the science of right- 第22部分

maltreats　the　garrison　on　marching　out；　or　otherwise　violates　the

agreement；　cannot　complain　of　injury　or　wrong　if　on　another　occasion

the　same　treatment　is　inflicted　upon　themselves。　But；　in　fact；　all

such　actions　fundamentally　involve　the　commission　of　wrong　and

injustice；　in　the　highest　degree；　because　they　take　all　validity

away　from　the　conception　of　right；　and　give　up　everything；　as　it

were　by　law　itself；　to　savage　violence；　and　thus　overthrow　the

rights　of　men　generally。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　PART。　PUBLIC　RIGHT。

　　　　　THE　SYSTEM　OF　THOSE　LAWS　WHICH　REQUIRE　PUBLIC　PROMULGATION。

　　　　　　　　　　　　THE　PRINCIPLES　OF　RIGHT　IN　CIVIL　SOCIETY。



　　　　　　　　　43。　Definition　and　Division　of　Public　Right。



　　Public　right　embraces　the　whole　of　the　laws　that　require　to　be

universally　promulgated　in　order　to　produce　juridical　state　of

society。　It　is　therefore　a　system　of　those　laws　that　are　requisite　for

a　people　as　a　multitude　of　men　forming　a　nation；　or　for　a　number　of

nations；　in　their　relations　to　each　other。　Men　and　nations；　on　account

of　their　mutual　influence　on　one　another；　require　a　juridical

constitution　uniting　them　under　one　will；　in　order　that　they　may

participate　in　what　is　right。　This　relation　of　the　individuals　of　a

nation　to　each　other　constitutes　the　civil　union　in　the　social

state；　and；　viewed　as　a　whole　in　relation　to　its　constituent

members；　it　forms　the　political　state　（civitas）。

　　1。　The　state；　as　constituted　by　the　common　interest　of　all　to　live

in　a　juridical　union；　is　called；　in　view　of　its　form；　the　commonwealth

or　the　republic　in　the　wider　sense　of　the　term　（res　publica　latius　sic

dicta）。　The　principles　of　right　in　this　sphere　thus　constitute　the

first　department　of　public　right　as　the　right　of　the　state　（jus

civitatis）　or　national　right。　2。　The　state；　again；　viewed　in

relation　to　other　peoples；　is　called　a　power　（potentia）；　whence　arises

the　idea　of　potentates。　Viewed　in　relation　to　the　supposed

hereditary　unity　of　the　people　composing　it；　the　state　constitutes　a

nation　（gens）。　Under　the　general　conception　of　public　right；　in

addition　to　the　right　of　the　individual　state；　there　thus　arises

another　department　of　right；　constituting　the　right　of　nations　（jus

gentium）　or　international　right。　3。　Further；　as　the　surface　of　the

earth　is　not　unlimited　in　extent；　but　is　circumscribed　into　a　unity；

national　right　and　international　right　necessarily　culminate　in　the

idea　of　a　universal　right　of　mankind；　which　may　be　called

Cosmopolitical　Right　（jus　cosmopoliticum）。　And　national；

international；　and　cosmopolitical　right　are　so　interconnected；　that；

if　any　one　of　these　three　possible　forms　of　the　juridical　relation

fails　to　embody　the　essential　principles　that　ought　to　regulate

external　freedom　by　law；　the　structure　of　legislation　reared　by　the

others　will　also　be　undermined；　and　the　whole　system　would　at　last

fall　to　pieces。



　　　　　　　　　　I。　Right　of　the　State　and　Constitutional　Law。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Jus　Civitatis）。



　　　　　　　　　44。　Origin　Of　the　Civil　Union　and　Public　Right。



　　It　is　not　from　any　experience　prior　to　the　appearance　of　an　external

authoritative　legislation　that　we　learn　of　the　maxim　of　natural

violence　among　men　and　their　evil　tendency　to　engage　in　war　with

each　other。　Nor　is　it　assumed　here　that　it　is　merely　some　particular

historical　condition　or　fact；　that　makes　public　legislative　constraint

necessary；　for　however　well…disposed　or　favourable　to　right　men　may　be

considered　to　be　of　themselves；　the　rational　idea　of　a　state　of

society　not　yet　regulated　by　right；　must　be　taken　as　our

starting…point。　This　idea　implies　that　before　a　legal　state　of　society

can　be　publicly　established；　individual　men；　nations；　and　states；

can　never　be　safe　against　violence　from　each　other；　and　this　is

evident　from　the　consideration　that　every　one　of　his　own　will

naturally　does　what　seems　good　and　right　in　his　own　eyes；　entirely

independent　of　the　opinion　of　others。　Hence；　unless　the　institution　of

right　is　to　be　renounced；　the　first　thing　incumbent　on　men　is　to

accept　the　principle　that　it　is　necessary　to　leave　the　state　of

nature；　in　which　every　one　follows　his　own　inclinations；　and　to　form　a

union　of　all　those　who　cannot　avoid　coming　into　reciprocal

communication；　and　thus　subject　themselves　in　common　to　the　external

restraint　of　public　compulsory　laws。　Men　thus　enter　into　a　civil

union；　in　which　every　one　has　it　determined　by　law　what　shall　be

recognized　as　his；　and　this　is　secured　to　him　by　a　competent

external　power　distinct　from　his　own　individuality。　Such　is　the

primary　obligation；　on　the　part　of　all　men；　to　enter　into　the

relations　of　a　civil　state　of　society。

　　The　natural　condition　of　mankind　need　not；　on　this　ground；　be

represented　as　a　state　of　absolute　injustice；　as　if　there　could　have

been　no　other　relation　originally　among　men　but　what　was　merely

determined　by　force。　But　this　natural　condition　must　be　regarded；　if

it　ever　existed；　as　a　state　of　society　that　was　void　of　regulation

by　right　（status　justitiae　vacuus）；　so　that　if　a　matter　of　right

came　to　be　in　dispute　（jus　controversum）；　no　competent　judge　was　found

to　give　an　authorized　legal　decision　upon　it。　It　is　therefore

reasonable　that　any　one　should　constrain　another　by　force；　to　pass

from　such　a　nonjuridical　state　of　life　and　enter　within　the

jurisdiction　of　a　civil　state　of　society。　For；　although　on　the　basis

of　the　ideas　of　right　held　by　individuals　as　such；　external　things　may

be　acquired　by　occupancy　or　contract；　yet　such　acquisition　is　only

provisory　so　long　as　it　has　not　yet　obtained　the　sanction　of　a

public　law。　Till　this　sanction　is　reached；　the　condition　of　possession

is　not　determined　by　any　public　distributive　justice；　nor　is　it

secured　by　any　power　exercising　public　right。



　　If　men　were　not　disposed　to　recognize　any　acquisition　at　all　as

rightful…　even　in　a　provisional　way…　prior　to　entering　into　the

civil　state；　this　state　of　society　would　itself　be　impossible。　For　the

laws　regarding　the　mine　and　thine　in　the　state　of　nature；　contain

formally　the　very　same　thing　as　they　prescribe　in　the　civil　state；

when　it　is　viewed　merely　according　to　rational　conceptions：　only

that　in　the　forms　of　the　civil　state　the　conditions　are　laid　down

under　which　the　formal　prescriptions　of　the　state　of　nature　attain

realization　conformable　to　distributive　justice。　Were　there；　then；　not

even　provisionally；　an　external　meum　and　tuum　in　the　state　of

nature；　neither　would　there　be　any　juridical　duties　in　relation　to

them；　and；　consequently；　there　would　be　no　obligation　to　pass　out　of

that　state　into　another。



　　　　　　　45。　The　Form　of　the　State　and　its　Three　Powers。



　　A　state　（civitas）　is　the　union　of　a　number　of　men　under　juridical

laws。　These　laws；　as　such；　are　to　be　regarded　as　necessary　a　priori…

that　is；　as　following　of　themselves　from　the　conceptions　of　external

right　generally…　and　not　as　merely　established　by　statute。　The　form　of

the　state　is　thus　involved　in　the　idea　of　the　state；　viewed　as　it

ought　to　be　according　to　pure　principles　of　right；　and　this　ideal　form

furnishes　the　normal　criterion　of　every　real　union　that　constitutes

a　commonwealth。

　　Every　state　contains　in　itself　three　powers；　the　universal　united

will　of　the　people　being　thus　personified　in　a　political　triad。

These　are　the　legislative　power；　the　executive　power；　and　the

judiciary　power。　1。　The　legislative　power　of　the　sovereignty　in　the

state　is　embodied　in　the　person　of　the　lawgiver；　2。　the　executive

power　is　embodied　in　the　person　of　the　ruler　who　administers　the

Law；　and　3。　the　judiciary　power；　embodied　in　the　person　of　the

judge；　is　the　function　of　assigning　every　one　what　is　his　own；

according　to　the　law　（potestas　legislatoria；　rectoria；　et　judiciaria）。

These　three　powers　may　be　compared　to　the　three　propositions　in　a

practical　syllogism：　the　major　as　the　sumption　laying　down　the

universal　law　of　a　will；　the　minor　presenting　the　command　applicable

to　an　action　according　to　the　law　as　the　principle　of　the　subsumption；

and　the　conclusion　containing　the　sentence；　or　judgement　of　right；

in　the　particular　case　under　consideration。



　　　　　46。　The　Legislative　Power　and　the　Members　of　the　State。



　　The　legislative　power；　viewed　in　its　rational　principle；　can　only

belong　to　the　united　will　of　the　people。　For；　as　all　right　ought　to

proceed　from　this　power；　it　is　necessary　that　its　laws　should　be

unable　to　do　wrong　to　any　one　whatever。　Now；　if　any　one　individual

determines　anything　in　the　state　in　contradistinction　to　another；　it

is　always　possible　that　he　may　perpetrate　a　wrong　on　that　other；　but

this　is　never　possible　when　all　determine　and　decree　what　is　to　be　Law

to　themselves。　Volenti　non　fit　injuria。　Hence　it　is　only　the　united

and　consenting　will　of　all　the　people…　in　so　far　as　each　of　them

determines　the　same　thing　about　all；　and　all　determine　the　same

thing　about　each