the six enneads- 第151部分

　　　　　9。　So　much　for　one　of　the　genera…　the　〃Substance；〃　so　called；　of　the　Sensible　realm。　　　　　But　what　are　we　to　posit　as　its　species？　how　divide　this　genus？　　　　　The　genus　as　a　whole　must　be　identified　with　body。　Bodies　may　be　divided　into　the　characteristically　material　and　the　organic：　the　material　bodies　comprise　fire；　earth；　water；　air；　the　organic　the　bodies　of　plants　and　animals；　these　in　turn　admitting　of　formal　differentiation。　　　　　The　next　step　is　to　find　the　species　of　earth　and　of　the　other　elements；　and　in　the　case　of　organic　bodies　to　distinguish　plants　according　to　their　forms；　and　the　bodies　of　animals　either　by　their　habitations…　on　the　earth；　in　the　earth；　and　similarly　for　the　other　elements…　or　else　as　light；　heavy　and　intermediate。　Some　bodies；　we　shall　observe；　stand　in　the　middle　of　the　universe；　others　circumscribe　it　from　above；　others　occupy　the　middle　sphere：　in　each　case　we　shall　find　bodies　different　in　shape；　so　that　the　bodies　of　the　living　beings　of　the　heavens　may　be　differentiated　from　those　of　the　other　elements。　　　　　Once　we　have　classified　bodies　into　the　four　species；　we　are　ready　to　combine　them　on　a　different　principle；　at　the　same　time　intermingling　their　differences　of　place；　form　and　constitution；　the　resultant　combinations　will　be　known　as　fiery　or　earthy　on　the　basis　of　the　excess　or　predominance　of　some　one　element。　　　　　The　distinction　between　First　and　Second　Substances；　between　Fire　and　a　given　example　of　fire；　entails　a　difference　of　a　peculiar　kind…　the　difference　between　universal　and　particular。　This　however　is　not　a　difference　characteristic　of　Substance；　there　is　also　in　Quality　the　distinction　between　whiteness　and　the　white　object；　between　grammar　and　some　particular　grammar。　　　　　The　question　may　here　be　asked：　〃What　deficiency　has　grammar　compared　with　a　particular　grammar；　and　science　as　a　whole　in　comparison　with　a　science？〃　Grammar　is　certainly　not　posterior　to　the　particular　grammar：　on　the　contrary；　the　grammar　as　in　you　depends　upon　the　prior　existence　of　grammar　as　such：　the　grammar　as　in　you　becomes　a　particular　by　the　fact　of　being　in　you；　it　is　otherwise　identical　with　grammar　the　universal。　　　　　Turn　to　the　case　of　Socrates：　it　is　not　Socrates　who　bestows　manhood　upon　what　previously　was　not　Man；　but　Man　upon　Socrates；　the　individual　man　exists　by　participation　in　the　universal。　　　　　Besides；　Socrates　is　merely　a　particular　instance　of　Man；　this　particularity　can　have　no　effect　whatever　in　adding　to　his　essential　manhood。　　　　　We　may　be　told　that　Man　＇the　universal＇　is　Form　alone；　Socrates　Form　in　Matter。　But　on　this　very　ground　Socrates　will　be　less　fully　Man　than　the　universal；　for　the　Reason…Principle　will　be　less　effectual　in　Matter。　If；　on　the　contrary；　Man　is　not　determined　by　Form　alone；　but　presupposes　Matter；　what　deficiency　has　Man　in　comparison　with　the　material　manifestation　of　Man；　or　the　Reason…Principle　in　isolation　as　compared　with　its　embodiment　in　a　unit　of　Matter？　　　　　Besides；　the　more　general　is　by　nature　prior；　hence；　the　Form…Idea　is　prior　to　the　individual：　but　what　is　prior　by　nature　is　prior　unconditionally。　How　then　can　the　Form　take　a　lower　rank？　The　individual；　it　is　true；　is　prior　in　the　sense　of　being　more　readily　accessible　to　our　cognisance；　this　fact；　however；　entails　no　objective　difference。　　　　　Moreover；　such　a　difference；　if　established；　would　be　incompatible　with　a　single　Reason…Principle　of　Substance；　First　and　Second　Substance　could　not　have　the　same　Principle；　nor　be　brought　under　a　single　genus。　　　　　10。　Another　method　of　division　is　possible：　substances　may　be　classed　as　hot…dry；　dry…cold；　cold…moist；　or　however　we　choose　to　make　the　coupling。　We　may　then　proceed　to　the　combination　and　blending　of　these　couples；　either　halting　at　that　point　and　going　no　further　than　the　compound；　or　else　subdividing　by　habitation…　on　the　earth；　in　the　earth…　or　by　form　and　by　the　differences　exhibited　by　living　beings；　not　qua　living；　but　in　their　bodies　viewed　as　instruments　of　life。　　　　　Differentiation　by　form　or　shape　is　no　more　out　of　place　than　a　division　based　on　qualities…　heat；　cold　and　the　like。　If　it　be　objected　that　qualities　go　to　make　bodies　what　they　are；　then；　we　reply；　so　do　blendings；　colours；　shapes。　Since　our　discussion　is　concerned　with　Sensible　Substance；　it　is　not　strange　that　it　should　turn　upon　distinctions　related　to　sense…perception：　this　Substance　is　not　Being　pure　and　simple；　but　the　Sensible　Being　which　we　call　the　Universe。　　　　　We　have　remarked　that　its　apparent　subsistence　is　in　fact　an　assemblage　of　Sensibles；　their　existence　guaranteed　to　us　by　sense…perception。　But　since　their　combination　is　unlimited；　our　division　must　be　guided　by　the　Form…Ideas　of　living　beings；　as　for　example　the　Form…Idea　of　Man　implanted　in　Body；　the　particular　Form　acts　as　a　qualification　of　Body；　but　there　is　nothing　unreasonable　in　using　qualities　as　a　basis　of　division。　　　　　We　may　be　told　that　we　have　distinguished　between　simple　and　composite　bodies；　even　ranking　them　as　opposites。　But　our　distinction；　we　reply；　was　between　material　and　organic　bodies　and　raised　no　question　of　the　composite。　In　fact；　there　exists　no　means　of　opposing　the　composite　to　the　simple；　it　is　necessary　to　determine　the　simples　in　the　first　stage　of　division；　and　then；　combining　them　on　the　basis　of　a　distinct　underlying　principle；　to　differentiate　the　composites　in　virtue　of　their　places　and　shapes；　distinguishing　for　example　the　heavenly　from　the　earthly。　　　　　These　observations　will　suffice　for　the　Being　＇Substance＇；　or　rather　the　Becoming；　which　obtains　in　the　Sensible　realm。　　　　　11。　Passing　to　Quantity　and　the　quantum；　we　have　to　consider　the　view　which　identifies　them　with　number　and　magnitude　on　the　ground　that　everything　quantitative　is　numbered　among　Sensible　things　or　rated　by　the　extension　of　its　substrate：　we　are　here；　of　course；　discussing　not　Quantity　in　isolation；　but　that　which　causes　a　piece　of　wood　to　be　three　yards　long　and　gives　the　five　in　〃five　horses；〃　　　　　Now　we　have　often　maintained　that　number　and　magnitude　are　to　be　regarded　as　the　only　true　quantities；　and　that　Space　and　Time　have　no　right　to　be　conceived　as　quantitative：　Time　as　the　measure　of　Motion　should　be　assigned　to　Relation；　while　Space；　being　that　which　circumscribes　Body；　is　also　a　relative　and　falls　under　the　same　category；　though　continuous；　it　is；　like　Motion；　not　included　in　Quantity。　　　　　On　the　other　hand；　why　do　we　not　find　in　the　category　of　Quantity　〃great〃　and　〃small〃？　It　is　some　kind　of　Quantity　which　gives　greatness　to　the　great；　greatness　is　not　a　relative；　though　greater　and　smaller　are　relatives；　since　these；　like　doubleness；　imply　an　external　correlative。　　　　　What　is　it；　then；　which　makes　a　mountain　small　and　a　grain　of　millet　large？　Surely；　in　the　first　place；　〃small〃　is　equivalent　to　〃smaller。〃　It　is　admitted　that　the　term　is　applied　only　to　things　of　the　same　kind；　and　from　this　admission　we　may　infer　that　the　mountain　is　〃smaller〃　rather　than　〃small；〃　and　that　the　grain　of　millet　is　not　large　in　any　absolute　sense　but　large　for　a　grain　of　millet。　In　other　words；　since　the　comparison　is　between　things　of　the　same　kind；　the　natural　predicate　would　be　a　comparative。　　　　　Again；　why　is　not　beauty　classed　as　a　relative？　Beauty；　unlike　greatness；　we　regard　as　absolute　and　as　a　quality；　〃more　beautiful〃　is　the　relative。　Yet　even　the　term　〃beautiful〃　may　be　attached　to　something　which　in　a　given　relation　may　appear　ugly：　the　beauty　of　man；　for　example；　is　ugliness　when　compared　with　that　of　the　gods；　〃the　most　beautiful　of　monkeys；〃　we　may　quote；　〃is　ugly　in　comparison　with　any　other　type。〃　Nonetheless；　a　thing　is　beautiful　in　itself；　as　related　to　something　else　it　is　either　more　or　less　beautiful。　　　　　Similarly；　an　object　is　great　in　itself；　and　its　greatness　is　due；　not　to　any　external；　but　to　its　own　participation　in　the　Absolute　Great。　　　　　Are　we　actually　to　eliminate　the　beautiful　on　the　pretext　that　there　is　a　more　beautiful？　No　more　then　must　we　eliminate　the　great　because　of　the　greater：　the　greater　can　obviously　have　no　existence　whatever　apart　from　the　great；　just　as　the　more　beautiful　can　have　no　existence　without　the　beautiful。　　　　　12。　It　follows　that　we　must　allow　contrariety　to　Quantity：　whenever　we　speak　of　great　and　small；　our　notions　acknowledge　this　contrariety　by　evolving　opposite　images；　as　also　when　we　refer　to　many　and　few；　indeed；　〃few〃　and　〃many〃　call　for　similar　treatment　to　〃small〃　and　〃great。〃　　　　　〃Many；〃　predicated　of　the　inhabitants　of　a　house；　does　duty　for　〃more〃：　〃few〃　people　are　said　to　be　in　the　theatre　instead　of　〃less。〃　　　　　〃Many；〃　again；　necessarily　involves　a　large　numerical　plurality。　This　plurality　can　scarcely　be　a　relative；　it　is　simply　an　expansion　of　number；　its　contrary　being　a　contraction。　　　　　The　same　applies　to　the　continuous　＇magnitude＇；　the　notion　of　which　entails　prolongation　to　a　distant　point。　　　　　Quantity；　then；　appears　whenever　there　is　a　progression　from　the　unit　or　the　point：　if　either　progression　comes　to　a　rapid　halt；　we　have　respectively　〃few〃　and　〃small〃；　if　it　goes　forward　and　does　not　quickly　cease；　〃many〃　and　〃great。〃　　　　　What；　we　may　be　asked；　is　the　limit　of　this　progression？　What；　we　retort；　is　the　limit