her away； and as such she accepts it。 Granted that the symbols in
use among the lower animals are fewer and less highly differentiated
than in the case of any known human language； and therefore that
animal language is incomparably less subtle and less capable of
expressing delicate shades of meaning than our own； these
differences are nevertheless only those that exist between highly
developed and inchoate language； they do not involve those that
distinguish language from no language。 They are the differences
between the undifferentiated protoplasm of the amoeba and our own
complex organisation； they are not the differences between life and
no life。 In animal language as much as in human there is a mind
intentionally making use of a symbol accepted by another mind as
invariably attached to a certain idea； in order to produce that idea
in the mind which it is desired to affectmore briefly； there is a
sayer； a sayee； and a covenanted symbol designedly applied。 Our own
speech is vertebrated and articulated by means of nouns； verbs； and
the rules of grammar。 A dog's speech is invertebrate； but I do not
see how it is possible to deny that it possesses all the essential
elements of language。
I have said nothing about Professor R。 L。 Garner's researches into
the language of apes； because they have not yet been so far verified
and accepted as to make it safe to rely upon them； but when he lays
it down that all voluntary sounds are the products of thought； and
that； if they convey a meaning to another； they perform the
functions of human speech； he says what I believe will commend
itself to any unsophisticated mind。 I could have wished； however；
that he had not limited himself to sounds； and should have preferred
his saying what I doubt not he would readily acceptI mean； that
all symbols or tokens of whatever kind； if voluntarily adopted as
such； are the products of thought； and perform the functions of
human speech； but I cannot too often remind you that nothing can be
considered as fulfilling the conditions of language； except a
voluntary application of a recognised token in order to convey a
more or less definite meaning； with the intention doubtless of thus
purchasing as it were some other desired meaning and consequent
sensation。 It is astonishing how closely in this respect money and
words resemble one another。 Money indeed may be considered as the
most universal and expressive of all languages。 For gold and silver
coins are no more money when not in the actual process of being
voluntarily used in purchase； than words not so in use are language。
Pounds； shillings and pence are recognised covenanted tokens； the
outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual purchasing
power； but till in actual use they are only potential money； as the
symbols of language； whatever they may be； are only potential
language till they are passing between two minds。 It is the power
and will to apply the symbols that alone gives life to money； and as
long as these are in abeyance the money is in abeyance also； the
coins may be safe in one's pocket； but they are as dead as a log
till they begin to burn in it； and so are our words till they begin
to burn within us。
The real question； however； as to the substantial underlying
identity between the language of the lower animals and our own；
turns upon that other question whether or no； in spite of an
immeasurable difference of degree； the thought and reason of man and
of the lower animals is essentially the same。 No one will expect a
dog to master and express the varied ideas that are incessantly
arising in connection with human affairs。 He is a pauper as against
a millionaire。 To ask him to do so would be like giving a street…
boy sixpence and telling him to go and buy himself a founder's share
in the New River Company。 He would not even know what was meant；
and even if he did it would take several millions of sixpences to
buy one。 It is astonishing what a clever workman will do with very
modest tools； or again how far a thrifty housewife will make a very
small sum of money go； or again in like manner how many ideas an
intelligent brute can receive and convey with its very limited
vocabulary； but no one will pretend that a dog's intelligence can
ever reach the level of a man's。 What we do maintain is that；
within its own limited range； it is of the same essential character
as our own； and that though a dog's ideas in respect of human
affairs are both vague and narrow； yet in respect of canine affairs
they are precise enough and extensive enough to deserve no other
name than thought or reason。 We hold moreover that they communicate
their ideas in essentially the same manner as we dothat is to say；
by the instrumentality of a code of symbols attached to certain
states of mind and material objects； in the first instance
arbitrarily； but so persistently； that the presentation of the
symbol immediately carries with it the idea which it is intended to
convey。 Animals can thus receive and impart ideas on all that most
concerns them。 As my great namesake said some two hundred years
ago； they know 〃what's what； and that's as high as metaphysic wit
can fly。〃 And they not only know what's what themselves； but can
impart to one another any new what's…whatness that they may have
acquired； for they are notoriously able to instruct and correct one
another。
Against this Professor Max Muller contends that we can know nothing
of what goes on in the mind of any lower animal； inasmuch as we are
not lower animals ourselves。 〃We can imagine anything we like about
what passes in the mind of an animal；〃 he writes； 〃we can know
absolutely nothing。〃 ｛19｝ It is something to have it in evidence
that he conceives animals as having a mind at all； but it is not
easy to see how they can be supposed to have a mind； without being
able to acquire ideas； and having acquired； to read； mark； learn；
and inwardly digest them。 Surely the mistake of requiring too much
evidence is hardly less great than that of being contented with too
little。 We； too； are animals； and can no more refuse to infer
reason from certain visible actions in their case than we can in our
own。 If Professor Max Muller's plea were allowed； we should have to
deny our right to infer confidently what passes in the mind of any
one not ourselves； inasmuch as we are not that person。 We never；
indeed； can obtain irrefragable certainty about this or any other
matter； but we can be sure enough in many cases to warrant our
staking all that is most precious to us on the soundness of our
opinion。 Moreover； if the Professor denies our right to infer that
animals reason； on the ground that we are not animals enough
ourselves to be able to form an opinion； with what right does he
infer so confidently himself that they do not reason？ And how； if
they present every one of those appearances which we are accustomed
to connect with the communication of an idea from one mind to
another； can we deny that they have a language of their own； though
it is one which in most cases we can neither speak nor understand？
How can we say that a sentinel rook； when it sees a man with a gun
and warns the other rooks by a concerted note which they all show
that they understand by immediately taking flight； should not be
credited both with reason and the germs of language？
After all； a professor； whether of philology； psychology； biology；
or any other ology； is hardly the kind of person to whom we should
appeal on such an elementary question as that of animal intelligence
and language。 We might as well ask a botanist to tell us whether
grass grows； or a meteorologist to tell us if it has left off
raining。 If it is necessary to appeal to any one； I should prefer
the opinion of an intelligent gamekeeper to that of any professor；
however learned。 The keepers； again； at the Zoological Gardens；
have exceptional opportunities for studying the minds of animals
modified； indeed； by captivity； but still minds of animals。 Grooms；
again； and dog…fanciers； are to the full as able to form an
intelligent opinion on the reason and language of animals as any
University Professor； and so are cats'…meat men。 I have repeatedly
asked gamekeepers and keepers at the Zoological Gardens whether
animals could reason and converse with one another； and have always
found myself regarded somewhat contemptuously for having even asked
the question。 I once said to a friend； in the hearing of a keeper
at the Zoological Gardens； that the penguin was very stupid。 The
man was furious； and jumped upon me at once。 〃He's not stupid at
all；〃 said he； 〃he's very intelligent。〃
Who has not seen a cat； when it wishes to go out； raise its fore
paws on to the handle of the door； or as near as it can get； and
look round； evidently asking some one to turn it for her？ Is it
reasonable to deny that a reasoning process is going on in the cat's
mind； whereby she connects her wish with the steps necessary for its
fulfilment； and also with certain invariable symbols which she knows
her master or mistress will interpret？ Once； in company with a
friend； I watched a cat playing with a hou