have a separate existence apart from the 〃also〃 connecting them。 The sensuous universality； the
immediate unity of positive being and negative exclusion； is only then a property； when oneness
and pure universality are evolved from it and distinguished from one another； and when that
sensuous universality combines these with one another。 Only after this relation of the unity to those
pure essential moments is effected； is the 〃Thing〃 complete。
This； then； is the way the 〃Thing〃 in perception is constituted； and consciousness is perceptual in
character so far as this 〃Thing〃 is its object： it has merely to 〃take〃 the object （capio…per…ception）
and assume the attitude of pure apprehension； and what comes its way in so doing is truth （das
Wahre）。 If it did something when taking the given； it would by such supplementation or elimination
alter the truth。 Since the object is the true and universal； the self…same； while consciousness is the
variable and non…essential； it may happen that consciousness apprehends the object wrongly and
deceives itself。 The percipient is aware of the possibility of deception； for； in the universality
forming the principle here； the percipient is directly aware of otherness； but aware of it as null and
naught； as what is superseded。 His criterion of truth is therefore self…sameness； and his procedure
is that of apprehending what comes before him as self…same。 Since； at the same time； diversity is a
fact for him； his procedure is a way of relating the diverse moments of his apprehension to one
another。 If； however； in this comparison a want of sameness comes out； this is not an untruth on
the part of the object （for the object is the self…same）； but on the part of perception。
Let us now see what sort of experience consciousness forms in the course of its actual perception。
We； who are analysing the process； find this experience already contained in the development （just
given） of the object and of the attitude of consciousness towards it。 The experience will be merely
the development of the contradictions that appear there。
The object which I apprehend presents itself as purely 〃one〃 and single： also； I am aware of the
〃property〃 （Eigenschaft） in it； a property which is universal； thereby transcending the particularity
of the object。 The first form of being； in which the objective reality has the sense of a 〃one〃； was
thus not its true being； and since the object is the true fact here； the untruth falls on my side； and
the apprehension was not correct。 On account of the universality of the property （Eigenschaft）
I must rather take the objective entity as a community （Gemeinschaft） in general。 I further
perceive now the property to be determinate； opposed to another and excluding this other。 Thus；
in point of fact； I did not apprehend the object rightly when I defined it as a 〃commonness〃 or
community with others； or as continuity； and must rather； taking account of the determinateness
of the property； isolate parts within the continuity and set down the object as a 〃one〃 that
excludes。 In the disintegrated 〃one〃 I find many such properties； which do not affect one another；
but are indifferent to one another。 Thus I did not apprehend the object correctly when I took it for
something that excludes。 The object； instead； just as formerly it was merely continuity in general； is
not a universal common medium where many properties in the form of sense universals subsist；
each for itself and on its own account； and； qua determinate； excluding the others。 The simple and
true fact； which I perceive； is； however； in virtue of this result； not a universal medium either； but
the particular property by itself； which； again； in this form； is neither a property nor a determinate
being； for it is now neither attached to a distince 〃one〃 nor in relation to others。 But the particular
quality is a property only when attached to a 〃one〃； and determinate only in relation to others。 By
being this bare relation of self to self； it remains merely sensuous existence in general； since it no
longer contains the character of negativity； and the mode of consciousness； which is now aware of
a being of sense； is merely a way of 〃meaning〃 （Meinen） or 〃intending〃； i。e。 it has left the attitude of
perception entirely and gone back into itself。 But sense existence and 〃meaning〃 themselves pass
over into perception： I am thrown back on the beginning； and once more dragged into the same
circuit； that supersedes itself in every moment and as a whole。
Consciousness； then； has to go over this cycle again； but not in the same way as on the first
occasion。 For it has found out； regarding perception； that the truth and outcome of perception is its
dissolution； is reflection out of and away from the truth into itself。 In this way consciousness
becomes definitely aware of how its perceptual process is essentially constituted； viz。 that this is
not a simple bare apprehension； but in its apprehension is at the same time reflected out of the true
content back into itself。 This return of consciousness into itself； which is immediately involved and
implicated in that pure apprehension — for this return to self has proved to be essential to
perception — alters the true content。 Consciousness is aware that this aspect is at the same time its
own； and takes it upon itself and by so doing consciousness will thus get the true object bare and
naked。
In this way we have； now； in the case of perception； as happened in the case of sensuous
certainty； the aspect of consciousness being forced back upon itself； but； in the first instance； not in
the sense in which this took place in the former case — i。e。 not as if the truth of perception fell
within it。 Rather consciousness is aware that the untruth； that comes out there； falls within it。 By
knowing this； however； consciousness is able to cancel and supersede this untruth。 It distinguishes
its apprehension of the truth from the untruth of its perception； corrects this untruth； and； so far as
itself takes in hand to make this correction； the truth； qua truth of perception； certainly falls within
its own consciousness。 The procedure of consciousness； which we have now to consider； is thus
so constituted that it no longer merely perceives； but is also conscious of its reflection into self； and
keeps this apart from the simple apprehension proper。
2。 The Contradictoriness of the Perception of “Things”
To begin with； then； I am aware of the 〃thing〃 as a one and have to keep it fixed in this true
character as one〃。 If in the course of perceiving something crops up contradicting that； then I must
take it to be due to my reflection。 Now； in perception various different properties also turn up；
which seem to be properties of the thing。 But the thin is a 〃one〃； and we are aware in ourselves
that this diversity； by which the thing ceases to be a unity； falls in us。 This thing； then； is； in point of
fact； merely white to our eyes； also tart to our tongue； and also cubical to our feeling； and so on。
The entire diversity of these aspects comes not from the thing； but from us； and we find them
falling apart thus from one another； because the organs they affect are quite distinct inter se； the
eye is entirely distinct from the tongue； and so on。 We are； consequently； the universal medium
where such elements get dissociated； and exist each by itself。 By the fact； then； that we regard the
characteristic of being a universal medium as our reflection； we preserve and maintain the
self…sameness and truth of the thing； its being a 〃one〃。
These diverse aspects； which consciousness puts to its side of the account； are； however； each by
itself just as it appears in the universal medium； specifically determined。 White is only in opposition
to black； and so on； and the thing is a 〃one〃 just by the fact that it is opposed to other things。 It
does not； however； exclude others from itself； so far as it is 〃one〃； for to be 〃one〃 is to be in a
universal relation of self to self； and hence by the fact of its being 〃one〃 it is rather like all。 It is
through the determinate characteristic that the thing excludes other things。 Things themselves are
thus determinate in and for themselves； they have properties by which they distinguish themselves
from one another。 Since the property is the special and peculiar property ＇the proper property＇
of the thing； or a specific characteristic in the thing itself； the thing has several properties。 For； in
the first place； the thing is true being； is a being inherently in itself； and what is in it is so as its own
essential nature； and not on account of other things。 Hence； in the second place； the determinate
properties are not on account of other things and for other things； but inherent in that thing itself。
They are； however； determinate properties in it only by the fact that they are several； and maintain
their distinction from one another。 And； in the third self…contained； each in and for itself； and are
indifferent to one another。 It is； then； in truth the thing itself which is white； and also cubical； and
also tart；； and so on； in other words； the thing is the 〃also〃； the general medium