we　expected　to

discover　a　teleological　connection　（nexus　finalis）；　only　a

mechanical　or　physical　connection　appears。　In　such　a　case；　we　merely

fail　to　find　the　additional　form　of　unity　we　expected；　but　we　do　not

lose　the　rational　unity　which　the　mind　requires　in　its　procedure　in

experience。　But　even　a　miscarriage　of　this　sort　cannot　affect　the

law　in　its　general　and　teleological　relations。　For　although　we　may

convict　an　anatomist　of　an　error；　when　he　connects　the　limb　of　some

animal　with　a　certain　purpose；　it　is　quite　impossible　to　prove　in　a

single　case　that　any　arrangement　of　nature；　be　it　what　it　may；　is

entirely　without　aim　or　design。　And　thus　medical　physiology；　by　the

aid　of　a　principle　presented　to　it　by　pure　reason；　extends　its　very

limited　empirical　knowledge　of　the　purposes　of　the　different　parts

of　an　organized　body　so　far　that　it　may　be　asserted　with　the　utmost

confidence；　and　with　the　approbation　of　all　reflecting　men；　that　every

organ　or　bodily　part　of　an　animal　has　its　use　and　answers　a　certain

design。　Now；　this　is　a　supposition　which；　if　regarded　as　of　a

constitutive　character；　goes　much　farther　than　any　experience　or

observation　of　ours　can　justify。　Hence　it　is　evident　that　it　is

nothing　more　than　a　regulative　pr