is the same thing； about reason； we shall not find the want of an
academic definition hinder us from a reasonable conclusion。 What
nurse or mother will doubt that her infant child can reason within
the limits of its own experience； long before it can formulate its
reason in articulately worded thought？ If the development of any
given animal is； as our opponents themselves admit； an epitome of
the history of its whole anterior development； surely the fact that
speech is an accomplishment acquired after birth so artificially
that children who have gone wild in the woods lose it if they have
ever learned it； points to the conclusion that man's ancestors only
learned to express themselves in articulate language at a
comparatively recent period。 Granted that they learn to think and
reason continually the more and more fully for having done so； will
common sense permit us to suppose that they could neither think nor
reason at all till they could convey their ideas in words？
I will return later to the reason of the lower animals； but will now
deal with the question what it is that constitutes language in the
most comprehensive sense that can be properly attached to it。 I
have said already that language to be language at all must not only
convey fairly definite coherent ideas； but must also convey them to
another living being。 Whenever two living beings have conveyed and
received ideas； there has been language； whether looks or gestures
or words spoken or written have been the vehicle by means of which
the ideas have travelled。 Some ideas crawl； some run； some fly； and
in this case words are the wings they fly with； but they are only
the wings of thought or of ideas； they are not the thought or ideas
themselves； nor yet； as Professor Max Muller would have it；
inseparably connected with them。 Last summer I was at an inn in
Sicily； where there was a deaf and dumb waiter； he had been born so；
and could neither write nor read。 What had he to do with words or
words with him？ Are we to say； then； that this most active； amiable
and intelligent fellow could neither think nor reason？ One day I
had had my dinner and had left the hotel。 A friend came in； and the
waiter saw him look for me in the place I generally occupied。 He
instantly came up to my friend； and moved his two forefingers in a
way that suggested two people going about together； this meant 〃your
friend〃； he then moved his forefingers horizontally across his eyes；
this meant； 〃who wears divided spectacles〃； he made two fierce marks
over the sockets of his eyes； this meant； 〃with the heavy eyebrows〃；
he pulled his chin； and then touched his white shirt； to say that my
beard was white。 Having thus identified me as a friend of the
person he was speaking to； and as having a white beard； heavy
eyebrows； and wearing divided spectacles； he made a munching
movement with his jaws to say that I had had my dinner； and finally；
by making two fingers imitate walking on the table； he explained
that I had gone away。 My friend； however； wanted to know how long I
had been gone； so he pulled out his watch and looked inquiringly。
The man at once slapped himself on the back； and held up the five
fingers of one hand； to say it was five minutes ago。 All this was
done as rapidly as though it had been said in words； and my friend；
who knew the man well； understood without a moment's hesitation。
Are we to say that this man had no thought； nor reason； nor
language； merely because he had not a single word of any kind in his
head； which I am assured he had not； for； as I have said； he could
not speak with his fingers？ Is it possible to deny that a dialogue…
…an intelligent conversationhad passed between the two men？ And
if conversation； then surely it is technical and pedantic to deny
that all the essential elements of language were present。 The signs
and tokens used by this poor fellow were as rude an instrument of
expression； in comparison with ordinary language； as going on one's
hands and knees is in comparison with walking； or as walking
compared with going by train； but it is as great an abuse of words
to limit the word 〃language〃 to mere words written or spoken； as it
would be to limit the idea of a locomotive to a railway engine。
This may indeed pass in ordinary conversation； where so much must be
suppressed if talk is to be got through at all； but it is
intolerable when we are inquiring about the relations between
thought and words。 To do so is to let words become as it were the
masters of thought； on the ground that the fact of their being only
its servants and appendages is so obvious that it is generally
allowed to go without saying。
If all that Professor Max Muller means to say is； that no animal but
man commands an articulate language； with verbs and nouns； or is
ever likely to command one （and I question whether in reality he
means much more than this）； no one will differ from him。 No dog or
elephant has one word for bread； another for meat； and another for
water。 Yet； when we watch a cat or dog dreaming； as they often
evidently do； can we doubt that the dream is accompanied by a mental
image of the thing that is dreamed of； much like what we experience
in dreams ourselves； and much doubtless like the mental images which
must have passed through the mind of my deaf and dumb waiter？ If
they have mental images in sleep； can we doubt that waking； also；
they picture things before their mind's eyes； and see them much as
we dotoo vaguely indeed to admit of our thinking that we actually
see the objects themselves； but definitely enough for us to be able
to recognise the idea or object of which we are thinking； and to
connect it with any other idea； object； or sign that we may think
appropriate？
Here we have touched on the second essential element of language。
We laid it down； that its essence lay in the communication of an
idea from one intelligent being to another； but no ideas can be
communicated at all except by the aid of conventions to which both
parties have agreed to attach an identical meaning。 The agreement
may be very informal； and may pass so unconsciously from one
generation to another that its existence can only be recognised by
the aid of much introspection； but it will be always there。 A
sayer； a sayee； and a convention； no matter what； agreed upon
between them as inseparably attached to the idea which it is
intended to conveythese comprise all the essentials of language。
Where these are present there is language； where any of them are
wanting there is no language。 It is not necessary for the sayee to
be able to speak and become a sayer。 If he comprehends the sayer
that is to say； if he attaches the same meaning to a certain symbol
as the sayer doesif he is a party to the bargain whereby it is
agreed upon by both that any given symbol shall be attached
invariably to a certain idea； so that in virtue of the principle of
associated ideas the symbol shall never be present without
immediately carrying the idea along with it； then all the essentials
of language are complied with； and there has been true speech though
never a word was spoken。
The lower animals； therefore； many of them； possess a part of our
own language； though they cannot speak it； and hence do not possess
it so fully as we do。 They cannot say 〃bread；〃 〃meat；〃 or 〃water；〃
but there are many that readily learn what ideas they ought to
attach to these symbols when they are presented to them。 It is idle
to say that a cat does not know what the cat's…meat man means when
he says 〃meat。〃 The cat knows just as well； neither better nor
worse than the cat's…meat man does； and a great deal better than I
myself understand much that is said by some very clever people at
Oxford or Cambridge。 There is more true employment of language；
more bona fide currency of speech； between a sayer and a sayee who
understand each other； though neither of them can speak a word； than
between a sayer who can speak with the tongues of men and of angels
without being clear about his own meaning； and a sayee who can
himself utter the same words； but who is only in imperfect agreement
with the sayer as to the ideas which the words or symbols that he
utters are intended to convey。 The nature of the symbols counts for
nothing； the gist of the matter is in the perfect harmony between
sayer and sayee as to the significance that is to be associated with
them。
Professor Max Muller admits that we share with the lower animals
what he calls an emotional language； and continues that we may call
their interjections and imitations language if we like； as we speak
of the language of the eyes or the eloquence of mute nature； but he
warns us against mistaking metaphor for fact。 It is indeed mere
metaphor to talk of the eloquence of mute nature； or the language of
winds and waves。 There is no intercommunion of mind with mind by
means of a covenanted symbol； but it is only an apparent； not a
real； metaphor to say that two pairs of eyes have spoken when they
have signalled to one another something which they both understand。
A schoolboy at home for the holidays wants another plate of pudding；
and does not lik