orthodoxy- 第7部分

　　　　　The　phrases　of　the　street　are　not　only　forcible　but　subtle：　



for　a　figure　of　speech　can　often　get　into　a　crack　too　small　for



a　definition。　　Phrases　like　〃put　out〃　or　〃off　colour〃　might　have



been　coined　by　Mr。　Henry　James　in　an　agony　of　verbal　precision。　



And　there　is　no　more　subtle　truth　than　that　of　the　everyday　phrase



about　a　man　having　〃his　heart　in　the　right　place。〃　　It　involves　the



idea　of　normal　proportion；　not　only　does　a　certain　function　exist；



but　it　is　rightly　related　to　other　functions。　　Indeed；　the　negation



of　this　phrase　would　describe　with　peculiar　accuracy　the　somewhat　morbid



mercy　and　perverse　tenderness　of　the　most　representative　moderns。　



If；　for　instance；　I　had　to　describe　with　fairness　the　character



of　Mr。　Bernard　Shaw；　I　could　not　express　myself　more　exactly



than　by　saying　that　he　has　a　heroically　large　and　generous　heart；



but　not　a　heart　in　the　right　place。　　And　this　is　so　of　the　typical



society　of　our　time。







　　　　　The　modern　world　is　not　evil；　in　some　ways　the　modern



world　is　far　too　good。　　It　is　full　of　wild　and　wasted　virtues。　



When　a　religious　scheme　is　shattered　（as　Christianity　was　shattered



at　the　Reformation）；　it　is　not　merely　the　vices　that　are　let　loose。　



The　vices　are；　indeed；　let　loose；　and　they　wander　and　do　damage。　



But　the　virtues　are　let　loose　also；　and　the　virtues　wander



more　wildly；　and　the　virtues　do　more　terrible　damage。　　The　modern



world　is　full　of　the　old　Christian　virtues　gone　mad。　　The　virtues



have　gone　mad　because　they　have　been　isolated　from　each　other



and　are　wandering　alone。　　Thus　some　scientists　care　for　truth；



and　their　truth　is　pitiless。　　Thus　some　humanitarians　only　care



for　pity；　and　their　pity　（I　am　sorry　to　say）　is　often　untruthful。　



For　example；　Mr。　Blatchford　attacks　Christianity　because　he　is　mad



on　one　Christian　virtue：　　the　merely　mystical　and　almost　irrational



virtue　of　charity。　　He　has　a　strange　idea　that　he　will　make　it



easier　to　forgive　sins　by　saying　that　there　are　no　sins　to　forgive。　



Mr。　Blatchford　is　not　only　an　early　Christian；　he　is　the　only



early　Christian　who　ought　really　to　have　been　eaten　by　lions。　



For　in　his　case　the　pagan　accusation　is　really　true：　　his　mercy



would　mean　mere　anarchy。　　He　really　is　the　enemy　of　the　human　race



because　he　is　so　human。　　As　the　other　extreme；　we　may　take



the　acrid　realist；　who　has　deliberately　killed　in　himself　all



human　pleasure　in　happy　tales　or　in　the　healing　of　the　heart。　



Torquemada　tortured　people　physically　for　the　sake　of　moral　truth。　



Zola　tortured　people　morally　for　the　sake　of　physical　truth。　



But　in　Torquemada's　time　there　was　at　least　a　system　that　could



to　some　extent　make　righteousness　and　peace　kiss　each　other。　



Now　they　do　not　even　bow。　　But　a　much　stronger　case　than　these　two　of



truth　and　pity　can　be　found　in　the　remarkable　case　of　the　dislocation



of　humility。







　　　　　It　is　only　with　one　aspect　of　humility　that　we　are　here　concerned。　



Humility　was　largely　meant　as　a　restraint　upon　the　arrogance



and　infinity　of　the　appetite　of　man。　　He　was　always　outstripping



his　mercies　with　his　own　newly　invented　needs。　　His　very　power



of　enjoyment　destroyed　half　his　joys。　　By　asking　for　pleasure；



he　lost　the　chief　pleasure；　for　the　chief　pleasure　is　surprise。　



Hence　it　became　evident　that　if　a　man　would　make　his　world　large；



he　must　be　always　making　himself　small。　　Even　the　haughty　visions；



the　tall　cities；　and　the　toppling　pinnacles　are　the　creations



of　humility。　　Giants　that　tread　down　forests　like　grass　are



the　creations　of　humility。　　Towers　that　vanish　upwards　above



the　loneliest　star　are　the　creations　of　humility。　　For　towers



are　not　tall　unless　we　look　up　at　them；　and　giants　are　not　giants



unless　they　are　larger　than　we。　　All　this　gigantesque　imagination；



which　is；　perhaps；　the　mightiest　of　the　pleasures　of　man；　is　at　bottom



entirely　humble。　　It　is　impossible　without　humility　to　enjoy　anything



even　pride。







　　　　　But　what　we　suffer　from　to…day　is　humility　in　the　wrong　place。　



Modesty　has　moved　from　the　organ　of　ambition。　　Modesty　has　settled



upon　the　organ　of　conviction；　where　it　was　never　meant　to　be。　



A　man　was　meant　to　be　doubtful　about　himself；　but　undoubting　about



the　truth；　this　has　been　exactly　reversed。　　Nowadays　the　part



of　a　man　that　a　man　does　assert　is　exactly　the　part　he　ought　not



to　asserthimself。　　The　part　he　doubts　is　exactly　the　part　he



ought　not　to　doubtthe　Divine　Reason。　　Huxley　preached　a　humility



content　to　learn　from　Nature。　　But　the　new　sceptic　is　so　humble



that　he　doubts　if　he　can　even　learn。　　Thus　we　should　be　wrong　if　we



had　said　hastily　that　there　is　no　humility　typical　of　our　time。　



The　truth　is　that　there　is　a　real　humility　typical　of　our　time；



but　it　so　happens　that　it　is　practically　a　more　poisonous　humility



than　the　wildest　prostrations　of　the　ascetic。　　The　old　humility　was



a　spur　that　prevented　a　man　from　stopping；　not　a　nail　in　his　boot



that　prevented　him　from　going　on。　　For　the　old　humility　made　a　man



doubtful　about　his　efforts；　which　might　make　him　work　harder。　



But　the　new　humility　makes　a　man　doubtful　about　his　aims；　which　will　make



him　stop　working　altogether。







　　　　　At　any　street　corner　we　may　meet　a　man　who　utters　the　frantic



and　blasphemous　statement　that　he　may　be　wrong。　　Every　day　one



comes　across　somebody　who　says　that　of　course　his　view　may　not



be　the　right　one。　　Of　course　his　view　must　be　the　right　one；



or　it　is　not　his　view。　　We　are　on　the　road　to　producing　a　race



of　men　too　mentally　modest　to　believe　in　the　multiplication　table。　



We　are　in　danger　of　seeing　philosophers　who　doubt　the　law　of　gravity



as　being　a　mere　fancy　of　their　own。　　Scoffers　of　old　time　were　too



proud　to　be　convinced；　but　these　are　too　humble　to　be　convinced。　



The　meek　do　inherit　the　earth；　but　the　modern　sceptics　are　too　meek



even　to　claim　their　inheritance。　　It　is　exactly　this　intellectual



helplessness　which　is　our　second　problem。







　　　　　The　last　chapter　has　been　concerned　only　with　a　fact　of　observation：　



that　what　peril　of　morbidity　there　is　for　man　comes　rather　from



his　reason　than　his　imagination。　　It　was　not　meant　to　attack　the



authority　of　reason；　rather　it　is　the　ultimate　purpose　to　defend　it。　



For　it　needs　defence。　　The　whole　modern　world　is　at　war　with　reason；



and　the　tower　already　reels。







　　　　　The　sages；　it　is　often　said；　can　see　no　answer　to　the　riddle



of　religion。　　But　the　trouble　with　our　sages　is　not　that　they



cannot　see　the　answer；　it　is　that　they　cannot　even　see　the　riddle。　



They　are　like　children　so　stupid　as　to　notice　nothing　paradoxical



in　the　playful　assertion　that　a　door　is　not　a　door。　　The　modern



latitudinarians　speak；　for　instance；　about　authority　in　religion



not　only　as　if　there　were　no　reason　in　it；　but　as　if　there　had　never



been　any　reason　for　it。　　Apart　from　seeing　its　philosophical　basis；



they　cannot　even　see　its　historical　cause。　　Religious　authority



has　often；　doubtless；　been　oppressive　or　unreasonable；　just　as



every　legal　system　（and　especially　our　present　one）　has　been



callous　and　full　of　a　cruel　apathy。　　It　is　rational　to　attack



the　police；　nay；　it　is　glorious。　　But　the　modern　critics　of　religious



authority　are　like　men　who　should　attack　the　police　without　ever



having　heard　of　burglars。　　For　there　is　a　great　and　possible　peril



to　the　human　mind：　　a　peril　as　practical　as　burglary。　　Against　it



religious　authority　was　reared；　rightly　or　wrongly；　as　a　barrier。　



And　against　it　something　certainly　must　be　reared　as　a　barrier；



if　our　race　is　to　avoid　ruin。







　　　　　That　peril　is　that　the　human　intellect　is　free　to　destroy　itself。　



Just　as　one　generation　could　prevent　the　very　existence　of　the　next



generation；　by　all　entering　a　monastery　or　jumping　into　the　sea；　so　one



set　of　thinkers　can　in　some　degree　prevent　further　thinking　by　teaching



the　next　generation　that　there　is　no　validity　in　any　human　thought。　



It　is　idle　to　talk　always　of　the　alternative　of　reason　and　faith。　



Reason　is　itself　a　matter　of　faith。　　It　is　an　act　of　faith　to　assert



that　our　thoughts　have　any　relation　to　reality　at　all。　　If　you　are



merely　a　sceptic；　you　must　sooner　or　later　ask　yourself　the　question；



〃Why　should　ANYTHING　go　right；　even　observation　and　deduction？　



Why　should　not　good　logic　be　as　misleading　as　bad　logic？　



They　are　both　movements　in　the　brain　of　a　bewildered　ape？〃　



The　young　sceptic　says；　〃I　have　a　right　to　think　for　myself。〃　



But　the　ol