the six enneads- 第7部分

uch　living　beings　as　have　the　gift　of　music；　finding　themselves　well…off　in　other　ways；　they　sing；　too；　as　their　nature　is；　and　so　their　day　is　pleasant　to　them。　　　　　And　if；　even；　we　set　Happiness　in　some　ultimate　Term　pursued　by　inborn　tendency；　then　on　this　head；　too；　we　must　allow　it　to　animals　from　the　moment　of　their　attaining　this　Ultimate：　the　nature　in　them　comes　to　a　halt；　having　fulfilled　its　vital　course　from　a　beginning　to　an　end。　　　　　It　may　be　a　distasteful　notion；　this　bringing…down　of　happiness　so　low　as　to　the　animal　world…　making　it　over；　as　then　we　must；　even　to　the　vilest　of　them　and　not　withholding　it　even　from　the　plants；　living　they　too　and　having　a　life　unfolding　to　a　Term。　　　　　But；　to　begin　with；　it　is　surely　unsound　to　deny　that　good　of　life　to　animals　only　because　they　do　not　appear　to　man　to　be　of　great　account。　And　as　for　plants；　we　need　not　necessarily　allow　to　them　what　we　accord　to　the　other　forms　of　life；　since　they　have　no　feeling。　It　is　true　people　might　be　found　to　declare　prosperity　possible　to　the　very　plants：　they　have　life；　and　life　may　bring　good　or　evil；　the　plants　may　thrive　or　wither；　bear　or　be　barren。　　　　　No：　if　Pleasure　be　the　Term；　if　here　be　the　good　of　life；　it　is　impossible　to　deny　the　good　of　life　to　any　order　of　living　things；　if　the　Term　be　inner…peace；　equally　impossible；　impossible；　too；　if　the　good　of　life　be　to　live　in　accordance　with　the　purpose　of　nature。　　　　　2。　Those　that　deny　the　happy　life　to　the　plants　on　the　ground　that　they　lack　sensation　are　really　denying　it　to　all　living　things。　　　　　By　sensation　can　be　meant　only　perception　of　state；　and　the　state　of　well…being　must　be　Good　in　itself　quite　apart　from　the　perception：　to　be　a　part　of　the　natural　plan　is　good　whether　knowingly　or　without　knowledge：　there　is　good　in　the　appropriate　state　even　though　there　be　no　recognition　of　its　fitness　or　desirable　quality…　for　it　must　be　in　itself　desirable。　　　　　This　Good　exists；　then；　is　present：　that　in　which　it　is　present　has　well…being　without　more　ado：　what　need　then　to　ask　for　sensation　into　the　bargain？　　　　　Perhaps；　however；　the　theory　is　that　the　good　of　any　state　consists　not　in　the　condition　itself　but　in　the　knowledge　and　perception　of　it。　　　　　But　at　this　rate　the　Good　is　nothing　but　the　mere　sensation；　the　bare　activity　of　the　sentient　life。　And　so　it　will　be　possessed　by　all　that　feel；　no　matter　what。　Perhaps　it　will　be　said　that　two　constituents　are　needed　to　make　up　the　Good；　that　there　must　be　both　feeling　and　a　given　state　felt：　but　how　can　it　be　maintained　that　the　bringing　together　of　two　neutrals　can　produce　the　Good？　　　　　They　will　explain；　possibly；　that　the　state　must　be　a　state　of　Good　and　that　such　a　condition　constitutes　well…being　on　the　discernment　of　that　present　good；　but　then　they　invite　the　question　whether　the　well…being　comes　by　discerning　the　presence　of　the　Good　that　is　there；　or　whether　there　must　further　be　the　double　recognition　that　the　state　is　agreeable　and　that　the　agreeable　state　constitutes　the　Good。　　　　　If　well…being　demands　this　recognition；　it　depends　no　longer　upon　sensation　but　upon　another；　a　higher　faculty；　and　well…being　is　vested　not　in　a　faculty　receptive　of　pleasure　but　in　one　competent　to　discern　that　pleasure　is　the　Good。　　　　　Then　the　cause　of　the　well…being　is　no　longer　pleasure　but　the　faculty　competent　to　pronounce　as　to　pleasure's　value。　Now　a　judging　entity　is　nobler　than　one　that　merely　accepts　a　state：　it　is　a　principle　of　Reason　or　of　Intellection：　pleasure　is　a　state：　the　reasonless　can　never　be　closer　to　the　Good　than　reason　is。　How　can　reason　abdicate　and　declare　nearer　to　good　than　itself　something　lying　in　a　contrary　order？　　　　　No：　those　denying　the　good　of　life　to　the　vegetable　world；　and　those　that　make　it　consist　in　some　precise　quality　of　sensation；　are　in　reality　seeking　a　loftier　well…being　than　they　are　aware　of；　and　setting　their　highest　in　a　more　luminous　phase　of　life。　　　　　Perhaps；　then；　those　are　in　the　right　who　found　happiness　not　on　the　bare　living　or　even　on　sensitive　life　but　on　the　life　of　Reason？　　　　　But　they　must　tell　us　it　should　be　thus　restricted　and　why　precisely　they　make　Reason　an　essential　to　the　happiness　in　a　living　being：　　　　　〃When　you　insist　on　Reason；　is　it　because　Reason　is　resourceful；　swift　to　discern　and　compass　the　primal　needs　of　nature；　or　would　you　demand　it；　even　though　it　were　powerless　in　that　domain？〃　　　　　If　you　call　it　in　as　a　provider；　then　the　reasonless；　equally　with　the　reasoning；　may　possess　happiness　after　their　kind；　as　long　as；　without　any　thought　of　theirs；　nature　supplies　their　wants：　Reason　becomes　a　servant；　there　is　no　longer　any　worth　in　it　for　itself　and　no　worth　in　that　consummation　of　reason　which；　we　hold；　is　virtue。　　　　　If　you　say　that　reason　is　to　be　cherished　for　its　own　sake　and　not　as　supplying　these　human　needs；　you　must　tell　us　what　other　services　it　renders；　what　is　its　proper　nature　and　what　makes　it　the　perfect　thing　it　is。　　　　　For；　on　this　admission；　its　perfection　cannot　reside　in　any　such　planning　and　providing：　its　perfection　will　be　something　quite　different；　something　of　quite　another　class：　Reason　cannot　be　itself　one　of　those　first　needs　of　nature；　it　cannot　even　be　a　cause　of　those　first　needs　of　nature　or　at　all　belong　to　that　order：　it　must　be　nobler　than　any　and　all　of　such　things：　otherwise　it　is　not　easy　to　see　how　we　can　be　asked　to　rate　it　so　highly。　　　　　Until　these　people　light　upon　some　nobler　principle　than　any　at　which　they　still　halt；　they　must　be　left　where　they　are　and　where　they　choose　to　be；　never　understanding　what　the　Good　of　Life　is　to　those　that　can　make　it　theirs；　never　knowing　to　what　kind　of　beings　it　is　accessible。　　　　　What　then　is　happiness？　Let　us　try　basing　it　upon　Life。　　　　　3。　Now　if　we　draw　no　distinction　as　to　kinds　of　life；　everything　that　lives　will　be　capable　of　happiness；　and　those　will　be　effectively　happy　who　possess　that　one　common　gift　of　which　every　living　thing　is　by　nature　receptive。　We　could　not　deny　it　to　the　irrational　whilst　allowing　it　to　the　rational。　If　happiness　were　inherent　in　the　bare　being…alive；　the　common　ground　in　which　the　cause　of　happiness　could　always　take　root　would　be　simply　life。　　　　　Those；　then；　that　set　happiness　not　in　the　mere　living　but　in　the　reasoning　life　seem　to　overlook　the　fact　that　they　are　not　really　making　it　depend　upon　life　at　all：　they　admit　that　this　reasoning　faculty；　round　which　they　centre　happiness；　is　a　property　＇not　the　subject　of　a　property＇：　the　subject；　to　them；　must　be　the　Reasoning…Life　since　it　is　in　this　double　term　that　they　find　the　basis　of　the　happiness：　so　that　they　are　making　it　consist　not　in　life　but　in　a　particular　kind　of　life…　not；　of　course；　a　species　formally　opposite　but；　in　terminology；　standing　as　an　〃earlier〃　to　a　〃later〃　in　the　one　Kind。　　　　　Now　in　common　use　this　word　〃Life〃　embraces　many　forms　which　shade　down　from　primal　to　secondary　and　so　on；　all　massed　under　the　common　term…　life　of　plant　and　life　of　animal…　each　phase　brighter　or　dimmer　than　its　next：　and　so　it　evidently　must　be　with　the　Good…of…Life。　And　if　thing　is　ever　the　image　of　thing；　so　every　Good　must　always　be　the　image　of　a　higher　Good。　　　　　If　mere　Being　is　insufficient；　if　happiness　demands　fulness　of　life；　and　exists；　therefore；　where　nothing　is　lacking　of　all　that　belongs　to　the　idea　of　life；　then　happiness　can　exist　only　in　a　being　that　lives　fully。　　　　　And　such　a　one　will　possess　not　merely　the　good；　but　the　Supreme　Good　if；　that　is　to　say；　in　the　realm　of　existents　the　Supreme　Good　can　be　no　other　than　the　authentically　living；　no　other　than　Life　in　its　greatest　plenitude；　life　in　which　the　good　is　present　as　something　essential　not　as　something　brought　from　without；　a　life　needing　no　foreign　substance　called　in　from　a　foreign　realm；　to　establish　it　in　good。　　　　　For　what　could　be　added　to　the　fullest　life　to　make　it　the　best　life？　If　anyone　should　answer；　〃The　nature　of　Good〃　＇The　Good；　as　a　Divine　Hypostasis＇；　the　reply　would　certainly　be　near　our　thought；　but　we　are　not　seeking　the　Cause　but　the　main　constituent。　　　　　It　has　been　said　more　than　once　that　the　perfect　life　and　the　true　life；　the　essential　life；　is　in　the　Intellectual　Nature　beyond　this　sphere；　and　that　all　other　forms　of　life　are　incomplete；　are　phantoms　of　life；　imperfect；　not　pure；　not　more　truly　life　than　they　are　its　contrary：　here　let　it　be　said　succinctly　that　since　all　living　things　proceed　from　the　one　principle　but　possess　life　in　different　degrees；　this　principle　must　be　the　first　life　and　the　most　complete。　　　　　4。　If；　then；　the　perfect　life　is　within　human　reach；　the　man　attaining　it　attains　happiness：　if　not；　happiness　must　be　made　over　to　the　gods；　for　the　perfect　life　is　for　them　alone。　　　　　But　since　we　hold　that　happiness　is　for　human　beings　too；　we　must　consider　what　this　perfect　life　is。　The　matter　may　be　stated　thus：　　　　　It　has　been　shown　elsewhere　that　man；　when　he　commands　not　merely　the　life　of　sensation　but　also　Reason　and　Authentic　Intellection；　has　realised　the　perfect　life。　　　　　But　are　we　to　picture　this　kind　of　life　as　something　foreign　imported　into　his　nature？　　　　　No：　there　exists　no　single　human　being　that　does　not　either　potentially　or　effectively　possess　this　th