idea the objective is the immediate world found ready to hand； or the idea as life
is in the phenomenon of individual existence。 At the same time； in so far as this
judgement is pure distinguishing within its own limits （§ 223）； the idea realises in
one both itself and its other。 Consequently it is the certitude of the virtual identity
between itself and the objective world。 Reason comes to the world with an
absolute faith in its ability to make the identity actual； and to raise its certitude to
truth； and with the instinct of realising explicitly the nullity of that contrast which
it sees to be implicitly null。
§ 225
This process is in general terms Cognition。 In Cognition in a single act the
contrast is virtually superseded； as regards both the one…sidedness of subjectivity
and the one…sidedness of objectivity。 At first； however； the supersession of the
contrast is but implicit。 The process as such is in consequence immediately
infected with the finitude of this sphere； and splits into the twofold movement of
the instinct of reason； presented as two different movements。 On the one hand it
supersedes the one…sidedness of the Idea's subjectivity by receiving the existing
world into itself； into subjective conception and thought； and with this objectivity；
which is thus taken to be real and true； for its content it fills up the abstract
certitude of itself。 On the other hand； it supersedes the one…sidedness of the
objective world； which is now； on the contrary； estimated as only a mere
semblance； a collection of contingencies and shapes at bottom visionary。 It
modifies and informs that world by the inward nature of the subjective； which is
here taken to be the genuine objective。 The former is the instinct of science after
Truth； Cognition properly so called … the Theoretical action of the idea。 The
latter is the instinct of the Good to fulfil the same … the Practical activity of the
idea； or Volition。
？
＇a＇ Cognition proper
§ 226
The universal finitude of Cognition； which lies in the one judgement； the
presupposition of the contrast （§ 224） … a presupposition in contradiction of
which its own act lodges protest … specialises itself more precisely on the face of
its own idea。 The result of that specialisation is that its two elements receive the
aspect of being diverse from each other； and； as they are at least complete； they
take up the relation of 'reflection'； not of 'notion'； to one another。 The assimilation
of the matter； therefore； as a datum； presents itself in the light of a reception of it
into categories which at the same time remain external to it； and which meet each
other in the same style of diversity。 Reason is active here； but it is reason in the
shape of understanding。 The truth which such Cognition can reach will therefore
be only finite： the infinite truth （of the notion） is isolated and made transcendent；
an inaccessible goal in a world of its own。 Still in its external action cognition
stands under the guidance of the notion； and notional principles form the secret
clue to its movement。
§ 226n
The finitude of Cognition lies in the presupposition of a world already in existence； and in the
consequent view of the knowing subject as a tabula rasa。 The conception is one attributed to
Aristotle； but no man is further than Aristotle from such an outside theory of Cognition。 Such a
style of Cognition does not recognise in itself the activity of the notion … an activity which it is
implicitly； but not consciously。 In its own estimation its procedure is passive。 Really that procedure
is active。
§ 227
Finite Cognition； when it presupposes what is distinguished from it to be
something already existing and confronting it … to be the various facts of external
nature or of consciousness … has； in the first place； （1） formal identity or the
abstraction of universality for the form of its action。 Its activity therefore consists
in analysing the given concrete object； isolating its differences； and giving them
the form of abstract universality。 Or it leaves the concrete thing as a ground； and
by setting aside the unessential…looking particulars； brings into relief a concrete
universal； the Genus； or Force and Law。 This is the Analytical Method。
§ 227n
People generally speak of the analytical and synthetic methods； as if it depended solely on our
choice which we pursued。 This is far from the case。 It depends on the form of the objects of our
investigation； which of the two methods that are derivable from the notion of finite cognition ought
to be applied。 In the first place； cognition is analytical。 Analytical cognition deals with an object
which is presented in detachment； and the aim of its action is to trace back to a universal the
individual object before it。 Thought in such circumstances means no more than an act of
abstraction or of formal identity。 That is the sense in which thought is understood by Locke and all
empiricists。 Cognition； it is often said； can never do more than separate the given concrete objects
into their abstract elements； and then consider these elements in their isolation。 It is； however； at
once apparent that this turns things upside down； and that cognition； if its purpose be to take things
as they are； thereby falls into contradiction with itself。 Thus the chemist e。g。 places a piece of flesh
in his retort； tortures it in many ways； and then informs us that it consists of nitrogen； carbon；
hydrogen； etc。 True： but these abstract matters have ceased to be flesh。 The same defect occurs in
the reasoning of an empirical psychologist when he analyses an action into the various aspects
which it presents； and then sticks to these aspects in their separation。 The object which is
subjected to analysis is treated as a sort of onion from which one coat is peeled off after another。
§ 228
This universality is （2） also a specific universality。 In this case the line of activity
follows the three 'moments' of the notion； which （as it has not its infinity in finite
cognition） is the specific or definite notion of understanding。 The reception of the
object into the forms of this notion is the Synthetic Method。
§ 228n
The movement of the Synthetic method is the reverse of the Analytical method。 The latter starts
from the individual； and proceeds to the universal； in the former the starting…point is given by the
universal （as a definition）； from which we proceed by particularising （in division） to the individual
（the theorem）。 The Synthetic method thus presents itself as the development … the 'moments' of the
notion on the object。
Definition； Division and Theorem
§ 229
＇a＇ When the object has been in the first instance brought by cognition into the
form of the specific notion in general； so that in this way its genus and its
universal character or speciality are explicitly stated； we have the Definition。 The
materials and the proof of Definition are procured by means of the Analytical
method （§ 227）。 The specific character however is expected to be a 'mark' only：
that is to say it is to be in behoof only of the purely subjective cognition which is
external to the object。
§ 229n
Definition involves the three organic elements of the notion： the universal or proximate genus
（genus proximum）； the particular or specific character of the genus （qualitas specifica）； and the
individual； or object defined。 The first question that definition suggests； is where it comes from。
The general answer to this question is to say； that definitions originate by way of analysis。 This will
explain how it happens that people quarrel about the correctness of proposed definitions； for here
everything depends on what perceptions we started from； and what points of view we had before
our eyes in so doing。 The richer the object to be defined is； that is； the more numerous are the
aspects which it offers to our notice； the more various are the definitions we may frame of it。 Thus
there are quite a host of definitions of life； of the state； etc。 Geometry； on the contrary； dealing with
a theme so abstract as space； has an easy task in giving definitions。 Again； in respect of the matter
or contents of the objects defined； there is no constraining necessity present。 We are expected to
admit that space exists； that there are plants； animals； etc。； nor is it the business of geometry；
botany； etc。； to demonstrate that the objects in question necessarily are。 This very circumstance
makes the synthetic method of cognition as little suitable for philosophy as the analytical： for
philosophy has above all things to leave no doubt of the necessity of its objects。 And yet several
attempts have been made to introduce the synthetic method into philosophy。 Thus Spinoza； in
particular； begins with definitions。 He says； for instance； that s