llective subject； the non…multiple must be without intellection； that non…multiple will be the First： intellection and the Intellectual…Principle must be characteristic of beings coming later。 4。 Another consideration is that if The Good ＇and First＇ is simplex and without need； it can neither need the intellective act nor possess what it does not need： it will therefore not have intellection。 （Interpolation or corruption： It is without intellection because； also； it contains no duality。） Again； an Intellectual…Principle is distinct from The Good and takes a certain goodness only by its intellection of The Good。 Yet again： In any dual object there is the unity ＇the principle of identity＇ side by side with the rest of the thing； an associated member cannot be the unity of the two and there must be a self…standing unity ＇within the duality＇ before this unity of members can exist： by the same reasoning there must be also the supreme unity entering into no association whatever； something which is unity…simplex by its very being； utterly devoid of all that belongs to the thing capable of association。 How could anything be present in anything else unless in virtue of a source existing independently of association？ The simplex ＇or absolute＇ requires no derivation； but any manifold； or any dual； must be dependent。 We may use the figure of； first； light； then； following it； the sun； as a third； the orb of the moon taking its light from the sun： Soul carries the Intellectual…Principle as something imparted and lending the light which makes it essentially intellective； Intellectual…Principle carries the light as its own though it is not purely the light but is the being into whose very essence the light has been received； highest is That which； giving forth the light to its sequent； is no other than the pure light itself by whose power the Intellectual…Principle takes character。 How can this highest have need of any other？ It is not to be identified with any of the things that enter into association； the self…standing is of a very different order。 5。 And again： the multiple must be always seeking its identity； desiring self…accord and self…awareness： but what scope is there within what is an absolute unity in which to move towards its identity or at what term may it hope for self…knowing？ It holds its identity in its very essence and is above consciousness and all intellective act。 Intellection is not a primal either in the fact of being or in the value of being； it is secondary and derived： for there exists The Good； and this moves towards itself while its sequent is moved and by that movement has its characteristic vision。 The intellective act may be defined as a movement towards The Good in some being that aspires towards it； the effort produces the fact； the two are coincident； to see is to have desired to see： hence again the Authentic Good has no need of intellection since itself and nothing else is its good。 The intellective act is a movement towards the unmoved Good： thus the self…intellection in all save the Absolute Good is the working of the imaged Good within them： the intellectual principle recognises the likeness； sees itself as a good to itself； an object of attraction： it grasps at that manifestation of The Good and； in holding that； holds self…vision： if the state of goodness is constant； it remains constantly self…attractive and self…intellective。 The self…intellection is not deliberate： it sees itself as an incident in its contemplation of The Good； for it sees itself in virtue of its Act； and； in all that exists； the Act is towards The Good。 6。 If this reasoning is valid； The Good has no scope whatever for intellection which demands something attractive from outside。 The Good； then； is without Act。 What Act indeed； could be vested in Activity's self？ No activity has yet again an activity； and whatever we may add to such Activities as depend from something else； at least we must leave the first Activity of them all； that from which all depend； as an uncontaminated identity； one to which no such addition can be made。 That primal Activity； then； is not an intellection； for there is nothing upon which it could Exercise intellection since it is The First； besides； intellection itself does not exercise the intellective act； this belongs to some principle in which intellection is vested。 There is； we repeat； duality in any thinking being； and the First is wholly above the dual。 But all this may be made more evident by a clearer recognition of the twofold principle at work wherever there is intellection： When we affirm the reality of the Real Beings and their individual identity of being and declare that these Real Beings exist in the Intellectual Realm； we do not mean merely that they remain unchangeably self…identical by their very essence； as contrasted with the fluidity and instability of the sense…realm； the sense…realm itself may contain the enduring。 No； we mean rather that these principles possess； as by their own virtue； the consummate fulness of being。 The Essence described as the primally existent cannot be a shadow cast by Being； but must possess Being entire； and Being is entire when it holds the form and idea of intellection and of life。 In a Being； then； the existence； the intellection； the life are present as an aggregate。 When a thing is a Being； it is also an Intellectual…Principle； when it is an Intellectual…Principle it is a Being； intellection and Being are co…existents。 Therefore intellection is a multiple not a unitary and that which does not belong to this order can have no Intellection。 And if we turn to the partial and particular； there is the Intellectual form of man； and there is man； there is the Intellectual form of horse and there is horse； the Intellectual form of Justice； and Justice。 Thus all is dual： the unit is a duality and yet again the dual reverts to unity。 That； however； which stands outside all this category can be neither an individual unity nor an aggregate of all the duals or in any way a duality。 How the duals rose from The One is treated elsewhere。 What stands above Being stands above intellection： it is no weakness in it not to know itself； since as pure unity it contains nothing which it needs to explore。 But it need not even spend any knowing upon things outside itself： this which was always the Good of all gives them something greater and better than its knowledge of them in giving them in their own identity to cling； in whatever measure be possible； to a principle thus lofty。 SEVENTH TRACTATE。
IS THERE AN IDEAL ARCHETYPE OF PARTICULAR BEINGS？
1。 We have to examine the question whether there exists an ideal archetype of individuals； in other words whether I and every other human being go back to the Intellectual； every ＇living＇ thing having origin and principle There。 If Socrates； Socrates' soul； is external then the Authentic Socrates… to adapt the term… must be There； that is to say； the individual soul has an existence in the Supreme as well as in this world。 If there is no such permanent endurance and what was Socrates may with change of time become another soul and be Pythagoras or someone else… then the individual Socrates has not that existence in the Divine。 But if the Soul of the individual contains the Reason…Principles of all that it traverses； once more all men have their ＇archetypic＇ existence There： and it is our doctrine that every soul contains all the Reason…Principles that exist in the Kosmos： since then the Kosmos contains the Reason…Principles not merely of man； but also of all individual living things； so must the Soul。 Its content of Reason…Principles； then； must be limitless； unless there be a periodical renovation bounding the boundlessness by the return of a former series。 But if ＇in virtue of this periodic return＇ each archetype may be reproduced by numerous existents； what need is there that there be distinct Reason…Principles and archetypes for each existent in any one period？ Might not one ＇archetypal＇ man suffice for all； and similarly a limited number of souls produce a limitless number of men？ No： one Reason…Principle cannot account for distinct and differing individuals： one human being does not suffice as the exemplar for many distinct each from the other not merely in material constituents but by innumerable variations of ideal type： this is no question of various pictures or images reproducing an original Socrates； the beings produced differ so greatly as to demand distinct Reason…Principles。 The entire soul…period conveys with it all the requisite Reason…Principles； and so too the same existents appear once more under their action。 There is no need to baulk at this limitlessness in the Intellectual； it is an infinitude having nothing to do with number or part； what we may think of it as its outgoing is no other than its characteristic Act。 2。 But individuals are brought into being by the union of the Reason…Principles of the parents； male and female： this seems to do away with a definite Reason…Principle for each of the offspring： one of the parents… the male let us say… is the source； and the off