the science of right- 第24部分

executive　or　governor；　for　the　governor；　as　administrator；　should

stand　under　the　authority　of　the　law；　and　is　bound　by　it　under　the

supreme　control　of　the　legislator。　The　legislative　authority　may

therefore　deprive　the　governor　of　his　power；　depose　him；　or　reform　his

administration；　but　not　punish　him。　This　is　the　proper　and　only

meaning　of　the　common　saying　in　England；　〃The　King…　as　the　supreme

executive　power…　can　do　no　wrong。〃　For　any　such　application　of

punishment　would　necessarily　be　an　act　of　that　very　executive　power　to

which　the　supreme　right　to　compel　according　to　law　pertains；　and　which

would　itself　be　thus　subjected　to　coercion；　which　is

self…contradictory。

　　3。　Further；　neither　the　legislative　power　nor　the　executive　power

ought　to　exercise　the　judicial　function；　but　only　appoint　judges　as

magistrates。　It　is　the　people　who　ought　to　judge　themselves；　through

those　of　the　citizens　who　are　elected　by　free　choice　as　their

representatives　for　this　purpose；　and　even　specially　for　every　process

or　cause。　For　the　judicial　sentence　is　a　special　act　of　public

distributive　justice　performed　by　a　judge　or　court　as　a　constitutional

administrator　of　the　law；　to　a　subject　as　one　of　the　people。　Such　an

act　is　not　invested　inherently　with　the　power　to　determine　and

assign　to　any　one　what　is　his。　Every　individual　among　the　people　being

merely　passive　in　this　relation　to　the　supreme　power；　either　the

executive　or　the　legislative　authority　might　do　him　wrong　in　their

determinations　in　cases　of　dispute　regarding　the　property　of

individuals。　It　would　not　be　the　people　themselves　who　thus

determined；　or　who　pronounced　the　judgements　of　〃guilty〃　or　〃not

guilty〃　regarding　their　fellow…citizens。　For　it　is　to　the

determination　of　this　issue　in　a　cause　that　the　court　has　to　apply　the

law；　and　it　is　by　means　of　the　executive　authority；　that　the　judge

holds　power　to　assign　to　every　one　his　own。　Hence　it　is　only　the

people　that　properly　can　judge　in　a　cause…　although　indirectly

representatives　elected　and　deputed　by　themselves；　as　in　a　jury。　It

would　even　be　beneath　the　dignity　of　the　sovereign　head　of　the　state

to　play　the　judge；　for　this　would　be　to　put　himself　into　a　position　in

which　it　would　be　possible　to　do　wrong；　and　thus　to　subject　himself　to

the　demand　for　an　appeal　to　a　still　higher　power　（a　rege　male

informato　ad　regem　melius　informandum）。

　　It　is　by　the　co…operation　of　these　three　powers…　the　legislative；

the　executive；　and　the　judicial…　that　the　state　realizes　its　autonomy。

This　autonomy　consists　in　its　organizing；　forming；　and　maintaining

itself　in　accordance　with　the　laws　of　freedom。　In　their　union　the

welfare　of　the　state　is　realized。　Salus　reipublicae　suprema　lex。*　By

this　is　not　to　be　understood　merely　the　individual　well…being　and

happiness　of　the　citizens　of　the　state；　for…　as　Rousseau　asserts…　this

end　may　perhaps　be　more　agreeably　and　more　desirably　attained　in　the

state　of　nature；　or　even　under　a　despotic　government。　But　the

welfare　of　the　state；　as　its　own　highest　good；　signifies　that

condition　in　which　the　greatest　harmony　is　attained　between　its

constitution　and　the　principles　of　right…　a　condition　of　the　state

which　reason　by　a　categorical　imperative　makes　it　obligatory　upon　us

to　strive　after。



　　*＇〃The　health　of　the　state　is　the　highest　law。〃＇



　　　　　　Constitutional　and　Juridical　Consequences　arising　from

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　the　Nature　of　the　Civil　Union。



　　　　　　　A。　Right　of　the　Supreme　Power；　Treason；　Dethronement；

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Revolution；　Reform。



　　The　origin　of　the　supreme　power　is　practically　inscrutable　by　the

people　who　are　placed　under　its　authority。　In　other　words；　the　subject

need　not　reason　too　curiously　in　regard　to　its　origin　in　the　practical

relation；　as　if　the　right　of　the　obedience　due　to　it　were　to　be

doubted　（jus　controversum）。　For　as　the　people；　in　order　to　be　able

to　abjudicate　with　a　title　of　right　regarding　the　supreme　power　in　the

state；　must　be　regarded　as　already　united　under　one　common　legislative

will；　it　cannot　judge　otherwise　than　as　the　present　supreme　head　of

the　state　（summus　imperans）　wills。　The　question　has　been　raised　as

to　whether　an　actual　contract　of　subjection　（pactum　subjectionis

civilis）　originally　preceded　the　civil　government　as　a　fact；　or

whether　the　power　arose　first；　and　the　law　only　followed　afterwards；

or　may　have　followed　in　this　order。　But　such　questions；　as　regards　the

people　already　actually　living　under　the　civil　law；　are　either

entirely　aimless；　or　even　fraught　with　subtle　danger　to　the　state。

For；　should　the　subject；　after　having　dug　down　to　the　ultimate

origin　of　the　state；　rise　in　opposition　to　the　present　ruling

authority；　he　would　expose　himself　as　a　citizen；　according　to　the

law　and　with　full　right；　to　be　punished；　destroyed；　or　outlawed。　A　law

which　is　so　holy　and　inviolable　that　it　is　practically　a　crime　even　to

cast　doubt　upon　it；　or　to　suspend　its　operation　for　a　moment；　is

represented　of　itself　as　necessarily　derived　from　some　supreme；

unblameable　lawgiver。　And　this　is　the　meaning　of　the　maxim；　〃All

authority　is　from　God〃；　which　proposition　does　not　express　the

historical　foundation　of　the　civil　constitution；　but　an　ideal

principle　of　the　practical　reason。　It　may　be　otherwise　rendered

thus：　〃It　is　a　duty　to　obey　the　law　of　the　existing　legislative　power；

be　its　origin　what　it　may。〃

　　Hence　it　follows；　that　the　supreme　power　in　the　state　has　only

rights；　and　no　（compulsory）　duties　towards　the　subject。　Further；　if

the　ruler　or　regent；　as　the　organ　of　the　supreme　power；　proceeds　in

violation　of　the　laws；　as　in　imposing　taxes；　recruiting　soldiers；

and　so　on；　contrary　to　the　law　of　equality　in　the　distribution　of

the　political　burdens；　the　subject　may　oppose　complaints　and

objections　（gravamina）　to　this　injustice；　but　not　active　resistance。

　　There　cannot　even　be　an　Article　contained　in　the　political

constitution　that　would　make　it　possible　for　a　power　in　the　state；

in　case　of　the　transgression　of　the　constitutional　laws　by　the　supreme

authority；　to　resist　or　even　to　restrict　it　in　so　doing。　For；

whoever　would　restrict　the　supreme　power　of　the　state　must　have

more；　or　at　least　equal；　power　as　compared　with　the　power　that　is　so

restricted；　and　if　competent　to　command　the　subjects　to　resist；　such　a

one　would　also　have　to　be　able　to　protect　them；　and　if　he　is　to　be

considered　capable　of　judging　what　is　right　in　every　case；　he　may　also

publicly　order　resistance。　But　such　a　one；　and　not　the　actual

authority；　would　then　be　the　supreme　power；　which　is　contradictory。

The　supreme　sovereign　power；　then；　in　proceeding　by　a　minister　who

is　at　the　same　time　the　ruler　of　the　state；　consequently　becomes

despotic；　and　the　expedient　of　giving　the　people　to　imagine…　when　they

have　properly　only　legislative　influence…　that　they　act　by　their

deputies　by　way　of　limiting　the　sovereign　authority；　cannot　so　mask

and　disguise　the　actual　despotism　of　such　a　government　that　it　will

not　appear　in　the　measures　and　means　adopted　by　the　minister　to

carry　out　his　function。　The　people；　while　represented　by　their

deputies　in　parliament；　under　such　conditions；　may　have　in　these

warrantors　of　their　freedom　and　rights；　persons　who　are　keenly

interested　on　their　own　account　and　their　families；　and　who　look　to

such　a　minister　for　the　benefit　of　his　influence　in　the　army；　navy；

and　public　offices。　And　hence；　instead　of　offering　resistance　to　the

undue　pretensions　of　the　government…　whose　public　declarations　ought

to　carry　a　prior　accord　on　the　part　of　the　people；　which；　however；

cannot　be　allowed　in　peace；　they　are　rather　always　ready　to　play

into　the　hands　of　the　government。　Hence　the　so…called　limited

political　constitution；　as　a　constitution　of　the　internal　rights　of

the　state；　is　an　unreality；　and　instead　of　being　consistent　with

right；　it　is　only　a　principle　of　expediency。　And　its　aim　is　not　so

much　to　throw　all　possible　obstacles　in　the　way　of　a　powerful　violator

of　popular　rights　by　his　arbitrary　influence　upon　the　government；　as

rather　to　cloak　it　over　under　the　illusion　of　a　right　of　opposition

conceded　to　the　people。

　　Resistance　on　the　part　of　the　people　to　the　supreme　legislative

power　of　the　state　is　in　no　case　legitimate；　for　it　is　only　by

submission　to　the　universal　legislative　will；　that　a　condition　of

law　and　order　is　possible。　Hence　there　is　no　right　of　sedition；　and

still　less　of　rebellion；　belonging　to　the　people。　And　least　of　all；

when　the　supreme　power　is　embodied　in　an　individual　monarch；　is

there　any　justification；　under　the　pretext　of　his　abuse　of　power；

for　seizing　his　person　or　taking　away　his　life　（monarchomachismus

sub　specie　tyrannicidii）。　The　slightest　attempt　of　this　kind　is　high

treason　（proditio　eminens）；　and　a　traitor　of　this　sort　who　aims　at　the

overthrow　of　his　country　may　be　punished；　as　a　political　parricide；

even　with　death。　It　is　the　duty　of　the