would it still be the Source？ If things other than itself are to exist； things dependent upon it for their reality； it must produce since there is no other source。 And further this engendering principle must be the very highest in worth； and its immediate offspring； its secondary； must be the best of all that follows。 2。 If the Intellectual…Principle were the engendering Source； then the engendered secondary； while less perfect than the Intellectual…Principle； would be close to it and similar to it： but since the engendering Source is above the Intellectual…Principle； the secondary can only be that principle。 But why is the Intellectual…Principle not the generating source？ Because ＇it is not a self…sufficing simplex＇： the Act of the Intellectual…Principle is intellection； which means that； seeing the intellectual object towards which it has turned； it is consummated； so to speak； by that object； being in itself indeterminate like sight ＇a vague readiness for any and every vision＇ and determined by the intellectual object。 This is why it has been said that 〃out of the indeterminate dyad and The One arise the Ideas and the numbers〃： for the dyad is the Intellectual…Principle。 Thus it is not a simplex； it is manifold； it exhibits a certain composite quality… within the Intellectual or divine order； of course… as the principle that sees the manifold。 It is； further； itself simultaneously object and agent of intellection and is on that count also a duality： and it possesses besides another object of intellection in the Order following upon itself。 But how can the Intellectual…Principle be a product of the Intellectual Object？ In this way： the intellectual object is self…gathered ＇self…compact＇ and is not deficient as the seeing and knowing principle must be… deficient； mean； as needing an object… it is therefore no unconscious thing： all its content and accompaniment are its possession； it is self…distinguishing throughout； it is the seat of life as of all things； it is； itself； that self…intellection which takes place in eternal repose； that is to say； in a mode other than that of the Intellectual…Principle。 But if something comes to being within an entity which in no way looks outside itself… and especially within a being which is the sum of being… that entity must be the source of the new thing： stable in its own identity； it produces； but the product is that of an unchanged being： the producer is unchangeably the intellectual object； the product is produced as the Intellectual Act； an Act taking intellection of its source… the only object that exists for it… and so becoming Intellectual…Principle； that is to say； becoming another intellectual being； resembling its source； a reproduction and image of that。 But how from amid perfect rest can an Act arise？ There is in everything the Act of the Essence and the Act going out from the Essence： the first Act is the thing itself in its realized identity； the second Act is an inevitably following outgo from the first； an emanation distinct from the thing itself。 Thus even in fire there is the warmth comported by its essential nature and there is the warmth going instantaneously outward from that characterizing heat by the fact that the fire； remaining unchangeably fire； utters the Act native to its essential reality。 So it is in the divine also： or rather we have there the earlier form of the double act： the divine remains in its own unchanging being； but from its perfection and from the Act included in its nature there emanates the secondary or issuing Act which… as the output of a mighty power； the mightiest there is… attains to Real Being as second to that which stands above all Being。 That transcendent was the potentiality of the All； this secondary is the All made actual。 And if this is all things； that must be above and outside of all； so； must transcend real being。 And again； if that secondary is all things； and if above its multiplicity there is a unity not ranking among those things； once more this unity transcends Real Being and therefore transcends the Intellectual…Principle as well。 There is thus something transcending Intellectual…Principle； for we must remember that real being is no corpse； the negation of life and of intellection； but is in fact identical with the Intellectual…Principle。 The Intellectual…Principle is not something taking cognisance of things as sensation deals with sense objects existing independently of sense： on the contrary； it actually is the things it knows： the ideas constituting them it has not borrowed： whence could it have taken them？ No： it exists here together with the things of the universe； identical with them； making a unity with them； and the collective knowledge ＇in the divine mind＇ of the immaterial is the universe of things。 FIFTH TRACTATE。
THAT THE INTELLECTUAL BEINGS ARE NOT OUTSIDE THE INTELLECTUAL…PRINCIPLE： AND ON THE NATURE OF THE GOOD。
1。 The Intellectual…Principle； the veritably and essentially intellective； can this be conceived as ever falling into error； ever failing to think reality？ Assuredly no： it would no longer be intelligent and therefore no longer Intellectual…Principle： it must know unceasingly… and never forget； and its knowledge can be no guesswork； no hesitating assent； no acceptance of an alien report。 Nor can it call on demonstration or； we are told it may at times act by this or； I method； at least there must be something patent to it in virtue of its own nature。 In actual fact reason tells us that all its knowledge is thus inherent to it； for there is no means by which to distinguish between the spontaneous knowledge and the other。 But； in any case； some knowledge； it is conceded； is inherent to it。 Whence are we to understand the certainty of this knowledge to come to it or how do its objects carry the conviction of their reality？ Consider sense…knowledge： its objects seem most patently certified； yet the doubt returns whether the apparent reality may not lie in the states of the percipient rather than in the material before him； the decision demands intelligence or reasoning。 Besides； even granting that what the senses grasp is really contained in the objects； none the less what is thus known by the senses is an image： sense can never grasp the thing itself； this remains for ever outside。 Now； if the Intellectual…Principle in its act… that is in knowing the intellectual… is to know these its objects as alien； we have to explain how it makes contact with them： obviously it might never come upon them； and so might never know them； or it might know them only upon the meeting： its knowing； at that； would not be an enduring condition。 If we are told that the Intellectual…Principle and the Intellectual Objects are linked in a standing unity； we demand the description of this unity。 Next； the intellections would be impressions； that is to say not native act but violence from without： now how is such impressing possible and what shape could the impressions bear？ Intellection； again； becomes at this a mere handling of the external； exactly like sense…perception。 What then distinguishes it unless that it deals with objects of less extension？ And what certitude can it have that its knowledge is true？ Or what enables it to pronounce that the object is good； beautiful； or just； when each of these ideas is to stand apart from itself？ The very principles of judgement； by which it must be guided； would be ＇as Ideas＇ excluded： with objects and canons alike outside it； so is truth。 Again； either the objects of the Intellectual…Principle are senseless and devoid of life and intellect or they are in possession of Intellect。 Now； if they are in possession of Intellect； that realm is a union of both and is Truth。 This combined Intellectual realm will be the Primal Intellect： we have only then to examine how this reality； conjoint of Intellectual…Principle and its object； is to be understood； whether as combining self…united identity with yet duality and difference； or what other relation holds between them。 If on the contrary the objects of Intellectual…Principle are without intelligence and life； what are they？ They cannot be premises； axioms or predicates： as predicates they would not have real existence； they would be affirmations linking separate entities； as when we affirm that justice is good though justice and good are distinct realities。 If we are told that they are self…standing entities… the distinct beings Justice and Good… then ＇supposing them to be outside＇ the Intellectual Realm will not be a unity nor be included in any unity： all is sundered individuality。 Where； then； are they and what spatial distinction keeps them apart？ How does the Intellectual…Principle come to meet with them as it travels round； what keeps each true to its character； what gives them enduring identity； what conceivable shape or character can they have？ They are being presented to us as some collection of figures； in gold or some other material substance； the work of some unknown sculptor or graver： but at once the Intellectual…Principle which contemplates them becomes sense…perception； and ther