the six enneads- 第135部分

nly　when　the　actuality　of　the　relationships　is　derived　from　no　other　source　than　Relation　itself；　the　actuality　must　be；　not　that　which　is　characteristic　of　the　substances　in　question；　but　that　which　is　specifically　called　relative。　Thus　double　with　its　correlative；　half　gives　actuality　neither　to　two　yards'　length　or　the　number　two；　nor　to　one　yard's　length　or　the　number　one；　what　happens　is　that；　when　these　quantities　are　viewed　in　their　relation；　they　are　found　to　be　not　merely　two　and　one　respectively；　but　to　produce　the　assertion　and　to　exhibit　the　fact　of　standing　one　to　the　other　in　the　condition　of　double　and　half。　Out　of　the　objects　in　a　certain　conjunction　this　condition　of　being　double　and　half　has　issued　as　something　distinct　from　either；　double　and　half　have　emerged　as　correlatives；　and　their　being　is　precisely　this　of　mutual　dependence；　the　double　exists　by　its　superiority　over　the　half；　and　the　half　by　its　inferiority；　there　is　no　priority　to　distinguish　double　from　half；　they　arise　simultaneously。　　　　　It　is　another　question　whether　they　endure　simultaneously。　Take　the　case　of　father　and　son；　and　such　relationships；　the　father　dies；　but　the　other　is　still　his　son；　and　so　with　brothers。　Moreover；　we　see　likeness　where　one　of　the　like　people　is　dead。　　　　　8。　But　we　are　digressing：　we　must　resume　our　enquiry　into　the　cause　of　dissimilarity　among　relations。　Yet　we　must　first　be　informed　what　reality；　common　to　all　cases；　is　possessed　by　this　Existence　derived　from　mutual　conditions。　　　　　Now　the　common　principle　in　question　cannot　be　a　body。　The　only　alternative　is　that；　if　it　does　exist；　it　be　something　bodiless；　either　in　the　objects　thus　brought　together　or　outside　of　them。　　　　　Further；　if　Relation　always　takes　the　same　form；　the　term　is　univocal　＇and　specific　differentiation　is　impossible＇；　if　not；　that　is　if　it　differs　from　case　to　case；　the　term　is　equivocal；　and　the　same　reality　will　not　necessarily　be　implied　by　the　mere　use　of　the　term　Relation。　　　　　How　then　shall　we　distinguish　relations？　We　may　observe　that　some　things　have　an　inactive　or　dormant　relation；　with　which　their　actuality　is　entirely　simultaneous；　others；　combining　power　and　function　with　their　relation；　have　the　relation　in　some　mode　always　even　though　the　mode　be　merely　that　of　potentiality；　but　attain　to　actual　being　only　in　contact　with　their　correlatives。　Or　perhaps　all　distinctions　may　be　reduced　to　that　between　producer　and　product；　where　the　product　merely　gives　a　name　to　the　producer　of　its　actuality：　an　example　of　this　is　the　relation　of　father　to　son；　though　here　both　producer　and　product　have　a　sort　of　actuality；　which　we　call　life。　　　　　Are　we　thus；　then；　to　divide　Relation；　and　thereby　reject　the　notion　of　an　identical　common　element　in　the　different　kinds　of　Relation；　making　it　a　universal　rule　that　the　relation　takes　a　different　character　in　either　correlative？　We　must　in　this　case　recognise　that　in　our　distinction　between　productive　and　non…productive　relations　we　are　overlooking　the　equivocation　involved　in　making　the　terms　cover　both　action　and　passion；　as　though　these　two　were　one；　and　ignoring　the　fact　that　production　takes　a　different　form　in　the　two　correlatives。　Take　the　case　of　equality；　producing　equals：　nothing　is　equal　without　equality；　nothing　identical　without　identity。　Greatness　and　smallness　both　entail　a　presence…　the　presence　of　greatness　and　smallness　respectively。　When　we　come　to　greater　and　smaller；　the　participants　in　these　relations　are　greater　and　smaller　only　when　greatness　and　smallness　are　actually　observed　in　them。　　　　　9。　It　follows　that　in　the　cases　specified　above…　agent；　knowledge　and　the　rest…　the　relation　must　be　considered　as　in　actual　operation；　and　the　Act　and　the　Reason…Principle　in　the　Act　must　be　assumed　to　be　real：　in　all　other　cases　there　will　be　simply　participation　in　an　Ideal…Form；　in　a　Reason…Principle。　　　　　If　Reality　implied　embodiment；　we　should　indeed　be　forced　to　deny　Reality　to　these　conditions　called　relative；　if　however　we　accord　the　pre…eminent　place　to　the　unembodied　and　to　the　Reason…Principles；　and　at　the　same　time　maintain　that　relations　are　Reason…Principles　and　participate　in　Ideal…Forms；　we　are　bound　to　seek　their　causes　in　that　higher　sphere。　Doubleness；　it　is　clear；　is　the　cause　of　a　thing　being　double；　and　from　it　is　derived　halfness。　　　　　Some　correlatives　owe　their　designations　to　the　same　Form；　others　to　opposite　Forms；　it　is　thus　that　two　objects　are　simultaneously　double　and　half　of　each　other；　and　one　great　and　the　other　small。　It　may　happen　that　both　correlatives　exist　in　one　object…likeness　and　unlikeness；　and；　in　general；　identity　and　difference；　so　that　the　same　thing　will　be　at　once　like　and　unlike；　identical　and　different。　　　　　The　question　arises　here　whether　sharing　in　the　same　Form　could　make　one　man　depraved　and　another　more　depraved。　In　the　case　of　total　depravity；　clearly　the　two　are　made　equal　by　the　absence　of　a　Form。　Where　there　is　a　difference　of　degree；　the　one　has　participated　in　a　Form　which　has　failed　to　predominate；　the　other　in　a　Form　which　has　failed　still　more：　or；　if　we　choose　the　negative　aspect；　we　may　think　of　them　both　as　failing　to　participate　in　a　Form　which　naturally　belonged　to　them。　　　　　Sensation　may　be　regarded　as　a　Form　of　double　origin　＇determined　both　by　the　sense…organ　and　by　the　sensible　object＇；　and　similarly　with　knowledge。　　　　　Habit　is　an　Act　directed　upon　something　had　＇some　experience　produced　by　habit＇　and　binding　it　as　it　were　with　the　subject　having　＇experiencing＇；　as　the　Act　of　production　binds　producer　and　product。　　　　　Measurement　is　an　Act　of　the　measurer　upon　the　measured　object：　it　too　is　therefore　a　kind　of　Reason…Principle。　　　　　Now　if　the　condition　of　being　related　is　regarded　as　a　Form　having　a　generic　unity；　Relation　must　be　allowed　to　be　a　single　genus　owing　its　reality　to　a　Reason…Principle　involved　in　all　instances。　If　however　the　Reason…Principles　＇governing　the　correlatives＇　stand　opposed　and　have　the　differences　to　which　we　have　referred；　there　may　perhaps　not　be　a　single　genus；　but　this　will　not　prevent　all　relatives　being　expressed　in　terms　of　a　certain　likeness　and　falling　under　a　single　category。　　　　　But　even　if　the　cases　of　which　we　have　spoken　can　be　subsumed　under　a　single　head；　it　is　nevertheless　impossible　to　include　in　a　single　genus　all　that　goes　with　them　in　the　one　common　category：　for　the　category　includes　negations　and　derivatives…　not　only；　for　example；　double　but　also　its　negative；　the　resultant　doubleness　and　the　act　of　doubling。　But　we　cannot　include　in　one　genus　both　the　thing　and　its　negative…　double　and　not…double；　relative　and　not…relative…　any　more　than　in　dealing　with　the　genus　animal　we　can　insert　in　it　the　nonanimal。　Moreover；　doubleness　and　doubling　have　only　the　relation　to　double　that　whiteness　has　to　white；　they　cannot　be　classed　as　identical　with　it。　　　　　10。　As　regards　Quality；　the　source　of　what　we　call　a　〃quale；〃　we　must　in　the　first　place　consider　what　nature　it　possesses　in　accordance　with　which　it　produces　the　〃qualia；〃　and　whether；　remaining　one　and　the　same　in　virtue　of　that　common　ground；　it　has　also　differences　whereby　it　produces　the　variety　of　species。　If　there　is　no　common　ground　and　the　term　Quality　involves　many　connotations；　there　cannot　be　a　single　genus　of　Quality。　　　　　What　then　will　be　the　common　ground　in　habit；　disposition；　passive　quality；　figure；　shape？　In　light；　thick　and　lean？　　　　　If　we　hold　this　common　ground　to　be　a　power　adapting　itself　to　the　forms　of　habits；　dispositions　and　physical　capacities；　a　power　which　gives　the　possessor　whatever　capacities　he　has；　we　have　no　plausible　explanation　of　incapacities。　Besides；　how　are　figure　and　the　shape　of　a　given　thing　to　be　regarded　as　a　power？　　　　　Moreover；　at　this；　Being　will　have　no　power　qua　Being　but　only　when　Quality　has　been　added　to　it；　and　the　activities　of　those　substances　which　are　activities　in　the　highest　degree；　will　be　traceable　to　Quality；　although　they　are　autonomous　and　owe　their　essential　character　to　powers　wholly　their　own！　　　　　Perhaps；　however；　qualities　are　conditioned　by　powers　which　are　posterior　to　the　substances　as　such　＇and　so　do　not　interfere　with　their　essential　activities＇。　Boxing；　for　example；　is　not　a　power　of　man　qua　man；　reasoning　is：　therefore　reasoning；　on　this　hypothesis；　is　not　quality　but　a　natural　possession　of　the　mature　human　being；　it　therefore　is　called　a　quality　only　by　analogy。　Thus；　Quality　is　a　power　which　adds　the　property　of　being　qualia　to　substances　already　existent。　　　　　The　differences　distinguishing　substances　from　each　other　are　called　qualities　only　by　analogy；　they　are；　more　strictly；　Acts　and　Reason…Principles；　or　parts　of　Reason…Principles；　and　though　they　may　appear　merely　to　qualify　the　substance；　they　in　fact　indicate　its　essence。　　　　　Qualities　in　the　true　sense…　those；　that　is；　which　determine　qualia…　being　in　accordance　with　our　definition　powers；　will　in　virtue　of　this　common　ground　be　a　kind　of　Reason…Principle；　they　will　also　be　in　a　sense　Forms；　that　is；　excellences　and　imperfections　whether　of　soul　or　of　body。　　　　　But　how　can　they　all　be　powers？　Beauty　or　health　of　soul　or　body；　very　well：　but　surely　not　ugliness；　disease；　weakness；　incapacity。　I