the science of right- 第27部分

drawing　interest　from　them；　not　for　the　wants　of　the　state　as　such；

which　is　rich；　but　for　those　of　the　people。　And　this　is　not　to　be　done

merely　by　voluntary　contributions；　but　by　compulsory　exactions　as

state…burdens；　for　we　are　here　considering　only　the　right　of　the　state

in　relation　to　the　people。　Among　the　voluntary　modes　of　raising　such

contributions；　lotteries　ought　not　to　be　allowed；　because　they

increase　the　number　of　those　who　are　poor；　and　involve　danger　to　the

public　property。　It　may　be　asked　whether　the　relief　of　the　poor

ought　to　be　administered　out　of　current　contributions；　so　that　every

age　should　maintain　its　own　poor；　or　whether　this　were　better　done

by　means　of　permanent　funds　and　charitable　institutions；　such　as

widows'　homes；　hospitals；　etc。？　And　if　the　former　method　is　the

better；　it　may　also　be　considered　whether　the　means　necessary　are　to

be　raised　by　a　legal　assessment　rather　than　by　begging；　which　is

generally　nigh　akin　to　robbing。　The　former　method　must　in　reality　be

regarded　as　the　only　one　that　is　conformable　to　the　right　of　the

state；　which　cannot　withdraw　its　connection　from　any　one　who　has　to

live。　For　a　legal　current　provision　does　not　make　the　profession　of

poverty　a　means　of　gain　for　the　indolent；　as　is　to　be　feared　is　the

case　with　pious　foundations　when　they　grow　with　the　number　of　the

poor；　nor　can　it　be　charged　with　being　an　unjust　or　unrighteous　burden

imposed　by　the　government　on　the　people。

　　2。　The　state　has　also　a　right　to　impose　upon　the　people　the　duty

of　preserving　children　exposed　from　want　or　shame；　and　who　would

otherwise　perish；　for　it　cannot　knowingly　allow　this　increase　of　its

power　to　be　destroyed；　however　unwelcome　in　some　respects　it　may　be。

But　it　is　a　difficult　question　to　determine　how　this　may　most　justly

be　carried　out。　It　might　be　considered　whether　it　would　not　be　right

to　exact　contributions　for　this　purpose　from　the　unmarried　persons

of　both　sexes　who　are　possessed　of　means；　as　being　in　part　responsible

for　the　evil；　and　further；　whether　the　end　in　view　would　be　best

carried　out　by　foundling　hospitals；　or　in　what　other　way　consistent

with　right。　But　this　is　a　problem　of　which　no　solution　has　yet　been

offered　that　does　not　in　some　measure　offend　against　right　or

morality。

　　3。　The　church　is　here　regarded　as　an　ecclesiastical　establishment

merely；　and　as　such　it　must　be　carefully　distinguished　from

religion；　which　as　an　internal　mode　of　feeling　lies　wholly　beyond

the　sphere　of　the　action　of　the　civil　power。　Viewed　as　an

institution　for　public　worship　founded　for　the　people…　to　whose

opinion　or　conviction　it　owes　its　origin…　the　church　establishment

responds　to　a　real　want　in　the　state。　This　is　the　need　felt　by　the

people　to　regard　themselves　as　also　subjects　of　a　Supreme　Invisible

Power　to　which　they　must　pay　homage；　and　which　may　of　be　brought

into　a　very　undesirable　collision　with　the　civil　power。　The　state

has　therefore　a　right　in　this　relation；　but　it　is　not　to　be　regarded

as　the　right　of　constitutional　legislation　in　the　church；　so　as　to

organize　it　as　may　seem　most　advantageous　for　itself；　or　to

prescribe　and　command　its　faith　and　ritual　forms　of　worship　（ritus）；

for　all　this　must　be　left　entirely　to　the　teachers　and　rulers　which

the　church　has　chosen　for　itself。　The　function　of　the　state　in　this

connection；　only　includes　the　negative　right　of　regulating　the

influence　of　these　public　teachers　upon　the　visible　political

commonwealth；　that　it　may　not　be　prejudicial　to　the　public　peace　and

tranquility。　Consequently　the　state　has　to　take　measures；　on

occasion　of　any　internal　conflict　in　the　church；　or　on　occasion　of　any

collision　of　the　several　churches　with　each　other；　that　civil

concord　is　not　endangered；　and　this　right　falls　within　the　province　of

the　police。　It　is　beneath　the　dignity　of　the　supreme　power　to

interpose　in　determining　what　particular　faith　the　church　shall

profess；　or　to　decree　that　a　certain　faith　shall　be　unalterably

held；　and　that　the　church　may　not　reform　itself。　For　in　doing　so；

the　supreme　power　would　be　mixing　itself　up　in　a　scholastic　wrangle；

on　a　footing　of　equality　with　its　subjects；　the　monarch　would　be

making　himself　a　priest；　and　the　churchmen　might　even　reproach　the

supreme　power　with　understanding　nothing　about　matters　of　faith。

Especially　would　this　hold　in　respect　of　any　prohibition　of　internal

reform　in　the　church；　for　what　the　people　as　a　whole　cannot

determine　upon　for　themselves　cannot　be　determined　for　the　people　by

the　legislator。　But　no　people　can　ever　rationally　determine　that

they　will　never　advance　farther　in　their　insight　into　matters　of

faith；　or　resolve　that　they　will　never　reform　the　institutions　of

the　church；　because　this　would　be　opposed　to　the　humanity　in　their　own

persons　and　to　their　highest　rights。　And　therefore　the　supreme　power

cannot　of　itself　resolve　and　decree　in　these　matters　for　the　people。

As　regards　the　cost　of　maintaining　the　ecclesiastical　establishment；

for　similar　reasons　this　must　be　derived　not　from　the　public　funds

of　the　state；　but　from　the　section　of　the　people　who　profess　the

particular　faith　of　the　church；　and　thus　only　ought　it　to　fall　as　a

burden　on　the　community。



　　D。　The　Right　of　Assigning　Offices　and　Dignities　in　the　State。



　　The　right　of　the　supreme　authority　in　the　state　also　includes：

　　1。　The　distribution　of　offices；　as　public　and　paid　employments；

　　2。　The　conferring　of　dignities；　as　unpaid　distinctions　of　rank；

founded　merely　on　honour；　but　establishing　a　gradation　of　higher　and

lower　orders　in　the　political　scale；　the　latter；　although　free　in

themselves；　being　under　obligation　determined　by　the　public　law　to

obey　the　former　so　far　as　they　are　also　entitled　to　command；

　　3。　Besides　these　relatively　beneficent　rights；　the　supreme　power

in　the　state　is　also　invested　with　the　right　of　administering

punishment。

　　As　regards　civil　offices；　the　question　arises　as　to　whether　the

sovereign　has　the　right；　after　bestowing　an　office　on　an　individual；

to　take　it　again　away　at　his　mere　pleasure；　without　any　crime　having

been　committed　by　the　holder　of　the　office。　I　say；　〃No。〃　For　what

the　united　will　of　the　people　would　never　resolve；　regarding　their

civil　officers；　cannot　（constitutionally）　be　determined　by　the

sovereign　regarding　them。　The　people　have　to　bear　the　cost　incurred　by

the　appointment　of　an　official；　and　undoubtedly　it　must　be　their

will　that　any　one　in　office　should　be　completely　competent　for　its

duties。　But　such　competency　can　only　be　acquired　by　a　long　preparation

and　training；　and　this　process　would　necessarily　occupy　the　time

that　would　be　required　for　acquiring　the　means　of　support　by　a

different　occupation。　Arbitrary　and　frequent　changes　would

therefore；　as　a　rule；　have　the　effect　of　filling　offices　with

functionaries　who　have　not　acquired　the　skill　required　for　their

duties；　and　whose　judgements　had　not　attained　maturity　by　practice。

All　this　is　contrary　to　the　purpose　of　the　state。　And　besides　it　is

requisite　in　the　interest　of　the　people　that　it　should　be　possible　for

every　individual　to　rise　from　a　lower　office　to　the　higher　offices；　as

these　latter　would　otherwise　fall　into　incompetent　hands；　and　that

competent　officials　generally　should　have　some　guarantee　of

life…long　provision。

　　Civil　dignities　include　not　only　such　as　are　connected　with　a　public

office；　but　also　those　which　make　the　possessors　of　them；　without

any　accompanying　services　to　the　state；　members　of　a　higher　class　or

rank。　The　latter　constitute　the　nobility；　whose　members　are

distinguished　from　the　common　citizens　who　form　the　mass　of　the

people。　The　rank　of　the　nobility　is　inherited　by　male　descendants；　and

these　again　communicate　it　to　wives　who　are　not　nobly　born。　Female

descendants　of　noble　families；　however；　do　not　communicate　their

rank　to　husbands　who　are　not　of　noble　birth；　but　they　descend

themselves　into　the　common　civil　status　of　the　people。　This　being

so；　the　question　then　emerges　as　to　whether　the　sovereign　has　the

right　to　found　a　hereditary　rank　and　class；　intermediate　between

himself　and　the　other　citizens？　The　import　of　this　question　does　not

turn　on　whether　it　is　conformable　to　the　prudence　of　the　sovereign；

from　regard　to　his　own　and　the　people's　interests；　to　have　such　an

institution；　but　whether　it　is　in　accordance　with　the　right　of　the

people　that　they　should　have　a　class　of　persons　above　them；　who；　while

being　subjects　like　themselves；　are　yet　born　as　their　commanders；　or

at　least　as　privileged　superiors？　The　answer　to　this　question；　as　in

previous　instances；　is　to　be　derived　from　the　principle　that　〃what　the

people；　as　constituting　the　whole　mass　of　the　subjects；　could　not

determine　regarding　themselves　and　their　associated　citizens；　cannot

be　constitutionally　determined　by　the　sovereign　regarding　the　people。〃

Now　a　hereditary　nobility　is　a　rank　which　takes　precedence　of　merit