d it is only collaterally。 Moreover； although it is censured； it is not abolished； its moral force may be diminished； but its cogency is by no means suspended； and its final destruction can only be accomplished by the reiterated attacks of judicial functionaries。 It will readily be understood that by connecting the censorship of the laws with the private interests of members of the community； and by intimately uniting the prosecution of the law with the prosecution of an individual； legislation is protected from wanton assailants； and from the daily aggressions of party spirit。 The errors of the legislator are exposed whenever their evil consequences are most felt； and it is always a positive and appreciable fact which serves as the basis of a prosecution。
I am inclined to believe this practice of the American courts to be at once the most favorable to liberty as well as to public order。 If the judge could only attack the legislator openly and directly； he would sometimes be afraid to oppose any resistance to his will； and at other moments party spirit might encourage him to brave it at every turn。 The laws would consequently be attacked when the power from which they emanate is weak； and obeyed when it is strong。 That is to say； when it would be useful to respect them they would be contested； and when it would be easy to convert them into an instrument of oppression they would be respected。 But the American judge is brought into the political arena independently of his own will。 He only judges the law because he is obliged to judge a case。 The political question which he is called upon to resolve is connected with the interest of the suitors； and he cannot refuse to decide it without abdicating the duties of his post。 He performs his functions as a citizen by fulfilling the precise duties which belong to his profession as a magistrate。 It is true that upon this system the judicial censorship which is exercised by the courts of justice over the legislation cannot extend to all laws indiscriminately； inasmuch as some of them can never give rise to that exact species of contestation which is termed a lawsuit； and even when such a contestation is possible； it may happen that no one cares to bring it before a court of justice。 The Americans have often felt this disadvantage； but they have left the remedy incomplete； lest they should give it an efficacy which might in some cases prove dangerous。 Within these limits the power vested in the American courts of justice of pronouncing a statute to be unconstitutional forms one of the most powerful barriers which has ever been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies。
Other Powers Granted To American Judges
The United States all the citizens have the right of indicting public functionaries before the ordinary tribunals … How they use this right … Art。 75 of the French Constitution of the An VIII … The Americans and the English cannot understand the purport of this clause。
It is perfectly natural that in a free country like America all the citizens should have the right of indicting public functionaries before the ordinary tribunals； and that all the judges should have the power of punishing public offences。 The right granted to the courts of justice of judging the agents of the executive government； when they have violated the laws； is so natural a one that it cannot be looked upon as an extraordinary privilege。 Nor do the springs of government appear to me to be weakened in the United States by the custom which renders all public officers responsible to the judges of the land。 The Americans seem； on the contrary； to have increased by this means that respect which is due to the authorities； and at the same time to have rendered those who are in power more scrupulous of offending public opinion。 I was struck by the small number of political trials which occur in the United States； but I had no difficulty in accounting for this circumstance。 A lawsuit； of whatever nature it may be； is always a difficult and expensive undertaking。 It is easy to attack a public man in a journal； but the motives which can warrant an action at law must be serious。 A solid ground of complaint must therefore exist to induce an individual to prosecute a public officer； and public officers are careful not to furnish these grounds of complaint when they are afraid of being prosecuted。
This does not depend upon the republican form of American institutions； for the same facts present themselves in England。 These two nations do not regard the impeachment of the principal officers of State as a sufficient guarantee of their independence。 But they hold that the right of minor prosecutions； which are within the reach of the whole community； is a better pledge of freedom than those great judicial actions which are rarely employed until it is too late。
In the Middle Ages； when it was very difficult to overtake offenders； the judges inflicted the most dreadful tortures on the few who were arrested； which by no means diminished the number of crimes。 It has since been discovered that when justice is more certain and more mild； it is at the same time more efficacious。 The English and the Americans hold that tyranny and oppression are to be treated like any other crime； by lessening the penalty and facilitating conviction。
In the year VIII of the French Republic a constitution was drawn up in which the following clause was introduced： 〃Art。 75。 All the agents of the government below the rank of ministers can only be prosecuted for offences relating to their several functions by virtue of a decree of the Conseil d'Etat； in which the case the prosecution takes place before the ordinary tribunals。〃 This clause survived the 〃Constitution de l'An VIII；〃 and it is still maintained in spite of the just complaints of the nation。 I have always found the utmost difficulty in explaining its meaning to Englishmen or Americans。 They were at once led to conclude that the Conseil d'Etat in France was a great tribunal； established in the centre of the kingdom； which exercised a preliminary and somewhat tyrannical jurisdiction in all political causes。 But when I told them that the Conseil d'Etat was not a judicial body； in the common sense of the term； but an administrative council composed of men dependent on the Crown； so that the king； after having ordered one of his servants； called a Prefect； to commit an injustice； has the power of commanding another of his servants； called a Councillor of State； to prevent the former from being punished； when I demonstrated to them that the citizen who has been injured by the order of the sovereign is obliged to solicit from the sovereign permission to obtain redress； they refused to credit so flagrant an abuse； and were tempted to accuse me of falsehood or of ignorance。 It frequently happened before the Revolution that a Parliament issued a warrant against a public officer who had committed an offence； and sometimes the proceedings were stopped by the authority of the Crown； which enforced compliance with its absolute and despotic will。 It is painful to perceive how much lower we are sunk than our forefathers； since we allow things to pass under the color of justice and the sanction of the law which violence alone could impose upon them。
Chapter VII： Political Jurisdiction In The United States
Chapter Summary
Definition of political jurisdiction … What is understood by political jurisdiction in France； in England； and in the United States … In America the political judge can only pass sentence on public officers … He more frequently passes a sentence of removal from office than a penalty … Political jurisdiction as it exists in the United States is； notwithstanding its mildness； and perhaps in consequence of that mildness； a most powerful instrument in the hands of the majority。
Political Jurisdiction In The United States
I understand； by political jurisdiction； that temporary right of pronouncing a legal decision with which a political body may be invested。
In absolute governments no utility can accrue from the introduction of extraordinary forms of procedure； the prince in whose name an offender is prosecuted is as much the sovereign of the courts of justice as of everything else； and the idea which is entertained of his power is of itself a sufficient security。 The only thing he has to fear is； that the external formalities of justice should be neglected； and that his authority should be dishonored from a wish to render it more absolute。 But in most free countries； in which the majority can never exercise the same influence upon the tribunals as an absolute monarch； the judicial power has occasionally been vested for a time in the representatives of the nation。 It has been thought better to introduce a temporary confusion between the functions of the different authorities than to violate the necessary principle of the unity of government。
England； France； and the United States have established this political jurisdiction by law； and it is curious to examine the different adaptations which these three great nations have made of the principle。 In England and in France the House of Lords and the Chambre des Paris *a constitute