in the state； being constituted by the relation of one； as king； to
the people； so that there is one only who is the lawgiver。 An
aristocracy； as a form of government； is； however； compounded of the
union of two relations： that of the nobles in relation to one
another as the lawgivers； thereby constituting the sovereignty； and
that of this sovereign power to the people。 A democracy； again； is the
most complex of all the forms of the state； for it has to begin by
uniting the will of all so as to form a people； and then it has to
appoint a sovereign over this common union； which sovereign is no
other than the united will itself。 The consideration of the ways in
which these forms are adulterated by the intrusion of violent and
illegitimate usurpers of power； as in oligarchy and ochlocracy； as
well as the discussion of the so called mixed constitutions； may be
passed over here as not essential； and as leading into too much
detail。
As regards the administration of right in the state； it may be
said that the simplest mode is also the best； but as regards its
bearing on right itself； it is also the most dangerous for the people；
in view of the despotism to which simplicity of administration so
naturally gives rise。 It is undoubtedly a rational maxim to aim at
simplification in the machinery which is to unite the people under
compulsory laws； and this would be secured were all the people to be
passive and to obey only one person over them； but the method would
not give subjects who were also citizens of the state。 It is sometimes
said that the people should be satisfied with the reflection that
monarchy； regarded as an autocracy； is the best political
constitution； if the monarch is good； that is； if be has the judgement
as well as the will to do right。 But this is a mere evasion and
belongs to the common class of wise tautological phrases。 It only
amounts to saying that 〃the best constitution is that by which the
supreme administrator of the state is made the best ruler〃； that is；
that the best constitution is the best！
52。 Historical Origin and Changes。
A Pure Republic。 Representative Government。
It is vain to inquire into the historical origin of the political
mechanism； for it is no longer possible to discover historically the
point of time at which civil society took its beginning。 Savages do
not draw up a documentary record of their having submitted
themselves to law； and it may be inferred from the nature of
uncivilized men that they must have set out from a state of
violence。 To prosecute such an inquiry in the intention of finding a
pretext for altering the existing constitution by violence is no
less than penal。 For such a mode of alteration would amount to
revolution； that could only be carried out by an insurrection of the
people； and
not by constitutional modes of legislation。 But insurrection against
an already existing constitution； is an overthrow of all civil and
juridical relations； and of right generally； and hence it is not a
mere alteration of the civil constitution； but a dissolution of it。 It
would thus form a mode of transition to a better constitution by
palingenesis and not by mere metamorphosis； and it would require a new
social contract； upon which the former original contract； as then
annulled； would have no influence。
It must； however； be possible for the sovereign to change the
existing constitution； if it is not actually consistent with the
idea of the original contract。 In doing so it is essential to give
existence to that form of government which will properly constitute
the people into a state。 Such a change cannot be made by the state
deliberately altering its constitution from one of the three forms
to one of the other two。 For example； political changes should not
be carried out by the aristocrats combining to subject themselves to
an autocracy； or resolving to fuse all into a democracy； or
conversely； as if it depended on the arbitrary choice and liking of
the sovereign what constitution he may impose on the people。 For； even
if as sovereign he resolved to alter the constitution into a
democracy； he might be doing wrong to the people； because they might
hold such a constitution in abhorrence； and regard either of the other
two as more suitable to them in the circumstances。
The forms of the state are only the letter （littera） of the original
constitution in the civil union； and they may therefore remain so long
as they are considered； from ancient and long habit （and therefore
only subjectively）； to be necessary to the machinery of the
political constitution。 But the spirit of that original contract
（anima pacti originarii） contains and imposes the obligation on the
constituting power to make the mode of the government conformable to
its idea； and； if this cannot be effected at once； to change it
gradually and continuously till it harmonize in its working with the
only rightful constitution； which is that of a pure republic。 Thus the
old empirical and statutory forms； which serve only to effect the
political subjection of the people； will be resolved into the original
and rational forms which alone take freedom as their principle； and
even as the condition of all compulsion and constraint。 Compulsion
is in fact requisite for the realization of a juridical
constitution； according to the proper idea of the state； and it will
lead at last to the realization of that idea； even according to the
letter。 This is the only enduring political constitution； as in it the
law is itself sovereign； and is no longer attached to a particular
person。 This is the ultimate end of all public right； and the state in
which every citizen can have what is his own peremptorily assigned
to him。 But so long as the form of the state has to be represented；
according to the letter； by many different moral persons invested with
the supreme power； there can only be a provisory internal right； and
not an absolutely juridical state of civil society。
Every true republic is and can only be constituted by a
representative system of the people。 Such a representative system is
instituted in name of the people； and is constituted by all the
citizens being united together； in order； by means of their
deputies； to protect and secure their rights。 But as soon as a supreme
head of the state in person… be it as king； or nobility； or the
whole body of the people in a democratic union… becomes also
representative； the united people then does not merely represent the
sovereignty； but they are themselves sovereign。 It is in the people
that the supreme power originally resides； and it is accordingly
from this power that all the rights of individual citizens as mere
subjects； and especially as officials of the state； must be derived。
When the sovereignty of the people themselves is thus realized； the
republic is established； and it is no longer necessary to give up
the reins of government into the hands of those by whom they have been
hitherto held； especially as they might again destroy all the new
institutions by their arbitrary and absolute will。
It was therefore a great error in judgement on the part of a
powerful ruler in our time； when he tried to extricate himself from
the embarrassment arising from great public debts； by transferring
this burden to the people； and leaving them to undertake and
distribute them among themselves as they might best think fit。 It thus
became natural that the legislative power； not only in respect of
the taxation of the subjects； but in respect of the government； should
come into the hands of the people。 It was requisite that they should
be able to prevent the incurring of new debts by extravagance or
war； and in consequence； the supreme power of the monarch entirely
disappeared； not by being merely suspended； but by passing over in
fact to the people； to whose legislative will the property of every
subject thus became subjected。 Nor can it be said that a tacit and yet
obligatory promise must be assumed as having； under such
circumstances； been given by the national assembly； not to
constitute themselves into a sovereignty； but only to administer the
affairs of the sovereign for the time； and after this was done to
deliver the reins of the government again into the monarch's hands。
Such a supposed contract would be null and void。 The right of the
supreme legislation in the commonwealth is not an alienable right； but
is the most personal of all rights。 Whoever possesses it can only
dispose by the collective will of the people； in respect of the
people； he cannot dispose in respect of the collective will itself；
which is the ultimate foundation of all public contracts。 A
contract； by which the people would be bound to give back their
authority again； would not be consistent with their position as a
legislative power； and yet it would be made binding upon the people；
which； on t