ces the theory is established； if not； there are other considerations to support it。 That every living being is self…sensitive allows of no doubt； if the universe is a living being； no more need be said； and what is true of the total must be true of the members； as inbound in that one life。 But what if we are invited to accept the theory of knowledge by likeness （rejecting knowledge by the self…sensitiveness of a living unity）？ Awareness must be determined by the nature and character of the living being in which it occurs； perception； then； means that the likeness demanded by the hypothesis is within this self…identical living being （and not in the object）… for the organ by which the perception takes place is in the likeness of the living being （is merely the agent adequately expressing the nature of the living being）： thus perception is reduced to a mental awareness by means of organs akin to the object。 If； then； something that is a living whole perceives not its own content but things like to its content； it must perceive them under the conditions of that living whole； this means that； in so far as it has perception； the objects appear not as its content but as related to its content。 And the objects are thus perceived as related because the mind itself has related them in order to make them amenable to its handling： in other words the causative soul or mind in that other sphere is utterly alien； and the things there； supposed to be related to the content of this living whole； can be nothing to our minds。＇ This absurdity shows that the hypothesis contains a contradiction which naturally leads to untenable results。 In fact； under one and the same heading； it presents mind and no mind； it makes things kin and no kin； it confuses similar and dissimilar： containing these irreconcilable elements； it amounts to no hypothesis at all。 At one and the same moment it postulates and denies a soul； it tells of an All that is partial； of a something which is at once distinct and not distinct； of a nothingness which is no nothingness； of a complete thing that is incomplete： the hypothesis therefore must be dismissed； no deduction is possible where a thesis cancels its own propositions。 SIXTH TRACTATE。
PERCEPTION AND MEMORY。
1。 Perceptions are no imprints； we have said； are not to be thought of as seal…impressions on soul or mind： accepting this statement； there is one theory of memory which must be definitely rejected。 Memory is not to be explained as the retaining of information in virtue of the lingering of an impression which in fact was never made； the two things stand or fall together； either an impression is made upon the mind and lingers when there is remembrance； or； denying the impression； we cannot hold that memory is its lingering。 Since we reject equally the impression and the retention we are obliged to seek for another explanation of perception and memory； one excluding the notions that the sensible object striking upon soul or mind makes a mark upon it； and that the retention of this mark is memory。 If we study what occurs in the case of the most vivid form of perception； we can transfer our results to the other cases； and so solve our problem。 In any perception we attain by sight； the object is grasped there where it lies in the direct line of vision； it is there that we attack it； there； then； the perception is formed； the mind looks outward； this is ample proof that it has taken and takes no inner imprint； and does not see in virtue of some mark made upon it like that of the ring on the wax； it need not look outward at all if； even as it looked； it already held the image of the object； seeing by virtue of an impression made upon itself。 It includes with the object the interval； for it tells at what distance the vision takes place： how could it see as outlying an impression within itself； separated by no interval from itself？ Then； the point of magnitude： how could the mind； on this hypothesis； define the external size of the object or perceive that it has any… the magnitude of the sky； for instance； whose stamped imprint would be too vast for it to contain？ And； most convincing of all； if to see is to accept imprints of the objects of our vision； we can never see these objects themselves； we see only vestiges they leave within us； shadows： the things themselves would be very different from our vision of them。 And； for a conclusive consideration； we cannot see if the living object is in contact with the eye； we must look from a certain distance； this must be more applicable to the mind； supposing the mind to be stamped with an imprint of the object； it could not grasp as an object of vision what is stamped upon itself。 For vision demands a duality； of seen and seeing： the seeing agent must be distinct and act upon an impression outside it； not upon one occupying the same point with it： sight can deal only with an object not inset but outlying。 2。 But if perception does not go by impression； what is the process？ The mind affirms something not contained within it： this is precisely the characteristic of a power… not to accept impression but； within its allotted sphere； to act。 Besides； the very condition of the mind being able to exercise discrimination upon what it is to see and hear is not； of course； that these objects be equally impressions made upon it； on the contrary； there must be no impressions； nothing to which the mind is passive； there can be only acts of that in which the objects become known。 Our tendency is to think of any of the faculties as unable to know its appropriate object by its own uncompelled act； to us it seems to submit to its environment rather than simply to perceive it； though in reality it is the master； not the victim。 As with sight； so with hearing。 It is the air which takes the impression； a kind of articulated stroke which may be compared to letters traced upon it by the object causing the sound； but it belongs to the faculty； and the soul…essence； to read the imprints thus appearing before it； as they reach the point at which they become matter of its knowledge。 In taste and smell also we distinguish between the impressions received and the sensations and judgements； these last are mental acts； and belong to an order apart from the experiences upon which they are exercised。 The knowing of the things belonging to the Intellectual is not in any such degree attended by impact or impression： they come forward； on the contrary； as from within； unlike the sense…objects known as from without： they have more emphatically the character of acts； they are acts in the stricter sense； for their origin is in the soul； and every concept of this Intellectual order is the soul about its Act。 Whether； in this self…vision； the soul is a duality and views itself as from the outside… while seeing the Intellectual…Principal as a unity； and itself with the Intellectual…Principle as a unity… this question is investigated elsewhere。 3。 With this prologue we come to our discussion of Memory。 That the soul； or mind； having taken no imprint； yet achieves perception of what it in no way contains need not surprise us； or rather； surprising though it is； we cannot refuse to believe in this remarkable power。 The Soul is the Reason…Principle of the universe； ultimate among the Intellectual Beings… its own essential Nature is one of the Beings of the Intellectual Realm… but it is the primal Reason…Principle of the entire realm of sense。 Thus it has dealings with both orders… benefited and quickened by the one； but by the other beguiled； falling before resemblances； and so led downwards as under spell。 Poised midway； it is aware of both spheres。 Of the Intellectual it is said to have intuition by memory upon approach； for it knows them by a certain natural identity with them； its knowledge is not attained by besetting them； so to speak； but by in a definite degree possessing them； they are its natural vision； they are itself in a more radiant mode； and it rises from its duller pitch to that greater brilliance in a sort of awakening； a progress from its latency to its act。 To the sense…order it stands in a similar nearness and to such things it gives a radiance out of its own store and； as it were； elaborates them to visibility： the power is always ripe and； so to say； in travail towards them； so that； whenever it puts out its strength in the direction of what has once been present in it； it sees that object as present still； and the more intent its effort the more durable is the presence。 This is why； it is agreed； children have long memory； the things presented to them are not constantly withdrawn but remain in sight； in their case the attention is limited but not scattered： those whose faculty and mental activity are busied upon a multitude of subjects pass quickly over all； lingering on none。 Now； if memory were a matter of seal…impressions retained； the multiplicity of objects would have no weakening effect on the memory。 Further； on the same hypothesis； we would have no need of thinking back to revive remembrance； nor would we be subject to forgetting and recalling； all would lie e