laches- 第8部分

NICIAS：　　Why；　Laches；　I　do　not　call　animals　or　any　other　things　which　have



no　fear　of　dangers；　because　they　are　ignorant　of　them；　courageous；　but　only



fearless　and　senseless。　　Do　you　imagine　that　I　should　call　little　children



courageous；　which　fear　no　dangers　because　they　know　none？　　There　is　a



difference；　to　my　way　of　thinking；　between　fearlessness　and　courage。　　I　am



of　opinion　that　thoughtful　courage　is　a　quality　possessed　by　very　few；　but



that　rashness　and　boldness；　and　fearlessness；　which　has　no　forethought；　are



very　common　qualities　possessed　by　many　men；　many　women；　many　children；



many　animals。　　And　you；　and　men　in　general；　call　by　the　term　'courageous'



actions　which　I　call　rash；my　courageous　actions　are　wise　actions。







LACHES：　　Behold；　Socrates；　how　admirably；　as　he　thinks；　he　dresses　himself



out　in　words；　while　seeking　to　deprive　of　the　honour　of　courage　those　whom



all　the　world　acknowledges　to　be　courageous。







NICIAS：　　Not　so；　Laches；　but　do　not　be　alarmed；　for　I　am　quite　willing　to



say　of　you　and　also　of　Lamachus；　and　of　many　other　Athenians；　that　you　are



courageous　and　therefore　wise。







LACHES：　　I　could　answer　that；　but　I　would　not　have　you　cast　in　my　teeth



that　I　am　a　haughty　Aexonian。







SOCRATES：　　Do　not　answer　him；　Laches；　I　rather　fancy　that　you　are　not　aware



of　the　source　from　which　his　wisdom　is　derived。　　He　has　got　all　this　from



my　friend　Damon；　and　Damon　is　always　with　Prodicus；　who；　of　all　the



Sophists；　is　considered　to　be　the　best　puller　to　pieces　of　words　of　this



sort。







LACHES：　　Yes；　Socrates；　and　the　examination　of　such　niceties　is　a　much　more



suitable　employment　for　a　Sophist　than　for　a　great　statesman　whom　the　city



chooses　to　preside　over　her。







SOCRATES：　　Yes；　my　sweet　friend；　but　a　great　statesman　is　likely　to　have　a



great　intelligence。　　And　I　think　that　the　view　which　is　implied　in　Nicias'



definition　of　courage　is　worthy　of　examination。







LACHES：　　Then　examine　for　yourself；　Socrates。







SOCRATES：　　That　is　what　I　am　going　to　do；　my　dear　friend。　　Do　not；　however；



suppose　I　shall　let　you　out　of　the　partnership；　for　I　shall　expect　you　to



apply　your　mind；　and　join　with　me　in　the　consideration　of　the　question。







LACHES：　　I　will　if　you　think　that　I　ought。







SOCRATES：　　Yes；　I　do；　but　I　must　beg　of　you；　Nicias；　to　begin　again。　　You



remember　that　we　originally　considered　courage　to　be　a　part　of　virtue。







NICIAS：　　Very　true。







SOCRATES：　　And　you　yourself　said　that　it　was　a　part；　and　there　were　many



other　parts；　all　of　which　taken　together　are　called　virtue。







NICIAS：　　Certainly。







SOCRATES：　　Do　you　agree　with　me　about　the　parts？　　For　I　say　that　justice；



temperance；　and　the　like；　are　all　of　them　parts　of　virtue　as　well　as



courage。　　Would　you　not　say　the　same？







NICIAS：　　Certainly。







SOCRATES：　　Well　then；　so　far　we　are　agreed。　　And　now　let　us　proceed　a　step；



and　try　to　arrive　at　a　similar　agreement　about　the　fearful　and　the　hopeful：　



I　do　not　want　you　to　be　thinking　one　thing　and　myself　another。　　Let　me　then



tell　you　my　own　opinion；　and　if　I　am　wrong　you　shall　set　me　right：　　in　my



opinion　the　terrible　and　the　hopeful　are　the　things　which　do　or　do　not



create　fear；　and　fear　is　not　of　the　present；　nor　of　the　past；　but　is　of



future　and　expected　evil。　　Do　you　not　agree　to　that；　Laches？







LACHES：　　Yes；　Socrates；　entirely。







SOCRATES：　　That　is　my　view；　Nicias；　the　terrible　things；　as　I　should　say；



are　the　evils　which　are　future；　and　the　hopeful　are　the　good　or　not　evil



things　which　are　future。　　Do　you　or　do　you　not　agree　with　me？







NICIAS：　　I　agree。







SOCRATES：　　And　the　knowledge　of　these　things　you　call　courage？







NICIAS：　　Precisely。







SOCRATES：　　And　now　let　me　see　whether　you　agree　with　Laches　and　myself　as



to　a　third　point。







NICIAS：　　What　is　that？







SOCRATES：　　I　will　tell　you。　　He　and　I　have　a　notion　that　there　is　not　one



knowledge　or　science　of　the　past；　another　of　the　present；　a　third　of　what



is　likely　to　be　best　and　what　will　be　best　in　the　future；　but　that　of　all



three　there　is　one　science　only：　　for　example；　there　is　one　science　of



medicine　which　is　concerned　with　the　inspection　of　health　equally　in　all



times；　present；　past；　and　future；　and　one　science　of　husbandry　in　like



manner；　which　is　concerned　with　the　productions　of　the　earth　in　all　times。　



As　to　the　art　of　the　general；　you　yourselves　will　be　my　witnesses　that　he



has　an　excellent　foreknowledge　of　the　future；　and　that　he　claims　to　be　the



master　and　not　the　servant　of　the　soothsayer；　because　he　knows　better　what



is　happening　or　is　likely　to　happen　in　war：　　and　accordingly　the　law　places



the　soothsayer　under　the　general；　and　not　the　general　under　the　soothsayer。　



Am　I　not　correct　in　saying　so；　Laches？







LACHES：　　Quite　correct。







SOCRATES：　　And　do　you；　Nicias；　also　acknowledge　that　the　same　science　has



understanding　of　the　same　things；　whether　future；　present；　or　past？







NICIAS：　　Yes；　indeed　Socrates；　that　is　my　opinion。







SOCRATES：　　And　courage；　my　friend；　is；　as　you　say；　a　knowledge　of　the



fearful　and　of　the　hopeful？







NICIAS：　　Yes。







SOCRATES：　　And　the　fearful；　and　the　hopeful；　are　admitted　to　be　future



goods　and　future　evils？







NICIAS：　　True。







SOCRATES：　　And　the　same　science　has　to　do　with　the　same　things　in　the



future　or　at　any　time？







NICIAS：　　That　is　true。







SOCRATES：　　Then　courage　is　not　the　science　which　is　concerned　with　the



fearful　and　hopeful；　for　they　are　future　only；　courage；　like　the　other



sciences；　is　concerned　not　only　with　good　and　evil　of　the　future；　but　of



the　present　and　past；　and　of　any　time？







NICIAS：　　That；　as　I　suppose；　is　true。







SOCRATES：　　Then　the　answer　which　you　have　given；　Nicias；　includes　only　a



third　part　of　courage；　but　our　question　extended　to　the　whole　nature　of



courage：　　and　according　to　your　view；　that　is；　according　to　your　present



view；　courage　is　not　only　the　knowledge　of　the　hopeful　and　the　fearful；　but



seems　to　include　nearly　every　good　and　evil　without　reference　to　time。　



What　do　you　say　to　that　alteration　in　your　statement？







NICIAS：　　I　agree；　Socrates。







SOCRATES：　　But　then；　my　dear　friend；　if　a　man　knew　all　good　and　evil；　and



how　they　are；　and　have　been；　and　will　be　produced；　would　he　not　be　perfect；



and　wanting　in　no　virtue；　whether　justice；　or　temperance；　or　holiness？　　He



would　possess　them　all；　and　he　would　know　which　were　dangers　and　which　were



not；　and　guard　against　them　whether　they　were　supernatural　or　natural；　and



he　would　provide　the　good；　as　he　would　know　how　to　deal　both　with　gods　or



men。







NICIAS：　　I　think；　Socrates；　that　there　is　a　great　deal　of　truth　in　what　you



say。







SOCRATES：　　But　then；　Nicias；　courage；　according　to　this　new　definition　of



yours；　instead　of　being　a　part　of　virtue　only；　will　be　all　virtue？







NICIAS：　　It　would　seem　so。







SOCRATES：　　But　we　were　saying　that　courage　is　one　of　the　parts　of　virtue？







NICIAS：　　Yes；　that　was　what　we　were　saying。







SOCRATES：　　And　that　is　in　contradiction　with　our　present　view？







NICIAS：　　That　appears　to　be　the　case。







SOCRATES：　　Then；　Nicias；　we　have　not　discovered　what　courage　is。







NICIAS：　　We　have　not。







LACHES：　　And　yet；　friend　Nicias；　I　imagined　that　you　would　have　made　the



discovery；　when　you　were　so　contemptuous　of　the　answers　which　I　made　to



Socrates。　　I　had　very　great　hopes　that　you　would　have　been　enlightened　by



the　wisdom　of　Damon。







NICIAS：　　I　perceive；　Laches；　that　you　think　nothing　of　having　displayed



your　ignorance　of　the　nature　of　courage；　but　you　look　only　to　see　whether　I



have　not　made　a　similar　display；　and　if　we　are　both　equally　ignorant　of　the



things　which　a　man　who　is　good　for　anything　should　know；　that；　I　suppose；



will　be　of　no　consequence。　　You　certainly　appear　to　me　very　like　the　rest



of　the　world；　looking　at　your　neighbour　and　not　at　yourself。　　I　am　of



opinion　that　enough　has　been　said　on　the　subject　which　we　have　been



discussing；　and　if　anything　has　been　imperfectly　said；　that　may　be



hereafter　corrected　by　the　help　of　Damon；　whom　you　think　to　laugh　down；



although　you　have　never　seen　him；　and　with　the　help　of　others。　　And　when　I



am　satisfied　myself；　I　will　freely　impart　my　satisfaction　to　you；　for　I



think　that　you　are　very　much　in　want　of　knowle